At first glance, it looks as if the time frame for Iran to build a nuclear weapon in the new NIE is the same as the one in the 2005 NIE. But I think the new estimate might actually suggest that the time frame is slightly longer.

One the last page of the “current NIE,”:http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf there’s a chart comparing the two estimates. The last row discusses the date by when Tehran could produce enough HEU for a nuke. On this point, the two estimates are essentially the same. The 2005 NIE says that Iran could do it “by the end of this decade”; the 2007 NIE says that “the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a weapon is late 2009.”

But the row above that is more interesting. It shows that, according to the 2005 NIE, the IC judged it “unlikely” that Iran would “make a *nuclear weapon*… before early-to-mid next decade.” The corresponding box for the 2007 NIE, however, says that “the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of *producing enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a weapon* is late 2009…”.

After noting that this date is “very unlikely,” the chart explains that

bq. We judge with moderate confidence Iran probably would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon
*sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame. (INR judges that Iran is unlikely to achieve this capability before 2013 because of foreseeable technical and programmatic problems.)*

That row is the only one that talks about weaponization. And only for the 2005 NIE. As we all know, there’s a distinction between these two things.

It’s a bit hard to compare these two estimates, but it _looks like_ the new one is positing a slightly longer time frame to a weapon than the previous estimate – it’s now early-to-mid next decade for Iran to acquire enough HEU for a weapon, as opposed to developing the actual weapon.

In addition to the lack of a weaponization date in the 2007 NIE, it’s hard to compare the two estimates because the 2005 NIE doesn’t compare the likelihood of different timeframes for weapons development. It’s possible that the 2005 estimate was a worst-case scenario and the time by which Tehran was _likely_ to have a nuke was later.

p=. *Covert Enrichment*

In any case, we should pay attention to the fact that the 2007 NIE is assessing the dates by which Iran could be capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon. However, the NIE says that

bq. We assess with moderate confidence that *Iran probably would use covert facilities*— rather than its declared nuclear sites—*for the production of highly enriched uranium for a weapon.*

I agree with this assessment…I find the notion that Iran would pull out of the NPT to be very unlikely, though I wouldn’t rule it out. If Tehran were to go this route, it would (for obvious reasons) take considerably more time to produce the relevant fissile material.

In other news, I was remiss before in failing to point out that Carah Ong has several good posts on the issue at “her place.”:http://irannuclearwatch.blogspot.com/

It’s never the evidence, is it?

bq. Bolton: Well, I think it’s potentially wrong, but I would also say, *many of the people who wrote this are former State Dept employees who during their career at the State Dept never gave much attention to the threat of the Iranian program. Now they are writing as (fingers quote) ‘members of the intelligence community’ the same opinions that they’ve had four and five years ago.*

Five years ago was 2002. But, you know, details…

[via “C&L”:http://www.crooksandliars.com/2007/12/04/bolton-not-swayed-in-the-slightest-by-the-nie-on-iran/ ]

As you all know, the “public version of the Iran NIE”:http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf came out yesterday. PDDNI Kerr’s statement is “here.”:http://dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_statement.pdf You can read S Hadley’s statement “here”:http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/12/20071203-5.html and a transcript of his press briefing yesterday “here.”:http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/12/20071203-10.html

Kerr explained that the NIE was made public because

bq. The Intelligence Community is on the record publicly with numerous statements based on our 2005 assessment on Iran. Since our understanding of Iran’s capabilities has changed, we felt it was important to release this information to ensure that an accurate presentation is available.

I wish they’d now declassify the 2005 NIE. And more than 4 pages of this one, for that matter. Especially because it covers a bunch of topics in which I am interested:

This Estimate focuses on the following key questions:

• What are Iran’s intentions toward developing nuclear weapons?

• What domestic factors affect Iran’s decisionmaking on whether to develop nuclear weapons?

• What external factors affect Iran’s decisionmaking on whether to develop nuclear weapons?

• What is the range of potential Iranian actions concerning the development of nuclear weapons, and the decisive factors that would lead Iran to choose one course of action over
another?

• What is Iran’s current and projected capability to develop nuclear weapons? What are our key assumptions, and Iran’s key chokepoints/vulnerabilities?

Anyway, the below part of the NIE has received the most attention:

bq. *We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program;* we also assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. We judge with high confidence that *the halt,* and Tehran’s announcement of its decision to suspend its declared uranium enrichment program and sign an Additional Protocol to its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement, *was directed primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran’s previously undeclared nuclear work.*

I actually made this same argument about a year ago in a “BAS article.”:http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/747720r27638k367/fulltext.pdf I also argued that

bq. …the very fact that Iran has previously offered several concessions, as well as curtailed some nuclear activities, should signal to the international community that Tehran has not necessarily committed itself to building nuclear weapons — and that there are those within the regime who are reluctant to risk political and economic isolation.

Nyah-nyah.

But it wasn’t just me…people like the “_ACW_”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1722/ic-iran-stopped-nuke-program-in-fall-2003 and “G Perkovich”:http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=19747&prog=zgp&proj=zme,znpp also told you so.

I’ll have a bit more to say about the NIE, but I wanted to get this info up and be obnoxious.

Lastly, I apologize to my 5 or so readers for how ass-tacular this blog has been in recent months. I assure you that my time has been -utterly wasted- well-spent on other stuff.