Steve Aftergood has the “unclassed exec.summary”:http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2007/10/jason_on_the_reliable_replacem.html of the JASON RRW study. As far as I know, the _Post’s_ Walter Pincus was the first to “report”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/29/AR2007092901569_pf.html on it. Jon Fox from GSN also has a “good article”:http://18.104.22.168/d_newswire/issues/2007_10_1.html#8216110E on the report.
Bottom line seems to be that the idea of “certifying a new warhead w/o testing” is still in the “not gonna happen” category, at least for now.
It is worth noting that former NNSA head Linton Brooks “said”:http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/index.cfm?fa=eventDetail&id=1019&&prog=zgp&proj=znpp at the CEIP conference a few months back that the RRW
bq. *will put the final nail in the coffin of nuclear testing* because in the next term when we take a serious look at the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the technical argument against ratification will be taken away by a concept that drives any question of the need to test for future problems out.