Robert Kadlec tells a story about plans to manage to evacuate BW victims from the Korean Peninsula:

More from this interview:

In this interview, Robert Kadlec made some comments about states with CBW programs:

From a recent BBC piece:

“On three occasions I questioned [former MI-6 head] Richard Dearlove about the provenance of this intelligence,” says the then foreign secretary, Jack Straw. “I just had an uneasy feeling about it. But Dearlove assured me on each occasion that these agents were reliable.” However, Mr Straw says that it is ultimately for politicians to take responsibility, because they make the final decisions.

Asked if he looks back on Iraq as an intelligence failure, Sir Richard’s answer is simple: “No.” He still believes Iraq had some kind of weapons programme and that elements may have been moved over the border to Syria. 

Maleeha Lodhi, former Pakistani ambassador to the UN, wrote an article in which she recounted this story:

It was then that Senator Hank Brown informed me — as mentioned in the book — that he intended to move an amendment to the Pressler legislation to lift the ban on economic assistance to Pakistan and release all embargoed military equipment including the F-16s. Between then and the success of the Brown Amendment, for which the Pakistan Embassy lobbied hard, the Clinton administration tried to secure a unilateral nuclear concession from Pakistan in return for supporting the amendment.

Pakistan refused, including the proposal to “cap” its nuclear weapons programme in exchange for release of the F-16s. I was present in meetings during the visit of army chief Gen Waheed Kakar to Washington when he flatly told the Americans that as “Pakistan’s national security was non-negotiable” they could keep the planes. In the end, the Brown Amendment was adopted, economic sanctions lifted and military equipment worth $368 million was released except the F-16s

I previously heard about this as a possible option:

The United Kingdom and United States intend to provide Australia with nuclear material in complete, welded power units that will not require refueling during their lifetime;

Here‘s a letter to the IAEA from Australian Foreign Minister about the AUKUS submarine project. Relevant excerpt below:

Here it is:

Crises between India and Pakistan are of particular concern because of the risk of an escalatory cycle between two nuclear-armed states. New Delhi and Islamabad probably are inclined to reinforce the current calm in their relationship following both sides’ renewal of a cease-fire along the Line of Control in early2021. However, Pakistan has a long history of supporting anti-India militant groups, and under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India is more likely than in the past to respond with military force to perceived or real Pakistani provocations. Each side’s perception of heightened tensions raises the risk of conflict, with violent unrest in Kashmir or a militant attack in India being potential flashpoints.

Pakistan’s latest on last year’s Brahmos launch:

Despite the lapse of one year, the Government of India has not acceded to Pakistan’s demand of a joint probein order to accurately establish the facts surrounding this serious incident. India has also not shared findings of its internal inquiry with Pakistan. Its unilateral and hasty closure of the so-called internal inquiry have raised serious questions on the command and control systems in place in India for its strategic weapons.

Pakistan reiterates its demand for joint probe into this irresponsible incident. We also expect satisfactory response to and clarification of several fundamental questions regarding security protocols and technical safeguards against accidental or unauthorized launch of missiles in a nuclearized environment.

From a recent review of Espionage of the Century by Zahid Said, former Counselor in Pakistan’s Netherlands embassy:

Dr Khan requested Ambassador Zahid to send some documents and other material through diplomatic bag to Islamabad as PAEC Chairman Dr Munir had requested for them. After some reluctance, Zahid Said agreed to receive the huge cache of papers and metal parts of the centrifuge to be shifted to Pakistan unchecked and unnoticed by the local authorities through a diplomatic channel.

In the hair-raising details of the events and challenges that followed the writer brings the material from Dr Khan’s residence to his official building where they lay in the garage for a few days. It was a grave risk and even a minute leakage was sufficient to sabotage the diplomatic ties with The Netherlands. According to the writer, when he informed his boss Agha Shahi, the then Secretary Foreign Affairs about his decision to help Dr Khan [which was in fact a help to his nation and country] he was livid to know how a junior officer of the Pakistani mission could dare act on his own without taking the Foreign Office into confidence. Zahid Said was thus directed to dump the material on some coast of the sea. However, he decided to do the opposite and handed the material to another Pakistani diplomat safely.