India recently tested an SLBM:

INS Arihant carried out a successful launch of a Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) on October 14, 2022. The missile was tested to a predetermined range and impacted the target area in the Bay of Bengal with very high accuracy. All operational and technological parameters of the weapon system have been validated.

The successful user training launch of the SLBM by INS Arihant is significant to prove crew competency and validate the SSBN programme, a key element of India’s nuclear deterrence capability. A robust, survivable and assured retaliatory capability is in keeping with India’s policy to have ‘Credible Minimum Deterrence‘ that underpins its ‘No First Use’ commitment.

I’m sure someone’s mentioned it, but XX published this FR notice in 2015 which notes that the End-User Review Committee

determined that the National University of Defense Technology (NUDT), the National Supercomputing Center in Changsha (NSCC-CS), National Supercomputing Center in Guangzhou (NSCC-GZ), and the National Supercomputing Center in Tianjin (NSCC-TJ), all located in the People’s Republic of China, meet the guidelines listed under § 744.11(b): Entities for which there is reasonable cause to believe, based on specific and articulated facts, that an entity has been involved, is involved, or poses a significant risk of being or becoming involved in activities that are contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States and those acting on behalf of such entities may be added to the Entity List pursuant to this section. Specifically, NUDT has used U.S.-origin multicores, boards, and (co)processors to produce the TianHe-1A and TianHe-2 supercomputers located at the National Supercomputing Centers in Changsha, Guangzhou, and Tianjin. The TianHe-1A and TianHe-2 supercomputers are believed to be used in nuclear explosive activities as described in § 744.2(a) of the EAR.

In this report, titled Report No. 27 (2007–2008) to the Storting Disarmament and Non-proliferation, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry stated that

The future of the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), which prohibits the US and Russia from possessing ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5500 kilometres, is also uncertain, because Russia has expressed doubt as to whether the treaty still serves the country’s security interests.

This 1988 CIA report has a useful section on nuclear diagnostic equipment:

More from this August document:

A) Status and reduction of nuclear arsenals and forces 

1) Reduction of the size of French deterrent forces 

(a) In keeping with the principle of strict sufficiency, France maintains its arsenal at the lowest level possible in the light of the strategic context and the foreseeable evolution of the threat. French nuclear forces are currently divided into two complementary components: 

• Seaborne component. Four nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, based at Île Longue and equipped with M51 intercontinental ballistic missiles, provide continuous at-sea deterrence. 

• Airborne component. This comprises Rafale aircraft carrying improved medium-range air-to-surface missiles that could be operated from French soil by the air and space force or, depending on the circumstances, from the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier by the navy. 

The President of the Republic has decided to renovate these two components, which will allow the permanence, credibility and strict sufficiency of the French nuclear deterrent forces to be maintained. 

As stated by the President on 7 February 2020, France has a total of fewer than 300 nuclear warheads. It has no weapons in reserve. 

Ambassador Munir Akram argued in this September 26 speech that

it is essential to recognize and address the key motivations that drive States to possess nuclear weapons. These include (i) nuclear and conventional threats from larger military forces; (ii) the existence of disputes and the failure of the UN to implement its own resolutions to resolve suchdisputes; (iii) the failure of the UN’s collective security system to deter aggression, foreign intervention and the unilateral use of force; and (iv) discrimination in the application of international norms for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.

From this interview:

QUESTION: IS PAKISTAN PREPARED TO GO AHEAD WITH A NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM IF THE NEED ARISES?

Answer:

Pakistan has no plans to develop nuclear weapons and we don’t think that a need will arise in the foreseeable future

In his book, W Burns included this anecdote, which I had never heard:

Pakistan remained a neuralgic topic; despite the president’s best efforts with Singh, and my own quiet conversations with Shivshankar Menon, the prime minister’s national security advisor, the Indians had no interest in opening up much with us about their relations with the Pakistanis. Active back-channel talks between them had nearly brought about a breakthrough over Kashmir and other disputes in the spring of 2007, but the collapsing political position of Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf had brought them to an abrupt halt, and they had made no more than fitful progress since then. We were increasingly worried about the risks of nuclear confrontation, but the Indians were not much interested in talking about their perceptions or how to avoid escalation, let alone any American mediation role.

About 2 weeks ago, Canada submitted this document to the recent BWC states-parties consultative meeting which contains a story which I’d never heard:

In August 2008, Canadian and Kyrgyz officials signed a legally-binding bilateral Agreement to cover construction of the new laboratory; the Treaty entered into force on 8 April 2009. The Treaty made clear that the new Facility was to be fully owned and operated by the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic after its completion. A copy of the Treaty (which was concluded in English, French, Kyrgyz and Russian) was made public at the time and is available on the Government of Canada website.

<snip>

In early 2011, as the $50 million contract for construction of the facility was being finalized, the project became the target of an aggressive, sustained and completely unfounded disinformation campaign. The campaign was led by a relatively small group of protestors, who Canada assessed to have ulterior motives and to be supported and encouraged by external backers.

As a direct result of the disinformation campaign, which created intense pressure for the Kyrgyz Government, just days before construction of the new Facility was set to commence the Kyrgyz Government advised Canada that the laboratory could not be built at the agreed site. As the Facility was designed for construction on this specific plot of land – taking into account unique seismic, topographical, geological, environmental and hydrological conditions – Canada concluded that it could not be built elsewhere without substantial, lengthy and very costly modifications. As a result, in September 2011 Canada informed the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic that it was no longer in a position to move forward with the laboratory Project.

From this article:

The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission started operation of the first nuclear power plant of the country at Karachi in 1971. The Indian nuclear explosion in 1974 forced the PAEC authorities to strengthen its efforts for indigenous manufacture of spare parts, components and equipment. Scientific and Engineering Services Directorate (SES) was established at Islamabad in 1984 with a mandate to establish infrastructure facilities in design and engineering, fabrication and welding, machining, testing, quality assurance and control, and non-destructive testing to gear up the indigenous manufacturing of mechanical equipment and parts.