In honor of this “fine post from James”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2198/safeguards-in-iran-and-elsewhere, here’s the Adage of the Week.
Wait. it’s “the same as last week’s”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1857/adage-of-the-week.
I’ve long thought that Iran may try use its influence over Iraq to extract concessions on its nuclear program. But a “BBC report”:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7901101.stm has UN ambassador Sir John Sawers saying that Iran tried to do exactly that before restarting uranium conversion:
“There were various Iranians who would come to London and suggest we had tea in some hotel or other. They’d do the same in Paris, they’d do the same in Berlin, and then we’d compare notes among the three of us,” he told the BBC.
“The Iranians wanted to be able to strike a deal whereby they stopped killing our forces in Iraq in return for them being allowed to carry on with their nuclear programme: *’We stop killing you in Iraq, stop undermining the political process there, you allow us to carry on with our nuclear programme without let or hindrance.’*
Also interesting is this admission from Nicholas Burns:
bq. “We had advocated regime change,” said Mr Burns. “We had a very threatening posture towards Iran for a number of years. It didn’t produce any movement whatsoever.”
The admission is obviously what is of interest, not the information.
A friendly back-and-forth can be found in the comments section of “this post.”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2192/iran-and-syria-reports
After ISIS contended that they had posted the reports first, Jeffrey responded as follows:
Your email to my inbox is time-stamped 10:44 am.
The time stamp on my post is 10:28.
The impressive feat, of course, is that you have actually read the report, which I cannot claim even at 4:20 pm.
“ISIS”:http://www.isisnucleariran.org/assets/pdf/IAEA_Report_Iran_Feb_2009.pdf and the “Wonk”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2192/iran-and-syria-reports have the latest IAEA reports about Iran and Syria. ISIS also has some “analysis”:http://www.isisnucleariran.org/assets/pdf/IAEA_Report_Analysis.pdf of the Iran report.
So what’s the status of the fresh fuel stored at Yongbyon, and the “process lines”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1865/more-than-you-wanted-to-know-about-magnox to make more? For that, we have SIGINT.
From “Dr. Sigfried (Sig) Hecker’s account of a February 2008 visit”:http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2008_rpt/dprk.pdf:
They have in storage less than a quarter of a reactor load of clad fuel rods. They also have in storage a full load of bare uranium fuel rods (our best estimate is 12,000) for the 50 MWe reactor. It appears that these can be used for the 5 MWe reactor, but may require some machining, and would have to be clad with magnesium alloy cladding. These operations would require the reconstitution of parts of the fuel fabrication facility, including the machine shop. Such actions would most likely take close to 1 year.
[snip]
Fuel Fabrication Facility. The front end of fuel fabrication (Building 1) had been operating making uranium dioxide (UO2) from uranium ore concentrate right up to the time the facility was shut down on July 15, 2007. The back end was operational with seven conversion furnaces, two casting furnaces, and eight machining lathes. However, the middle part, the fluorination facility, had deteriorated so badly during the freeze (1994 to 2003) that the building has been abandoned (as we were shown in August 2007). However, the DPRK had recently completed alternate fluorination equipment (using dry rather than wet techniques) in one of the ancillary buildings. However, this was a makeshift operation that has limited throughput potential. It was not put into full operation by the time of the shutdown on July 15.
The disablement steps taken at the fuel fabrication facility focused on those buildings and equipment that were in reasonable working order. The removal of the three uranium dissolver tanks and the disassembly of the seven conversion furnaces (with thousands of refractory bricks) are serious disablement steps. The removal of the casting furnaces and the machining lathes also constitute significant steps. The DPRK has not been willing to take steps to render the fresh fuel in storage not usable for a reactor restart. These fuel rods could be bent, making it necessary to recast and remanufacture the rods to precise tolerances. Or, since the uranium metal content is substantial (close to 100 metric tons of natural uranium metal), the fresh fuel rods could be sold to one of the five parties, which could use the uranium as feed material for light-water reactor fuel. DPRK officials say that they await additional corresponding measures by the United States before they are willing to take actions on the fresh fuel rods. If the fresh fuel rods are bent, the DPRK would have to recast and remachine, which would add several months to a restart time. If the fresh fuel were sold, then the DPRK would have to restart the entire fuel fabrication facility and produce new uranium metal, which would add approximately a year to a restart time.
There are some “pictures”:http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/5220/gallery/, too.
It’s been reported that “Hecker and colleagues may visit Yongbyon again soon”:http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20090209_4835.php.
Oh yeah. I almost forgot about the “musical bonus”:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SmwlzwGMMwc. Silly me.
Paul “raises a really important point”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1863/north-korea-heuwhat-about-the-uf6 about North Korea’s uranium conversion capabilities. It’s a timely subject, too.
The fuel fabrication complex at Yongbyon is reported to involve a series of process lines for uranium conversion. Uranium ore concentrate (i.e., yellowcake) is converted to UO3, which is converted to UO2, which is converted to green salt (UF4), which is then converted to metal to produce Magnox fuel rods. (“Have a look”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2179/nork-fuel-rod.)
The metallic fuel is natural (unenriched) uranium, which is cast into cylindrical shapes, machined smooth, and placed inside “cans” made of a magnesium alloy. “Here’s how the last conversion step is done in the UK”:http://www.westinghousenuclear.com/Products_&_Services/docs/flysheets/NF-FE-0010.pdf:
Uranium tetrafluoride (UF4) is converted to uranium metal for Magnox fuel by mixing it with magnesium metal. When heated in a furnace to 600oC, the UF4 and magnesium react together. Uranium melts and flows into a catchpot at the bottom of the furnace and a layer of fluoride slag forms on the top. After cooling, the billet of uranium is separated from the slag, remelted, and cast into rods.
And that’s why Yongbyon doesn’t have a UF6 process line (that anyone knows about). Now you know.
Now, as far as anyone knows, the only place this process has taken place in recent years, besides Yongbyon, is the “Springfields”:http://www.westinghousenuclear.com/Businesses/nuclear_fuel/springfields_site.shtm facility in Preston, Lancashire, England.
This is a timely subject because the IAEA’s latest report on Syria, “GOV/2009/6”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/file_download/159/Syria.pdf, mainly concerns the uranium traces found at the suspect site in the wadi at al-Kibar (AKA Dair Alzour), which appears for all the world to have been a Yongbyon-style Magnox reactor. It says that
analysis of the environmental samples taken from the Dair Alzour site revealed a significant number of anthropogenic natural uranium particles (i.e. produced as a result of chemical processing)…
Now, perhaps these particles weren’t traces of Magnox fuel or one of the related compounds mentioned above. But if they were from Magnox fuel, there are only three possible sources I can think of:
Now consider the following excerpt from the IAEA’s Syria report of November 2008, “GOV/2008/60”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/file_download/142/gov2008-60.pdf:
14. Satellite imagery and other information available to the Agency concerning installations at the three other locations in Syria referred to above suggest that those locations may be of relevance to the activities at the Dair Alzour site. As indicated above, the Agency requested access to the three locations on 2 May 2008. Analysis of satellite imagery taken of these locations indicates that landscaping activities and the removal of large containers took place shortly after the Agency’s request for access. While these activities may be unrelated to the Dair Alzour site, it would be helpful if Syria were to provide an explanation for these activities and to permit the Agency to visit the three locations.
Unfortunately, these three locations are mentioned only glancingly in GOV/2009/6. It doesn’t sound as if access has been granted, or will be anytime soon. And as for those “large containers,” what was in them and where they went is anybody’s guess.
Congratulations. You made it to the “musical bonus”:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K18p1tDHtxI&feature=related.
Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair testified before the SSCI on 12 February about, among other topics, Iran’s nuclear program. He stated that, in essence, the 2007 NIE is still operative:
bq. The assessment that was in our 2007 National Intelligence Estimate about Iran’s nuclear weapons programs are _generally_ still valid today. Tehran, at a minimum, is keeping open the option to develop deliverable nuclear weapons. The halt in the recent past in _some aspects_ of the program was primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure. [Emphasis added].
I’m not sure what, if anything, the italicized portions mean, but I thought it’d be useful to highlight them.
More interesting, however, is a statement that Blair made later during the hearing. To me, it may be in tension with the language cited above.
Blair said
bq. Iran is clearly developing all the components of a deliverable nuclear weapons program — fissionable material, nuclear _weaponizing capability_ and the means to deliver it. Whether they take it all the way to nuclear weapons and become a nuclear power I think will depend on — it will depend a great deal on their own internal decisions. [Emphasis added].
Since the “2007 NIE”:http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf stated that “Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program,” the definition of which included “nuclear weapon design and weaponization work,” one can’t be blamed for wondering what Blair was talking about.
Just to add to Josh’s “post”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1862/nk-heu-plant, I have been wondering if any better evidence has come to light that North Korea is capable of producing UF6. I haven’t been following North Korea as closely as I used to, but I “once wrote”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_03/NA_NorthKorea that:
North Korea has indigenous supplies of natural uranium, but *whether it can produce uranium hexafluoride is unclear.* A former State Department official familiar with North Korea’s nuclear programs told Arms Control Today Feb. 22 that, as of October 2002, *there was no evidence that North Korea possessed a facility for producing uranium hexafluoride.* North Korea does have a facility for producing uranium tetrafluoride, a uranium compound that is then converted to uranium hexafluoride, that was frozen under the Agreed Framework, the official said.
However, Gary Samore, who headed nonproliferation efforts for the White House during the Clinton administration, said *North Korea could “probably start making hex [uranium hexafluoride] fairly quickly,” Nuclear Fuel reported in September 2003.*
I wish people would focus on uranium conversion more when they talk about uranium enrichment. Without feedstock, a centrifuge facility can’t enrich a damn thing.
According to the South Korean newspaper Dong-a Ilbo, North Korea has a secret underground uranium enrichment facility, right there at the Yongbyon nuclear complex. The heavily scrutinized Yongbyon nuclear complex. The story is summarized “here”:http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iUMkh8pqycilFWddJSqYHe0psvcg.
Seriously, Yongbyon? Why not just put it under the National Mall?
This is actually just the latest in a series of reports to this effect. “The location moves around quite a bit, but the theme is consistent”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1418/size-matters.
And let’s not forget “Kumchang-ri”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/598/david-sanger-two-time-loser-on-kilju-and-kumchang-ri.
From tonight’s _Nelson Report_:
The other night we reported, correctly, that Tufts Fletcher School dean Steve Bosworth will be the Special Envoy for N. Korea, but we need to amend, or extend that information with the following:
Bosworth will be working part-time, not full-time, and he’ll continue his job as dean. When we wrote “confirmed” we meant to imply that, after Gen. Zinni, it’s trust but verify. This job will NOT be “Senate” confirmed.
Sung Kim, A/S Chris Hill’s special envoy for the 6-party talks, will be the primary negotiator , but on those occasions when high-level negotiations are needed, Bosworth will be called-in as the Special Envoy.
We would be less than candid if we did not also report that while the Korea commentariat thinks the world of Bosworth, there is concern that his post NOT being Senate confirmed makes it questionable he would have the top-level access required to achieve real decisions with N. Korea.
Go figure.
Bosworth’s profile is “here”:http://fletcher.tufts.edu/faculty/bosworth/profile.asp.
A previous mention of the envoy rumors is “here”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1844/track-i-and-a-half-in-pyongyang.
“Musical bonus”:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ll6LLGePYwM.