I haven’t flogged this horse enough, I guess.

I recently mentioned that a subsidiary of Pakistan’s National Engineering and Scientific Commission (NESCOM) is “responsible” for the country’s cruise missile programs.

Now an ISPR press release from 18 February links NESCOM with a recent Ra’ad II test:

 Pakistan conducted successful flight test of Air Launched Cruise Missile “Ra’ad-II”. Ra’ad-II, with a range of 600 Km, which significantly enhances air delivered strategic standoff capability on land and at sea. The weapon system is equipped with state of the art guidance and navigation systems ensuring engagement of targets with high precision.

The successful flight test was witnessed by Lieutenant General Nadeem Zaki Manj, Director General Strategic Plans Division, Dr. Nabeel Hayat Malik, Chairman NESCOM, senior officers from Strategic Plans Division, Strategic Forces and Strategic Organizations.

William Burns recently published a piece in the Atlantic about his role in the India 123 agreement negotiations.

Selling the agreement in international forums was mostly an exercise in blunt-force diplomacy with little of the practiced finesse that so often consumes the profession. I have sheepish memories of waking senior European officials in the middle of the night to obtain an exception for India from the Nuclear Suppliers Group. I didn’t belabor the technical arguments, nor did I really try to do much convincing. This was about power, and we were exercising it—hardly endearing ourselves to groggy partners, but impressing our Indian counterparts with the strength of America’s commitment to get this done.

The whole initiative was not an easy call—not for foreign capitals and not for the U.S. Congress. Questions remained about just how aligned India would be with us, how significant the costs of the India exception would be to nuclear diplomacy and the broader nuclear-nonproliferation regime, and whether the economic benefits for the American nuclear industry would ever live up to the hype. Proponents of the civil-nuclear deal tended to overstate the promise and understate the risk. Critics did the opposite, and were then lambasted by Indian officials as “nuclear ayatollahs” whose nonproliferation zeal blinded them to wider possibilities. Bush’s decision, nevertheless, was bold and smart.

I distinctly remember telling a commenter on ACW (IIRC) that they ought not use phrases like “nuclear ayatollahs.” .

Anyway, Burns’ account is consistent with a 2008 memorandum that he wrote for then-Sec State Rice. Here’s an excerpt:

I look out my window to a blinding bright light/Enola passes passes by

The contest for longest int’l agreement title.

I once observed that ISIS might be the Nile of nonproliferation think tanks. I based this claim on the names of both organization’s products.

ISIS, 2012: ISIS Analysis of IAEA Iran Safeguards Report: Production of 3.5% Enriched Uranium Increases Significantly; Iran Continues to Increase its Stock of 19.75% LEU; Rapid Installation of Large Numbers of IR-1 Centrifuge Outer Casings Not a Prelude to Dramatically Increased Centrifuge Deployment at Natanz or Fordow; Advanced Centrifuge Program Still Troubled But Makes Some Progress.

Nile, 2005: Chapter of Obeisance Before Giving Breath to the Inert One in the Presence of the Crescent Shaped Horns.

I have belatedly realized that the agreement known as CCW Amended Protocol II has a formal title with similar characteristics:

Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended on 3 May 1996(ProtocolII as amended on 3 May 1996) annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, Geneva, 3 May 1996

Come to think of it, there must be a list of long int’l agreement titles somewhere.

Self-Explanatory.

The last bit from the BAS piece that I’ll mention is this reiteration of Trump Administration policy concerning retaliation for a nuclear terrorist attack:

 The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review pointedly warns adversaries that abetting a terrorist nuclear attack against the United States would qualify for “the ultimate form of retaliation,” whose meaning should be unmistakable.

Presumably, they’re referring to this NPR paragraph:

For effective deterrence, the United States will hold fully accountable any state, terrorist group, or other non-state actor that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or employ nuclear devices. Although the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in countering nuclear terrorism is limited, our adversaries must understand that a terrorist nuclear attack against the United States or its allies and partners would qualify as an “extreme circumstance” under which the United States could consider the ultimate form of retaliation.

I’m not sure that I understand the point of the ambiguous language, but there it is.

The FR notice that I cited in this post described illegal exports destined for the the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and Pakistan’s Advanced Engineering Research Organization (AERO). Whether and to what extent the PAEC is connected to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program isn’t clear to me. In fact, a 2011 BIS press release described the PAEC as ” the science and technology organization in Pakistan responsible for Pakistan’s nuclear program, including the development and operation of nuclear power plants in Pakistan.”

AERO, however, is a bit different. According to this 2014 FR notice, the organization “has procured items on behalf of Pakistan’s Air Weapons Complex [AWC], a Pakistani government entity responsible for Pakistan’s cruise missile and strategic UAV programs.” The AWC is itself a subsidiary of Pakistan’s National Engineering and Scientific Commission (NESCOM), says this 2016 FR notice.

There’s also some relevant evidence from the Pakistani government. Back in 2008, Pakistan’s ISPR depicted a connection between NESCOM and the AWC:

General Tariq Majid, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC) visited Air Weapons Complex (AWC). On arrival he was received by Chairman National Engineering and Scientific Commission (NESCOM) Mr. Irfan Burney and Air Vice Marshal Zubair Iqbal Malik, Director General Air Weapons Complex.

And this documentary on NESCOM has images of the Babur (4:28) and Ra-ad (4:48) nuclear-capable cruise missiles.

https://youtu.be/WEsi1ihKfFA

A few weeks ago, BIS published in the Federal Register an Order Temporarily Denying Export Privileges to a number of entities for illegal exports to Pakistan. The FR notice contains more detail than I ever recall seeing in such a notice.

This is a good summary:

Respondents operated a well-developed procurement scheme for at least five years, designed to circumvent U.S. restrictions on exports of items to the PAEC and AERO based on their involvement in the proliferation of nuclear and missile technology. This scheme involved multinational entities and players located in at least three countries, the use of related and unrelated companies, changeable transshipment routes, and duplicitous methods of payment. Respondents themselves routinely generated false information to avoid detection of the scheme. In addition, on its own, the unsealing of the criminal indictment against the individual Respondents will not give the public sufficient notice of the individuals and entities involved in the ongoing procurement scheme. Thus, with the identification of the Respondents as set forth in this TDO, the undersigned expects to reduce the likelihood that U.S.-origin items will be exported, reexported or transferred to listed entities as part of the procurement scheme.

The notice adds that “the scheme is durable and ongoing.” Below are highlighted portions of the FR notice which explain some of what PAEC, AERO, et al have been up to and for what they’ve been shopping.

In 2006, the late Tyler Drumheller told PBS that the Bush administration diverted intel resources from Iran’s nuclear program to Iraq’s nuclear program in February 2001.

In the late Clinton administration, in the middle ’90s, there was a large push on Iraq. Then in the late ’90s, as they became more concerned about the nuclear proliferation in Iran, there was a movement of resources from Iraq to Iran. I was in the field then, so I saw that. It was seen as [compared to] Iraq, with the inspectors and with the sanctions and all, that Iran presented a much more dangerous threat than Iraq. Right after the Bush administration came in in February of 2001, we got the word to start gearing up on Iraq, start gearing up [intelligence] collection on Iraq, resources back to Iraq, that these guys were focused on Iraq.

I hadn’t heard this before.

The Tilden/Boyd BAS piece to which I previously referred contains what looks to be a current threat assessment of nuclear terrorism: 

Although there is no reason to believe that any terrorist group today possesses a nuclear weapon or even an organized program to obtain one, several groups have been unambiguous about their desire to achieve this capability,