Not new, but a lot of PAEC folks made informative statements at the 2007 Memorial Reference for Munir Ahmad Khan. For example….Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, Chairman NESCOM, former PAEC:

Not new, but a lot of PAEC folks made informative statements at the 2007 Memorial Reference for Munir Ahmad Khan. For example….Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, Chairman NESCOM, former PAEC:

”He was responsible for setting up Pakistan’s nuclear fuel cycle program, which culminated in providing indigenously manufactured fuel for the Karachi nuclear power plant. There was a time when Canada stopped the supply of fuel and spare parts for Kanupp and it was said that the streets of Karachi would go dark, but the indigenous fuel produced as a result of his efforts enabled Kanupp to successfully run despite sanctions. In developing the nuclear fuel cycle program, Mr. Munir Ahmad Khan established various nuclear facilities throughout the country. The offshoot of this nuclear fuel cycle program half way down the line gave us the uranium gas for Kahuta which we enriched and which was used in our nuclear weapons program”

”The Kahuta enrichment project itself was envisaged by PAEC, it was a project on which we did a lot of exploratory and research work for separating U-235 and U-238. Various techniques for enrichment including laser, centrifuge and diffusion were explored and groups formed by him to study these methods. I was responsible for one of these groups. Then finally a group was formed to study the gas-centrifuge method for uranium enrichment. This was a very big project for which he laid solid foundations for which credit must be attributed to Mr. Munir Ahmad Khan” 

”Then he established the entire infrastructure for the designing, manufacturing and testing of nuclear weapons for the air force, for the missiles, for tactical weapons. He also set up explosive plants, high-speed electronics facilities, precision and mechanical plants for the nuclear weapons program.”

”The Chaghi tunnels were also selected, built and made ready during his time. The Chaghi test site was selected by him in 1975/76 and was ready by 1980. He was a great manager of men and he pushed the people to do all this work and he brought out the best in the scientists and engineers of PAEC.”

”Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure was the result of his hard work and his vision. On the plutonium side, the New Labs reprocessing project was also completed under his leadership. He also began work on the Khushab plutonium production reactor, which is also an example of his vision.”

”PINSTECH was also expanded and completed during his tenure. He also set up Karachi Institute of Nuclear Power Engineering and Centre for Nuclear Studies. There were many other institutions and organizations and projects which were established by Mr. Munir Ahmad Khan which I cannot name here. “

Yesterday, I wrote about this 1995 report by USEC on the proper handling of UF6. I thought this part about cold traps was also worth a mention:

And here’s the diagram for which no one’s been waiting:

In 1995, USEC published an updated version of the DOE document, Uranium Hexafluoride: A Manual of Good Handling Practices. Perhaps I am misguided, but I find this physical properties diagram interesting:

Here’s a table:

Re-upping this one from a few years ago.

A little while ago, The Hindu had a good interview with Vijay Kumar Saraswat, then-head of India’s DRDO, which contains some informative material on DRDO’s origin and evolution, as well as an explanation of why certain DRDO programs have lagged in the past.

I found this section on the past effects of the MTCR to be telling:

We were to develop Prithvi missile’s one version in seven years but we developed three versions in 15 years – first of 150 km range, second of 250 km and the third naval version of 350 km range when fired from the ship, yes we took 15 years but we developed the complete system. Same thing happened in Agni One, Two Three programme. But still time and cost overruns were there because when IGMDP was planned we had planned to import some material. We had to import some materials for Prithvi which was first fired in 1988 and Agni in 1989 and then MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) which was brewing all this time clamped all restrictions on us. All the contracts which we had signed with all companies were not honoured and these companies took back everything. Everything was denied to us, this denial caused us a lot of delay and whatever we needed had to be designed, developed and produced by us.

From 1989 to 1997 was a harrowing period. There were restrictions imposed on India and for things like getting Magnesium supply and Servo valves for launch vehicles, we had to struggle and later produce our very own. At that time, Tamil Nadu government’s TIDCO helped in making Magnesium slab from ore.

Saraswat went on to say that India solved some problems caused by these restrictions, but others remain:

Though technical problems had been solved by first launches of Prithvi and Agni missiles. Now these problems are not there, Today, India produces its own servo valves not only for missiles but also for launch vehicles and many other industrial purposes. What was a critical technology in 1988 is no more critical, new technologies have come. A lot of liberalisation has taken place but the fact still remains that critical technologies which are required are not available to us. For example, we still do not have access to high end computer processors and we have to make do with Intel core system. I cannot get a high end computer and I have to start building it for my missile right from the chip.

Here’s a video of an Indian SLBM test featuring Dr. Saraswat:

This article from Studies in Intelligence about which I wrote has some more material worth highlighting. Specifically, this excerpt discusses an aspect of intelligence evaluation in an entertaining way:

This issue of Studies in Intelligence has a 1964 article examining the 1962 Special National Intelligence Estimate titled “The Military Buildup in Cuba.” The author describes the problem:

The whole piece is fascinating…here’s a good summary paragraph:

I also like this additional explanation:

Stark, bleak, wasted
Devastated

When?

All life
Totally annihilated

Die!

Does it have to be this way
Is this the price we’re gonna pay?

This 1992 article from Studies in Intelligence, which discusses the 1943 sabotage of the Vemork heavy-water production plant in is “an edited version of an article which was originally published in 1947 Yearbook of the Norwegian Tourist Association.” The author helped to carry out the sabotage operation. I don’t have anything to add, except that it’s a fascinating account of the author’s experience.

It also includes this map:

I found an article in a 1994 edition of Studies in Intelligence (p. 105) based on U.S. military attaches’ observations about their time in Moscow during the Cuban missile crisis. Obviously, historians and other experts have written much about this issue since the article originally appeared in 1966, but I think it’s worth reading what observers had to say at the time. Here’s a decent summary of the article:

Read the whole thing, but here’s the conclusion:

I very much like this anecdote concerning the post-crisis diplomatic environment;

Agoraphobic Nosebleed:

The Aum ShinriKyo
(Aum Supreme Truth Sect)
first started studying the powerful
hallucinogenic LSD
as a kind of chemical weapon
it might use during an armed revolt.