Could be a tiring Job in some locales:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ab7F1FQrtA

In this 2004 interview, with Dan Ford from the American Institute of Physics, Wolfgang Panofsky discusses Richard Garwin and his stint with the Rumsfeld Commission:

I think the instance often mentioned, you know, he was a member of the famous Rumsfeld Commission, which was charged with assessing the threat to the United States of ballistic missiles. But to most observers, was simply a… had a not so hidden agenda of justifying ballistic missile defense. Now Garwin basically did an honest job on that committee of basically assessing the North Korean threat and in turn, the fact that he who is usually more identified with the arms control side of things and who was usually very much identified with the loyal opposition to ballistic missile defense, nevertheless found that his concurrence with the findings of the Rumsfeld Commission and the subsequent use of that report to justify BMD.

That is often cited as to some extent being a symptom of naivety on his part on being oblivious to the political implications of his activities while doing an absolutely straightforward honest job on the technological parts of the thing. I mean, that’s one example where he basically proceeded to analyze the explicit task given to that Commission but… And since that Commission was not asked to recommend specific remedies to the ballistic missile threat, but only to analyze the ballistic missile threat, he kept to that. But in fact, the not so hidden agenda of that Commission was to justify BMD, so that’s essensially an instance.

A while back, State made public this list of documents concerning the NPT negotiating history. This 1968 document discusses an interesting aspect of safeguards and intelligence:

Obviously not news, but I do like this excerpt from “On the Soviet Nuclear Scent” by Henry S. Lowenhaupt.

The piece cites a number of cases where American and British intelligence analysts used intercepted letters and other sources to locate various facilities associated with the Soviet nuclear weapons programs. Scholars have written considerably more on this topic since 1967, but I find it interesting to read the conclusions drawn based on the then-available information.

Reader Tom Bielefeld was kind enough to send a link to the Schelling article that I mentioned a few days ago.

Heritage had an event last month to mark the 2005 signing by the United States and India of the 123 agreement. Featuring Ashley Tellis, Ted Jones, and Ambassador Richard Verma, the event provides insight into the dynamics leading up to that agreement.

As I noted here, a lot of PAEC folks made informative statements at the 2007 Memorial Reference for Munir Ahmad Khan. This time, the words are from former Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar:

During the early 1980s, there was an imminent threat of an Indian and Israeli attack on Kahuta and PINSTECH. Hectic discussions used to take place in the Foreign Office in Islamabad over this issue each day. This was during 1983-84 and the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had ordered to prepare contingency plans for an attack on the uranium enrichment plant at Kahuta and the reprocessing plant at PINSTECH. She had also ordered a file to be prepared with the title ‘Attack on Kahuta”. 

”In the fall of 1983, Munir Ahmed Khan met with Raja Ramanna , the chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission at the Imperial Hotel in Vienna, where both were attending an IAEA meeting. Concerned by an imminent attack on Pakistan’s nuclear facilities, Munir Ahmed Khan told Ramanna ‘ if such an attack took place against Kahuta or PINSTECH, it would release very little radioactivity because we had only a small enrichment plant and a small research reactor at these places. However, Pakistan would assume that such an attack came from India and would be forced to respond”. 

”Munir Khan told his Indian counterpart that he was simply making technical points and was not speaking in an fficial capacity, but went on to remind Ramanna that a Pakistani counter attack on Trombay would be huge and could release massive amounts of radiation to a large populated area causing a disaster. Under the circumstances, it would be better that India and Pakistan should not attack each other’s facilities.”

Not everyone has read Chapter VII of the UN Charter:

Chapter VII

CHAPTER VII: ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION

Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 40

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

Article 43

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

Article 44

When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member’s armed forces.

Article 45

In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 46

Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 47

1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council’s military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.
2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee’s responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.
3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.
4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-committees.

Article 48

1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.
2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.

Article 49

The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

Article 50

If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.

Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Re-upping this 2011 post from a while back, with a few edits.

I heard Thomas Schelling discuss nuclear terrorism at a New America Foundation event in October 2011, but haven’t been able to find a transcript of the event. I was happy to discover a 2011 piece by Dr. Schelling titled  “Whatever Happened to Nuclear Terrorism?” However, the link I had is dead and I can’t find a copy.

Anyway, he wrote:

In 1982 I published an article that began, “Sometime in the 1980’s an organization that is not a national government may acquire a few nuclear weapons. If not in the 1980’s, then in the 1990’s.”

I hedged about the 80’s but sounded pretty firm about the 90’s. It’s now the 2010’s, twenty-nine years later, and there has been no nuclear terrorism nor any acquisition of such weapons by any terrorist organization that we know of; and I think we’d know by now. I don’t know of anyone—and I knew many colleagues knowledgeable on the subject—who thought my expectations outlandish. Something needs to be explained!

His explanation is an interesting one; a PhD student to whom I described it replied, “So he’s saying it’s a market failure.” That, for me, is the most striking part of the argument. Schelling writes: 

Imagine that you have succeeded in stealing a Picasso insured for many millions of dollars, and you know that there are people willing to pay several millions for it: how do you find your customer? You cannot put a want ad in the New York Times.

Read the whole thing…I especially like this paragraph:

a “supplier” and a “customer” representing the terrorist organization may meet in a public place, each with a few unrecognizable body guards, to consummate the deal. At that point I fantasize that the seller and the buyer recognize each other, one is from the CIA and the other from the Israeli Mossad. Each is engaged in a “sting” operation, and they shake hands and go back to work.

Not sure everyone’s read it:

Article 25

The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.