In this June 30 speech, UK Ambassador Jonathan Allen provided some details on Iran’s Qased SLV:

We are deeply concerned by Iran’s development of advanced technologies under the guise of Space Launch Vehicle research and the roles these technologies play in supporting Iran’s military ballistic missile program. We reject Iran’s claims that the Qased system used in their most recent launch is not a military launch system. In addition to the self-proclaimed role of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps in the launch, Iran’s official reports show a Transporter Erector Launcher, characteristic of military ballistic missiles and not a static launch done, or “gantry”, of the type normally associated with civilian Space Launch Vehicles.

The UNSG report to which he referred in his speech has more detail :

Iran stated that, unlike all of its previous space launch vehicle tests, this programme was developed and conducted by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is a military entity known to control Iran’s strategic missile forces. The launch was conducted from an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps facility in Shahrud which was not previously associated with such launches.

<snip>

The design of the Qased second stage is based on a new solid-propellant motor and incorporates a new attitude control module. This solid-propellant motor design is similar to the Salman system unveiled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in February 2020 along with a range of other new ballistic missile technology, including the Raad-500 short-range ballistic missile. The Salman featured a flexible-nozzle control system, rather than jet vanes used on other Iranian solid-propellant motors. This technology improves the motor’s efficiency and is essential for the development of larger-diameter solid-propellant motors suitable, primarily, in the design of long- range ballistic missiles. Official Iranian media reporting in February 2020 showed a static test of the Salman motor at the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Shahrud facility. The test facilities at the Shahrud site include four additional static motor test platforms, which are only suitable for testing such larger-diameter solid-propellant ballistic missile motors.

Iranian state media reporting shows the Qased uses an attitude control module to control its orientation and flight path prior to satellite release. This technology has been derived from Iran’s development of ballistic missiles with manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles, such as the Emad variant of the Shahab-3 and the Qiam-2.

The attitude control system on the Qased demonstrated the capability to accurately control and orient a vehicle outside the atmosphere. This is an essential technology for the development of a long-range ballistic missile system capable of deploying both multiple re-entry vehicles and multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles.

I previously described this document as a “paper” written by Richard Garwin about the Ruina Panel. (Here, by the way, is a copy of the Ruina report, which looks as if it was faxed from Dr. Garwin’s office.). But the document is really a compilation of emails and notes from Garwin to the Wilson Center conference organizers. He devotes much space to discussing an NRL report about the Vela incident and related hydroacoustic evidence of a large explosion.

Here’ a 1980 letter from then-NRL Director Alan Berman concerning the report. Below is the Wilson Center Digital Archive’s summary of the document:

Alan Berman writes to US Office of Science and Technology Policy senior advisor John Marcum on hydroacoustic evidence on the Vela incident. Based on sounds recorded, it appeared that a large explosion occurred south of Ascension Island.

This material in the Garwin document seems to be Dr. Garwin’s travel itinerary for a December 1980 Ruina Panel event:

In this November 2019 paper, Richard Garwin discusses his time on the Ruina Panel, which investigated the 1979 Vela Incident.

I’ll write more about it later, but this line jumped out at me:

Only a subset of the Ruina Panel had extensive clearances for SCI– specifically,
technology and data from intelligence satellites.

I’m not sure I ever knew that.

About a month ago, the UN issued this document titled “Nuclear disarmament; follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons; reducing nuclear danger.”

This past November, Leonard Weiss gave a short speech titled “My Involvement with the 1979 Vela Satellite (6911) Event.” He recounted this episode about a 1980 holiday party:

During the celebration, while [Senator John] Glenn and I were chatting, Gerard Smith, U.S. Representative for Nonproliferation Matters walked over to us with drink in hand to join our chat. Smith had met with both Glenn and me on prior occasions to talk about nuclear agreements with other countries, particularly Euratom, that were required by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978…But now, at the party, Smith was more concerned with Glenn’s intent to introduce legislation to block an NRC decision to allow a shipment of uranium fuel for India’s Tarapur reactors under an old contract to proceed….When Smith told Glenn he thought letting the shipment go would be a good nonproliferation move, Glenn disagreed, saying that the Indians had been “bad guys” on nonproliferation issues. At this, Smith bristled and said “You think the Indians are bad gguys? If you want to talk about bad guys, talk about the Israelis!” And with that both men backed off and Smith took his leave. I was stunned by Smith’s comment and committed it to memory. I wasn’t sure exactly what Smith had in mind; the Israelis had vexed many State Department officials over the years with their deception on Dimona and their ostensible theft of HEU from the NUMEC corporation in Apollo Pennsylvania. But those events happened years before. There was now a new issue with the mysterious flash, and in retrospect I think Smith may have been telling Glenn that he believed those analysts in the intelligence community who thought Israel was the most likely perpetrator of a nuclear test detected by Vela 6911.

The UN posted this document the other day titled “Disarmament and Non-proliferation Education.”

The Netherlands issued a paper to the CD about a year ago titled “Back to Basics – the Programme of Work.” Annex I contains some history about which I was unaware:

The table in annex I of this paper provides an overview of the programmes of work adopted and stand-alone decisions on subsidiary bodies of the Conference. This clearly shows that in the first fifteen years of its existence, decisions on the (re-)establishment of subsidiary bodies and their mandates were taken separately from the decision on the programme of work, fully in line with the rules of procedure.

The whole annex is too long to post here, but take a look.

Warheads produced to exterminate the earth
This sacrifice will lead us to our death, no rebirth

**

World explosion
Mass obliteration
… of a race

I mentioned a recent FT interview with Frits Veerman which is behind a paywall. But I have since found an interview that Transparency International conducted with Veerman in 2018:

Veerman only had his suspicions. He knew he needed solid evidence, so he started correspondence with Khan. “Abdul and I shared a hobby: astronomy. I started to write him letters about that until I had the proof about what he was doing exactly. At one point he asked if I could share technical information about an ultracentrifuge with him by mail. There I had him, there I had proof that he was spying.” When Veerman showed the letters to the FDO management, they summoned him to destroy them. But he didn’t. He provided a copy to management, and archived the original letter. To this day, the letters are neatly and securely stored in his safe.

I must confess that I missed this:

The piece is based on the diary of a South African Navy officer, lieutenant Lindsey Rooke, who took part in a secret atmospheric nuclear weapons test conducted in 1979 off the coast of Antarctica. The test, detected by a US satellite called Vela, was the validation of a military power that engulfed the whole Southern African region in a ‘cold-war’ conflict in the late 70s and 80s. Her diary shows someone in contradiction between her love for nature and the mission she was on, which left a trace of devastation, death and radioactive contamination in one of the most pristine and protected environments on earth.