This 1954 letter from an attendee of the Tenth Session of the NATO Senior
Officers Course on Special Weapons (Atomic) contains an unsurprising observation:

Under present field conditions, and as proved by recent maneuvers in Germany, it takes between five hours and forty-five minutes and seven hours and a half to get the final O.K. to expend an A-bomb, after a field commander decides to use one.

This document contains an interesting anecdote of which I was unaware. Dr. Richard Garwin was a member of the Committee on Ballistic Acoustic of the National Academy of Sciences whose 1982 report concluded, as he put it, that “recordings from the Dallas Police Department of police microphone signals at the time of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy…were, in fact, not made from a microphone in Dealey Plaza and did not capture the assassination gun shots.”

Parvez Butt (Secretary, Ministry of Science and Technology and PAEC chairman 2001-2006) shared some details about Pakistan’s efforts to acquire technology for its nuclear weapons program:

”When I was made part of the nuclear weapons design and manufacture program, of course the decision was Mr. Munir Ahmad Khan’s, we were supposed to purchase equipment and machinery from abroad. Once a deal was within reach, Mr. Munir Ahmad Khan would always say, ‘ Lets buy twice this number!”.

“In the early days of our weapons program, during a discussion with Mr. Munir Ahmad Khan, I raised some doubts whether we could achieve our objectives, with the limited technological infrastructure that was available at that time, to which he replied, if the Americans could do it in the 1940s without specialized machines and equipment, we can do it as well. But he already had this in his mind and launched a massive program for the procurement and indigenous development of high-technology infrastructure, machines, facilities and equipment needed to develop and implement a self-sustaining nuclear program. One such project was HMC-3 which has been playing an important role in industry and in indigenization of various projects of the nuclear program”.

War and Peace in the Nuclear Age by WGBH which features 1980s-era interviews with a number of famous people. For example, here’s an interview with Roswell Gilpatric of the Gilpatric Commission.

In 2017, the Wilson Center ( I can’t find a link for it) held a conference titled The International Atomic Energy Agency at 60. There are 6 segments with lots of names you’ll recognize.

This1980 letter from US NRL Director Alan Berman has a data point about French nuclear tests in the Pacific of which I was unaware. Specifically, one of the tests’ yield was 38KT and was detonated “as much as 500 meters above the water surface.”

I wrote that “I am unaware of any case in which the OPCW or any other international organization has required a state to disclose stocks of an unscheduled chemical .” I was referring to the requirement in the July OPCW EC decision about which I wrote the other day. Syria must

(b)  declare to the Secretariat all of the chemical weapons it currently possesses, including sarin, sarin precursors, and chlorine that is not intended for purposes not prohibited under the Convention, as well as chemical weapons production facilities and other related facilities;…

Based on what I wrote yesterday, I should have written that I was “unaware of any case it which the OPCW has required a state to disclose stocks of a specific unscheduled chemical.” Essentially, the CWC requires states to declare unschedule chemicals ” except where intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.” This is obviously similar to the July requirement, but doesn’t specify a chemical.

I posted a link on Twitter to this post and asked “Are there any cases in which the OPCW or any other international organization has required such an action?”

One reader pointed out that in May 2014 the OPCW confirmed “the destruction of the entire declared Syrian stockpile of Isopropanol” which, though a Sarin precursor, is not a scheduled chemical under the CWC. Now, I believe that the CWC required Syria to declare its isopropanol. The convention mandates that a party declare “whether it owns or possesses any chemical weapons, or whether there are any chemical weapons located in any place under its jurisdiction or control.” The convention’s definition of “chemical weapons” includes “Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes.”

It’s also worth noting that this September 2013 OPCW EC decision required Syria to submit “further information” about the “chemical name and military designator of each chemical in its chemical weapons stockpile, including precursors and toxins, and quantities thereof.” Syria had already submitted “detailed information, including names, types, and quantities of its chemical weapons agents, types of munitions, and location and form of storage, production, and research and development facilities…”

So there’s some precedent.

The July OPCW EC decision about which I posted yesterday contains what I think is an unprecedented provision. Recall the requirement that Syria

(b)  declare to the Secretariat all of the chemical weapons it currently possesses, including sarin, sarin precursors, and chlorine that is not intended for purposes not prohibited under the Convention, as well as chemical weapons production facilities and other related facilities;…

I am unaware of any case in which the OPCW or any other international organization has required a state to disclose stocks of an unscheduled chemical .

*Update:* See this post.

Has there been much focus on this? The OPCW on July 9 gave Syria 90 days to comply with a number of steps. According to the text of its decision, the organization decided to “request, pursuant to paragraph 36 of Article VIII of the Convention, that the Syrian Arab Republic complete all of the following measures within 90 days of this decision in order to redress the situation:”

(a)  declare to the Secretariat the facilities where the chemical weapons, including precursors, munitions, and devices, used in the 24, 25, and 30 March 2017 attacks were developed, produced, stockpiled, and operationally stored for delivery;

(b)  declare to the Secretariat all of the chemical weapons it currently possesses, including sarin, sarin precursors, and chlorine that is not intended for purposes not prohibited under the Convention, as well as chemical weapons production facilities and other related facilities; and

(c)  resolve all of the outstanding issues regarding its initial declaration of its chemical weapons stockpile and programme;

Here’s Article VIII, paragraph 36:

In its consideration of doubts or concerns regarding compliance and cases of non-compliance, including, inter alia, abuse of the rights provided for under this Convention, the Executive Council shall consult with the States Parties involved and, as appropriate, request the State Party to take measures to redress the situation within a specified time. To the extent that the Executive Council considers further action to be necessary, it shall take, inter alia, one or more of the following measures: (a) Inform all States Parties of the issue or matter; (b) Bring the issue or matter to the attention of the Conference; (c) Make recommendations to the Conference regarding measures to redress the situation and to ensure compliance. The Executive Council shall, in cases of particular gravity and urgency, bring the issue or matter, including relevant information and conclusions, directly to the attention of the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Security Council. It shall at the same time inform all States Parties of this step.

The OPCW decision also states that, should Syria fail to take these steps, the organization will

recommend to the Conference to adopt a decision at its next session which undertakes appropriate action, pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Convention,

Here’s Article XII, paragraph 2:

In cases where a State Party has been requested by the Executive Council to take measures to redress a situation raising problems with regard to its compliance, and where the State Party fails to fulfil the request within the specified time, the Conference may, inter alia, upon the recommendation of the Executive Council, restrict or suspend the State Party’s rights and privileges under this Convention until it undertakes the necessary action to conform with its obligations under this Convention.