China’s statement to the First Committee has a useful summary of Beijing’s nuclear weapons policies:

China has pursued a nuclear strategy of self-defense, always kept its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for its national security, and has never and will never take part in any nuclear arms race with any other country. Given the huge gap between the nuclear arsenals of China and those of the US and the Russian Federation, it is unfair, unreasonable and infeasible to expect China to join in any trilateral arms control negotiation. China will never participate in such a negotiation and will never accept any coercion or blackmail.

China’s rejection of the so-called “trilateral arms control negotiation” does not mean that China evades its own responsibility for nuclear disarmament or refuses to participate in the global nuclear disarmament process. Ever since the first day of possessing nuclear weapons, China has been advocating the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. China has declared the policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, and unconditionally commits itself not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against Non-Nuclear-Weapon States or Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones. China is the only P5 country who makes such commitments. China firmly abides by its commitments on the moratorium of nuclear tests, and supports the development of the verification mechanism of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). China supports negotiation for a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices on the basis of a comprehensive and balanced program of work in accordance with the mandate contained in the Shannon Report, and supports the work of the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification. China is ready to engage in meaningful dialogue on the issues related to strategic stability with all parties on the basis of mutual respect, and will continue its participation in the arms control process under the framework of the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament and the P5.

The statement also contained some policy recommendations:

In the face of the increasingly complex and ominous international security landscape, the P5 should take proactive measures to manage differences, and work together to maintain global strategic stability. Since the Beijing Conference in January last year, the P5 have reached consensus on carrying out cooperation on strategic security issues including nuclear doctrines and policies, nuclear risk reduction, etc. China suggests that the P5 continue to strengthen dialogue on nuclear policies and doctrines, jointly reiterate that “A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”, make a commitment not to target their nuclear weapons at any State, commit to the no-first-use of nuclear weapons unconditionally, and conclude legally binding international instruments on providing negative and positive security assurances to non-nuclear weapon States. We urge the US to abandon the policies of nuclear umbrella and nuclear sharing, withdraw all the nuclear weapons deployed overseas, stop the development and deployment of its global missile defense system, and play a due role in improving international and regional security environment.

It’s old, but the 2002 UNSG report titled, The Issue of Missiles in All Its Aspects, is a decent primer on missiles. In addition to the history and background, there’s a concise explanation of what missiles are and how they work:

Here’s an excerpt from Pakistan’s statement to the First Committee:

India’s so-called “No first-use” policy lacks credence. Its Defence Minister himself cast doubt on this, when he held out the threat of pre- emptive nuclear attack last year. India has operationalized its “cold start” doctrine of a surprise attack against Pakistan, deploying several “strike force” brigades close to the border; outlined plans for a naval blockade, and proclaimed the intention of fighting a “limited war” with Pakistan under the “nuclear overhang”.

Also,

However, Pakistan cannot remain oblivious to the disturbing security dynamics in our region. Pakistan will take all necessary measures to ensure its security and to maintain full spectrum deterrence.

Peace and stability in South Asia can only be achieved through:

• the resolution of disputes between Pakistan and India, particularly the core issue of Jammu and Kashmir;

• the maintenance of a balance between conventional forces; and

• reciprocal measures for nuclear and missile restraint.

Pakistan’s proposal for a strategic restraint regime in South Asia, based on these inter-locking elements, remains on the table.

The statement also discusses other arms control issues, nuclear disarmament, and nonproliferation. Unsurprisingly, there’s a good deal of material about Pakistan’s relationship with India. 

Here is an excerpt from India’s statement to the First Committee:

As a responsible nuclear weapon State, India is committed as per its nuclear doctrine, to maintain credible minimum deterrence with the posture of no-first use and non-use against non-nuclear weapon States. Without diminishing the priority we attach to nuclear disarmament, India supports the immediate commencement of negotiations in the CD of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty on the basis of CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein, which remains the most suitable basis for negotiations to commence, as reinforced by the outcomes of the GGE on FMCT as well as the High-Level Expert Preparatory Group on FMCT. India participated in the recent GGE on Nuclear Disarmament Verification and looks forward to constructively participating in the upcoming GGE on NDV to further contribute in this important area of our work. India has supported the commencement of negotiation by the CD of a legally binding instrument on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), also building on the work of the GGE on PAROS that concluded in March 2019.

The document also calls for

complete elimination of nuclear weapons through a step by step process, enunciated in our Working Paper on Nuclear Disarmament submitted to the UNGA in 2006 and later to the CD in 2007 (CD/1816), has a wide resonance and continuing relevance. India reiterates its call to undertake the steps outlined in the Working Paper…

Here is the paper and here are the steps:

There’s more about topics like chemical and biological weapons, conventional weapons, delivery vehicles, and terrorism.

The Council of the European Union announced on October 12 that it is extending for one year the sanctions applied to several entities linked to CW use.

The Council today decided to extend the regime allowing the EU to impose restrictive measures on persons and entities involved in the development and use of chemical weapons by one year, until 16 October 2021.

The sanctions regime was introduced in 2018 as a follow-up to the conclusions of the European Council of 28 June 2018. The objective was to counter the proliferation and use of chemical weapons, which pose a serious threat to international security. The regime was due to apply until 16 October 2020. On the basis of a regular annual review, it was decided to extend the restrictive measures for a further year.

Restrictive measures currently apply to nine persons – five linked to the Syrian regime and four involved in the Salisbury attack using the toxic nerve agent Novichok – and one organisation, the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC), the Syrian regime’s principal entity for the development of chemical weapons.

It’s likely not news to people who have been following the issue, but the list of sanctioned persons contains some useful detail:

Some information from an October 5 UNSC meeting which serves as a useful follow-up to this post from the other day:

Izumi Nakamitsu, Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, said that, since she last briefed the Council, her Office has maintained regular contact with OPCW and has not received any further information from the Syrian authorities on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013) — which first mandated the scheduled destruction of the country’s chemical weapons programme.

I previously noted a July 9 OPCW decision which gave Syria 90 days to take a number of steps concerning the government’s chemical weapons program. This September 24 OPCW DG report states that “As at the date of this report, the Secretariat has not received a reply from the Syrian Arab Republic.” Given that the July decision requires the DG to report “within 100 days” regarding Syrian compliance, one imagines that we’ll hear more soon.

The NYRB published a review essay this past August about John Bolton’s most recent book. Without getting into its substance, I have to quote passages that make me question my writing ability:

Hedging against the remote possibility that some readers are smart enough to decipher spuriousness…

and

Even more trying are his sour, stilted witticisms, some of which he feels compelled to point out are supposed to be funny—in case any bleeding-heart types are too dumb to realize it.

The Review published a similar piece back in 2008 (sub,. req.) about Bolton’s first book. Readers can make what they will of this sentence:

Whether a consistent and comprehensive foreign policy, no longer intoxicated by ideological or neo-imperial fantasy, will emerge from this change of attitude is far from clear.

The next Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction is scheduled for this coming November. The first one took place last year. Here’s the most relevant part of the report:

At its 5th and 6th meetings, on 20 November, the Conference held a thematic debate. Representatives of participating States exchanged views on a range of related issues, including principles and objectives, general obligations regarding nuclear weapons, general obligations regarding other weapons of mass destruction, peaceful uses and international cooperation, institutional arrangements and other aspects. The Conference agreed that representatives of existing nuclear-weapon-free zones organizations should be invited to share good practices and lessons learned with respect to the implementation of treaties establishing such zones prior to the second session of the Conference.

There’s also a political declaration:

We, the representatives of participating States at the first session of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, having met at Headquarters from 18 to 22 November 2019, pursuant to General Assembly decision 73/546:

(a) Welcome all initiatives, resolutions, decisions and recommendations on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction;

(b) Believe that the establishment of a verifiable Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction would greatly enhance regional and international peace and security;

(c) Declare our intent and solemn commitment to pursue, in accordance with relevant international resolutions, and in an open and inclusive manner with all invited States, the elaboration of a legally binding treaty to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by consensus by the States of the region;

(d) Call upon all States of the Middle East and all other States to refrain from taking any measures that preclude the achievement of the objectives of the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction;

(e) Convinced that the realization of this long-standing goal would be facilitated by the participation of all States of the Middle East, extend an open-ended invitation to all States of the region to lend their support to the present declaration and to join the process;

(f) In that spirit, believe that the Conference, through the elaboration of a legally binding treaty establishing a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, could contribute to building regional and international confidence therein;

(g) Commit to undertaking efforts to follow up on the declaration and on the outcomes of the Conference and to engaging in preparations for the second session of the Conference, commend the efforts of the Secretary-General in convening the first session of the Conference, and request his continued efforts and those of relevant international organizations and the strong support of the international community towards the success of the Conference in establishing a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

According to this report, the “Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters began a two-year programme of work” this past January. Here’s a good summary:

In its capacity as the Board of Trustees of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, the Board engaged in substantive discussions on two of the Institute’s workstreams: weapons and ammunition management, and autonomous weapons and human control. The Board also reviewed current programmes, activities and finances of the Institute, including ongoing efforts to strengthen its policy impact, achieve financial sustainability and further expand its global engagement. The Board approved the report of the Director on the activities of the Institute for the period from January 2019 to December 2019 and the proposed programme of work and financial plan for 2020 and 2021. Lastly, the Board endorsed a proposal by the Institute to commemorate its fortieth anniversary in 2020, in the context of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the United Nations and with an emphasis on engaging women and youth on disarmament matters.

Some well-known names in the report, along with this observation regarding current events:

Members also noted that the pandemic had underscored the direct and indirect costs of biosecurity and biosafety breaches and underlined the critical importance of revitalizing the work of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.