Flying boxes through the air
Dropping cities everywhere
But water will still come
Man should surrender
Fire made for all to burn
Foolish end for all concerned
But water will still come
Man should surrender
Flying boxes through the air
Dropping cities everywhere
But water will still come
Man should surrender
Fire made for all to burn
Foolish end for all concerned
But water will still come
Man should surrender
Yesterday, I mentioned Dr. A.P. J. Abdul Kalam, the subject of this DRDO homage. Well, I thought that tonight would be as good a time as any to highlight an excerpt from an August 2008 speech from a Special Dialogue on Energy independence with the Malaysian Nuclear Agency:
Let me also share my second experience when I was the chief of Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA). It was 1998, India achieved a very important national milestone of becoming a nuclear weapon state. This accomplishment is yours. Many nations imposed technology denials and economic sanctions after the event. Particularly, the Light Combat Aircraft programme came to a halt because of collaborating countries breaking the agreements on the development contracts undertaken. I took an emergency meeting of the ADA Board and we formed a National Team for LCA control system with 20 members drawn from 7 organizations in the country with a two years project schedule. In 18 months, we realized a world class digital fly by wire control system for the LCA. Now, four LCA aircraft are flying and 5th one is getting ready for flight test. Cumulative flying hours logged by the 4 aircraft is over 500 hours. The batch production of LCA TEJAS is to commence.
DRDO’s October newsletter contains an homage to Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam:
Anil Kakodkar mentioned Kalam in this 2018 interview:
Nuclear weaponisation has a security connotation. The country becomes stronger, there is a deterrence, and one can stabilise the security situation. But it is also an expression of technological capability of the country. And that, I think, significantly changes the way country is perceived, even economically. (APJ Abdul) Kalam used to say strength brings in respect.
It’s not especially new, but here are some warnings about nuclear war from Pakistani PM Imran Khan in his 9/25 speech to the UNGA:
In order to divert attention from its illegal actions and atrocities in Indian Occupied Jammu and Kashmir, India is playing a dangerous game of upping the military ante against Pakistan in a nuclearized environment.
and
There will be no durable peace and stability in South Asia until the Jammu and Kashmir dispute is resolved on the basis of international legitimacy. Kashmir has been rightly described as a “nuclear flash point”.
Parenthetically, I don’t think I’ve before seen world leader quote Noam Chomsky:
According to respected Professor Noam Chomsky, mankind is at even a greater risk than it was before the 1st and 2nd World Wars in the last century, and this is because of the increased threat of nuclear war, Climate Change, and sadly the rise of authoritarian regimes.
China’s statement to the First Committee has a useful summary of Beijing’s nuclear weapons policies:
China has pursued a nuclear strategy of self-defense, always kept its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for its national security, and has never and will never take part in any nuclear arms race with any other country. Given the huge gap between the nuclear arsenals of China and those of the US and the Russian Federation, it is unfair, unreasonable and infeasible to expect China to join in any trilateral arms control negotiation. China will never participate in such a negotiation and will never accept any coercion or blackmail.
China’s rejection of the so-called “trilateral arms control negotiation” does not mean that China evades its own responsibility for nuclear disarmament or refuses to participate in the global nuclear disarmament process. Ever since the first day of possessing nuclear weapons, China has been advocating the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. China has declared the policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, and unconditionally commits itself not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against Non-Nuclear-Weapon States or Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones. China is the only P5 country who makes such commitments. China firmly abides by its commitments on the moratorium of nuclear tests, and supports the development of the verification mechanism of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). China supports negotiation for a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices on the basis of a comprehensive and balanced program of work in accordance with the mandate contained in the Shannon Report, and supports the work of the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification. China is ready to engage in meaningful dialogue on the issues related to strategic stability with all parties on the basis of mutual respect, and will continue its participation in the arms control process under the framework of the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament and the P5.
The statement also contained some policy recommendations:
In the face of the increasingly complex and ominous international security landscape, the P5 should take proactive measures to manage differences, and work together to maintain global strategic stability. Since the Beijing Conference in January last year, the P5 have reached consensus on carrying out cooperation on strategic security issues including nuclear doctrines and policies, nuclear risk reduction, etc. China suggests that the P5 continue to strengthen dialogue on nuclear policies and doctrines, jointly reiterate that “A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”, make a commitment not to target their nuclear weapons at any State, commit to the no-first-use of nuclear weapons unconditionally, and conclude legally binding international instruments on providing negative and positive security assurances to non-nuclear weapon States. We urge the US to abandon the policies of nuclear umbrella and nuclear sharing, withdraw all the nuclear weapons deployed overseas, stop the development and deployment of its global missile defense system, and play a due role in improving international and regional security environment.
It’s old, but the 2002 UNSG report titled, The Issue of Missiles in All Its Aspects, is a decent primer on missiles. In addition to the history and background, there’s a concise explanation of what missiles are and how they work:
Here’s an excerpt from Pakistan’s statement to the First Committee:
India’s so-called “No first-use” policy lacks credence. Its Defence Minister himself cast doubt on this, when he held out the threat of pre- emptive nuclear attack last year. India has operationalized its “cold start” doctrine of a surprise attack against Pakistan, deploying several “strike force” brigades close to the border; outlined plans for a naval blockade, and proclaimed the intention of fighting a “limited war” with Pakistan under the “nuclear overhang”.
Also,
However, Pakistan cannot remain oblivious to the disturbing security dynamics in our region. Pakistan will take all necessary measures to ensure its security and to maintain full spectrum deterrence.
Peace and stability in South Asia can only be achieved through:
• the resolution of disputes between Pakistan and India, particularly the core issue of Jammu and Kashmir;
• the maintenance of a balance between conventional forces; and
• reciprocal measures for nuclear and missile restraint.
Pakistan’s proposal for a strategic restraint regime in South Asia, based on these inter-locking elements, remains on the table.
The statement also discusses other arms control issues, nuclear disarmament, and nonproliferation. Unsurprisingly, there’s a good deal of material about Pakistan’s relationship with India.
Here is an excerpt from India’s statement to the First Committee:
As a responsible nuclear weapon State, India is committed as per its nuclear doctrine, to maintain credible minimum deterrence with the posture of no-first use and non-use against non-nuclear weapon States. Without diminishing the priority we attach to nuclear disarmament, India supports the immediate commencement of negotiations in the CD of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty on the basis of CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein, which remains the most suitable basis for negotiations to commence, as reinforced by the outcomes of the GGE on FMCT as well as the High-Level Expert Preparatory Group on FMCT. India participated in the recent GGE on Nuclear Disarmament Verification and looks forward to constructively participating in the upcoming GGE on NDV to further contribute in this important area of our work. India has supported the commencement of negotiation by the CD of a legally binding instrument on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), also building on the work of the GGE on PAROS that concluded in March 2019.
The document also calls for
complete elimination of nuclear weapons through a step by step process, enunciated in our Working Paper on Nuclear Disarmament submitted to the UNGA in 2006 and later to the CD in 2007 (CD/1816), has a wide resonance and continuing relevance. India reiterates its call to undertake the steps outlined in the Working Paper…
Here is the paper and here are the steps:
There’s more about topics like chemical and biological weapons, conventional weapons, delivery vehicles, and terrorism.
The Council of the European Union announced on October 12 that it is extending for one year the sanctions applied to several entities linked to CW use.
The Council today decided to extend the regime allowing the EU to impose restrictive measures on persons and entities involved in the development and use of chemical weapons by one year, until 16 October 2021.
The sanctions regime was introduced in 2018 as a follow-up to the conclusions of the European Council of 28 June 2018. The objective was to counter the proliferation and use of chemical weapons, which pose a serious threat to international security. The regime was due to apply until 16 October 2020. On the basis of a regular annual review, it was decided to extend the restrictive measures for a further year.
Restrictive measures currently apply to nine persons – five linked to the Syrian regime and four involved in the Salisbury attack using the toxic nerve agent Novichok – and one organisation, the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC), the Syrian regime’s principal entity for the development of chemical weapons.
It’s likely not news to people who have been following the issue, but the list of sanctioned persons contains some useful detail:
Some information from an October 5 UNSC meeting which serves as a useful follow-up to this post from the other day:
Izumi Nakamitsu, Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, said that, since she last briefed the Council, her Office has maintained regular contact with OPCW and has not received any further information from the Syrian authorities on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013) — which first mandated the scheduled destruction of the country’s chemical weapons programme.