Category Archives: Uncategorized

N Korea Hotels

The BBC has an informative post about North Korea’s hotels, which are a bit of a throwback. It’s actually about a book titled “Hotels of Pyongyang.” One of the authors describes the hotels as “well maintained relics of old times”.

Anyway, there are some good photos:

More on CTBT and Voting Rights

I posted about the voting rights of CTBT states signatories. Here’s a bit more about the process. Here’s the June G-77/China statement:

The Group would like to call attention to paragraph 5-b of the Annex to the Resolution establishing the Preparatory Commission (CTBT/MSS/RES/1) which states that the commission may permit Members to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the Members. The Group is of the view that the extraordinary circumstances occasioned by the COVID-19 pandemic, in which many State Signatories are confronted by debilitating economic uncertainties, may warrant the invocation of the provisions of paragraph 5-b.

Here’s Paragraph5-b of the Annex:

CTBT and Voting Rights

I have no particular expertise in this area, but I noticed the below October 19 EU statement concerning voting rights of CTBTO states signatories and I started digging.

First, the statement:

Nonetheless, it is our view that the Preparatory Commission has now concluded its consideration of the restoration of voting rights to some States Signatories who had applied for this. We reiterate that all States Signatories should fulfil their legal obligations to bear the expenses of the Organisation and pay their assessed contributions in full, on time and without conditions.

The EU warmly welcomes the fact that additional States Signatories have recently paid their contributions, bringing the number of countries with voting rights up to 123. We encourage all States Signatories in arrears to make use of this example, to regain their voting rights and take part in the upcoming Executive Secretary appointment process.

States are broke because of Covid-19. ACT has some more background:

As of July, some 73 CTBTO member states had not fully discharged their financial obligations to the CTBTO, which has resulted in the withholding of their voting rights.

<snip>

After considerable debate and unable to reach agreement on the selection process or eligibility, the June commission meeting was suspended to allow for further consultations in July to try to resolve the matter. The Preparatory Commission meeting was reconvened on July 10, 20, and 24 to reach an agreement on procedures for the executive secretary election, including on how to decide whether states in arrears will be allowed to vote.

According to the final report of the June-July meeting, it was decided that states must meet their financial obligations to the CTBTO by Sept. 15 to be able to vote and put forward a candidate, but exceptions for certain circumstances will be allowed for “conditions beyond the control of the state signatory.” Consideration will be given to states who are making progress toward their annual assessed contribution or to states, such as Iran, who have negotiated a payment plan to meet their financial obligations.

<snip>

Sources indicate that more than 30 states in arrears have filed for exceptions in order to be granted voting rights for the executive secretary selection process.

Here’s some more background from PassBlue:

For the first time in its 24-year history, state parties to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, a multilateral agreement that bans all nuclear testing worldwide, have taken a controversial decision by a two-thirds majority. Decisions in the treaty’s body are usually taken by consensus.

The majority decision on Oct. 19 was focused on whether countries with unpaid dues could vote in the election of the next executive secretary of the Preparatory Commission to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization. (The body is not part of the United Nations but has a cooperative agreement with it.)

The decision occurred after several months of negotiations failed to produce agreement on the matter.

<snip>

In the controversial vote on Oct. 19, member states restored the voting rights of just nine countries out of a total of 25 countries that applied for reinstatement. Diplomats in Vienna say that the list of nine countries was presented by Canada and supported by numerous other Western nations, such as the US and Britain. (The organization’s meetings on the matter were held behind closed doors.)

Two other proposals on restoring voting rights did not meet the necessary two-thirds majority. One proposal suggested reinstating the rights of all 25 countries; the other one, submitted by Russia, offered to restore the rights of 15 countries.

Here are some relevant statements from Russia, the G-77 and China, and the EU,

OPCW Sampling and Analysis in Syria

The folks at Bellingcat published a piece titled Unpublished OPCW Douma Correspondence Raises Doubts about Transparency of “OPCW Leaks” Promoters. I was struck by the portions describing the unpublished letter, some of which contains interesting material concerning the OPCW’s methodology for identifying the use of chlorine gas:

What Wikileaks did not release was a letter drafted by several members of the OPCW in June 2019 and then sent by the director general of the organisation, Fernando Arias, in reply to a letter from Whelan.

In Whelan’s letter he claimed there was no evidence of chlorine being used as a weapon in Douma, and traces of chlorine that were found were not consistent with the release of chlorine gas.

In a draft version of the unpublished reply seen by Bellingcat, Arias explains why Whelan’s assumptions are wrong – he simply wasn’t aware of the latest scientific techniques used by the OPCW because they were developed after he left the organisation. It was these techniques that allowed the OPCW to conclude chlorine chlorine gas had been released in the building in which the Syrian civilians died.

In his letter, which was drafted with the input of several OPCW scientists, Arias wrote: “Your letter further refers to 2,4,6-trichlorophenol as being used erroneously as an indicator of chlorine exposure, and you rightly point out that this chemical can be present for a variety of reasons that do not require chlorine gas exposure. However, there were additional chlorine-containing chemicals found in samples taken from Douma, and in particular, chlorinated pinene compounds that have been shown to form in certain types of wood that have been exposed to chlorine gas.

One of the Designated Laboratories that analysed samples after you completed your tenure has developed methods or analysing wood exposed to chlorine gas that can distinguish between different types of wood in the signatures of chlorinated compounds produced. This laboratory’s analysis of wood samples taken from Douma indicated that the wood indeed had been exposed to chlorine gas. Whether background samples were analysed or not has no bearing on this very clear evidence. All chlorinated compounds identified, combined with all other available data and information, support the conclusion of the report in regard to chlorine. Moreover, the findings from the analysis of samples conducted after the interim report was issued, do not contradict conclusions reached by either the interim or final reports.

“In summary, the environmental samples collected from Douma provided information consistent with an environmental release of a toxic chemical for use as a weapon. The inability to take samples from the victims or attend post-mortem procedures precludes drawing any conclusions on cause of injury and death to humans, and this was correctly and clearly specified in the report.”

EU Arms Database

The EU has established an online database “that will allow everyone to consult and analyse the data on Member States’ arms exports in a user-friendly manner.” The database, which is to be updated annually, “contains information on the value, destination and type of arms export licenses and actual exports from Member States, covering the years 2013-2019.”

This is some good background from the EU press release:

While decisions on issuing export licenses for military equipment are a clear national competence, the assessment criteria on which national authorities base their decisions are European. They are enshrined in the Common Position 2008/944 CFSP as the EU framework on arms export. The EEAS works together with Member States towards increased transparency and convergence in the implementation of that Common Position. It is essential to uphold European values when exporting arms: strict implementation by Member States of the Common Position on arms export is necessary.