All of this excerpt from Eco’s 1977 guide on writing a thesis is worth your time. Here’s an example:
Do not pretend to be Dante by saying that the poetic fury “dictates deep within,” and that you cannot surrender to the flat and pedestrian metalanguage of literary criticism. Are you a poet? Then do not pursue a university degree.
In a comment on this post, Pavel Podvig was kind enough to provide a link to a 2016 S&GS article titled On the Origins and Significance of the Limit Demarcating Low-Enriched Uranium from Highly Enriched Uranium.
I noticed something interesting (to me, anyway).
Here’s what State’s 2019 compliance report said about Chinese proliferation:
CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO ADHERENCE CONCERNS
Chinese entities continued to supply MTCR-controlled goods to missile programs of proliferation concern, including those in Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Pakistan in 2018.
ANALYSIS OF ADHERENCE CONCERNS
In November 2000, the People’s Republic of China (China) made a public commitment not to assist “in any way, any country in the development of ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons (i.e., missiles capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kilograms to a distance of at least 300 kilometers).”
Chinese entities continued to supply MTCR-controlled goods to missile programs of proliferation concern, including those in Iran, DPRK, Syria, and Pakistan in 2018.
China’s Assistance to Iran
Nowhere is the current challenge posed by missile proliferation and the expansion of missile capabilities more clear than in the case of Iran. Iran possesses the largest missile program in the Middle East and continues to work to increase the size, sophistication, range, accuracy, and lethality of its missile arsenal. It is developing an array of solid and liquid propellant short-range and medium-range ballistic missile systems, and continues to push to expand its capabilities.
We also remain concerned about the continuing ties between Chinese suppliers, and missile development efforts in places such as Iran – especially the activities of the infamous Chinese missile technology broker and fugitive from justice Karl Lee (a.k.a. Li Fangwei). Lee continues to shelter in China while serving as the most important overseas supplier of items and material for Iran’s missile program. Lee is a key broker for Iran’s ballistic missile program and provides significant assistance in supporting Iran’s ongoing efforts to develop more sophisticated missiles. The equipment and components that Lee has provide to Iran have contributed to Iran’s continued development of more sophisticated missiles with improved accuracy, range, and lethality.
Despite a warrant out for his arrest, and more than a decade of imposing sanctions on Lee under the Iran, Syria, and North Korea Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA), including most recently in April 2018, the Chinese government, to date, has not taken effective action to end his proliferation activity.
*snip*
Separately, throughout 2018, the United States raised a number of cases with China concerning transfers of missile technology by Chinese entities to programs of concern in Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Pakistan.
There’s a bit more, but that’s the most important part.
Here’s what the 2020 report says about the same topic:
CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO ADHERENCE/COMPLIANCE CONCERNS
Chinese entities continued to supply MTCR-controlled goods to missile programs of proliferation concern in 2019.
Additional information is provided in the higher classification Annex.
ANALYSIS OF ADHERENCE/COMPLIANCE CONCERNS
In November 2000, the People’s Republic of China (China) made a public commitment not to assist “in any way, any country in the development of ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons (i.e., missiles capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kilograms to a distance of at least 300 kilometers).”
Chinese entities continued to supply MTCR-controlled goods to missile programs of proliferation concern in 2019.
The JASON report about which I previously blogged, has an informative paragraph about the significance of the 20% U-235 threshold:
The choice of 20% enrichment to define LEU comes from tests and calculations carried out in the early 1950s, which indicated that a nuclear weapon could not be built using uranium enriched to less than 20%. Uranium at 20.1% enrichment is not significantly more weapons-usable than at 19.9%- there is no sharp physics threshold… there are no thresholds near the 20% enrichment level that would affect design or construction of a nuclear weapon. We needn’t worry about someone making a weapon with 19.99%-enriched uranium and the same is true for enrichments of 21% or 22%.
SPIN was nice enough to let me write this piece for them. Let the record reflect that the initial draft had considerably less detail about the No-Penis Guy.
This came out a while back, but I thought I’d point out the 2016 JASON report titled Low-Enriched Uranium for Potential Naval Nuclear Propulsion Applications. There are a number of useful bits, but I particularly like this chart
The BBC has an informative post about North Korea’s hotels, which are a bit of a throwback. It’s actually about a book titled “Hotels of Pyongyang.” One of the authors describes the hotels as “well maintained relics of old times”.
Anyway, there are some good photos:
