This 1977 MEMCON describes a discussion between President Carter and Nigerian Lt. General Olusegun Obasanjo regarding nuclear suppliers:

Nigerian Lt. General Olusegun Obasanjo  What about China?

President Carter: They feel that nuclear power is their own business.
But they are not a major supplier, and they probably don’t wish to be.
They are facing the Soviet atomic threat. China wants an international conference, and wants that to lead to the elimination of nuclear explosives worldwide. But while they’re facing the USSR, they do not wish limitations to be placed on their capacity in this regard.

Here’s another photo of IR-6 centrifuges:

Here are some other photos which I previously posted.

Here’s the text of a July letter from Foreign Minister Zarif to the UNSG. This paragraph stands out:

The US and E3 illusion that there can ever be a renegotiation of the timetable enshrined in the JCPOA and Resolution 2231 represents utter bad faith. The timetable for termination of voluntary restrictions accepted by Iran in the JCPOA—maliciously called “JCPOA sunset clauses,” in order to evoke fear— were the subject of the longest and most difficult negotiating process—which began from the very first day of the Muscat discussions in August 2012, and continued until the evening of July 13, 2015. Agreement on the current timetable required great flexibility and compromise on the part of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and huge sacrifices by Iran on other significant issues.

The letter includes a useful annex containing a slew of public Iranian documents concerning the JCPOA. Nice to have them all in one place.

Not exactly new, but this 2019 report from the Czech Republic’s Intel Service describes a North Korean procurement scheme:

Another case, which was disclosed in 2019 but took place earlier, illustrates well the use of elaborate re-exportation routes. This time North Korea tried to procure tank and armoured vehicle engines from the Czech Republic. The BIS discovered that North Koreans were trying to re-export the engines through Moldova, where the cargo was re-labelled as fishing boat engines in customs declarations. The cargo was then supposed to be transported to Ukraine, where it would be re-labelled again as power generator engines. The deal was guaranteed by banking institutions form several countries. Based on the BIS intelligence, the re-exportation process was cancelled.

According to the DAE,

The total amount of Uranium reserves in India as on February, 2021 is 3,50,438 tonne (t) in situ U3O8 (2,97,170t U).

This lengthy 1993 report by the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts To Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures From a Scientific and Technical Standpoint has a good deal of material with regard to a BWC verification regime, including a description of concerns with regard to declarations.

For example,

information provided… would need to be made available to all States Parties. Concern was expressed that this could create confidentiality problems for some of the categories of information already suggested as the subject for declarations.

That issue is familiar, but this one was new-ish to me:

…releasing the names of personnel employed in a declared facility may result in attacks by animal rights activists or terrorists. Industry may be unwilling to provide commercially sensitive information if it was to be made public. It may be possible to prevent such problems by careful definition of what information is required to be declared, and by ensuring the information is strictly controlled under the BWC.

Four hundred thousand people marched for CND… They’re already dead, unless they’re willing to act on what they see… They’re already dead

This document about which I wrote the other day has two other items of note:

Slogan: Nuclear war is having to never say “Sorry.”

Organization: Unicorn Peace for Children

This article about CND links to this document which “records placards and slogans” seen at a 1983 CND demonstration and

painstakingly lists organisations spotted participating. The list includes hundreds of regional CND groups as well as trade unions, Labour groups, and all sorts of special interest groups ranging from Marxist Leninists to the Royal Court Theatre, West Oxford Woodcraft Folk, and Whores Against Wars: English Collective of Prostitutes, to name but a few.

A while back, DIA posted this piece titled This Week in DIA History: DIA Identifies Leak of Classified KH-11 Capabilities.

Here’s an excerpt:

In 1978, analysts noted a sizeable increase in Soviet efforts to avoid satellite detection of their activities — even of weapon systems previously photographed. Although the Soviets knew the KH-11 satellite passed over the USSR, they had misclassified it as a non-photographic satellite. Suddenly, KH-11 collection on troop and equipment deployments, SS-20 mobile missiles and Backfire Bombers diminished. This provided clear indication that the Soviets obtained new, damaging information on the true capabilities of the KH-11.