In this document, the E3 included an explanation of the relationship between the MTCR Category I definition and nuclear weapons.

According to the MTCR Guidelines, Cat I items

include complete rocket systems (including ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles and sounding rockets) and unmanned air vehicle systems (including cruise missiles systems, target and reconnaissance drones) with capabilities exceeding a 300km/500kg range/payload threshold;

The August E3 letter to the UNSC explains that the 300/500 thresholds are “the recognized minima for the mass of a nuclear warhead and the distance required to ensure self-preservation after delivery.”

In a May statement to the UNGA, India described its nuclear posture:

India is committed to its credible minimum deterrence policy, a posture of non-first use of nuclear weapons and non-use against non-nuclear weapons States. India believes that the goal of a nuclear-weapon- free world can be achieved through a step-by-step process underwritten by a universal commitment and an agreed multilateral framework that is global, verifiable and non-discriminatory.

India also stated its position on an FMCT:

India supports the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a fissile material cut-off treaty on the basis of document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein

DAE explained in a recent response to aa parliamentary question that the country’s thorium “is available in Monazite, a Prescribed Substance as per the Atomic Energy Act 1962. Monazite is found in association with suite of six other atomic minerals..”

The department provided more detail about the country’s Thorium program :

Development of technologies pertaining to utilisation of thorium has been a part of ongoing R & D activities in Department of Atomic Energy so that a mature technology is in place, well before the beginning of the large scale deployment of the thorium based reactors. With sustained efforts over the years, India has gained experience in different areas of thorium fuel cycle. Large scale thorium utilisation is contemplated after a few decades of large scale deployment of Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs). In order to develop and demonstrate technologies for thorium based fuel, Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR) has been designed by Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC). It is also having advanced safety and passive engineered systems which enhance its safety. Efforts are currently on to enlarge the present thorium related R&D work and activities to a bigger scale and towards development of technologies for the third stage of our nuclear power programme.

,

Question: “Will the Minister of Atomic Energy be pleased to state…whether the Chinese are against Indian entry into the elite Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the position of the Government in this regard”?

Answer:

India’s membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) continues to be under the consideration of the Group. India has received support from a large number of members of the NSG. As a non-member of NSG, India is not privy to its internal discussions. However, it is gathered that procedural issues have been raised in the NSG in regard to consideration of India’s application for the membership. The Government has continued to engage with members of the NSG, at the appropriate levels, for support for an early decision on India”s membership by the Group.

This 1977 MEMCON describes a discussion between President Carter and Nigerian Lt. General Olusegun Obasanjo regarding nuclear suppliers:

Nigerian Lt. General Olusegun Obasanjo  What about China?

President Carter: They feel that nuclear power is their own business.
But they are not a major supplier, and they probably don’t wish to be.
They are facing the Soviet atomic threat. China wants an international conference, and wants that to lead to the elimination of nuclear explosives worldwide. But while they’re facing the USSR, they do not wish limitations to be placed on their capacity in this regard.

Here’s another photo of IR-6 centrifuges:

Here are some other photos which I previously posted.

Here’s the text of a July letter from Foreign Minister Zarif to the UNSG. This paragraph stands out:

The US and E3 illusion that there can ever be a renegotiation of the timetable enshrined in the JCPOA and Resolution 2231 represents utter bad faith. The timetable for termination of voluntary restrictions accepted by Iran in the JCPOA—maliciously called “JCPOA sunset clauses,” in order to evoke fear— were the subject of the longest and most difficult negotiating process—which began from the very first day of the Muscat discussions in August 2012, and continued until the evening of July 13, 2015. Agreement on the current timetable required great flexibility and compromise on the part of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and huge sacrifices by Iran on other significant issues.

The letter includes a useful annex containing a slew of public Iranian documents concerning the JCPOA. Nice to have them all in one place.

Not exactly new, but this 2019 report from the Czech Republic’s Intel Service describes a North Korean procurement scheme:

Another case, which was disclosed in 2019 but took place earlier, illustrates well the use of elaborate re-exportation routes. This time North Korea tried to procure tank and armoured vehicle engines from the Czech Republic. The BIS discovered that North Koreans were trying to re-export the engines through Moldova, where the cargo was re-labelled as fishing boat engines in customs declarations. The cargo was then supposed to be transported to Ukraine, where it would be re-labelled again as power generator engines. The deal was guaranteed by banking institutions form several countries. Based on the BIS intelligence, the re-exportation process was cancelled.

According to the DAE,

The total amount of Uranium reserves in India as on February, 2021 is 3,50,438 tonne (t) in situ U3O8 (2,97,170t U).

This lengthy 1993 report by the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts To Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures From a Scientific and Technical Standpoint has a good deal of material with regard to a BWC verification regime, including a description of concerns with regard to declarations.

For example,

information provided… would need to be made available to all States Parties. Concern was expressed that this could create confidentiality problems for some of the categories of information already suggested as the subject for declarations.

That issue is familiar, but this one was new-ish to me:

…releasing the names of personnel employed in a declared facility may result in attacks by animal rights activists or terrorists. Industry may be unwilling to provide commercially sensitive information if it was to be made public. It may be possible to prevent such problems by careful definition of what information is required to be declared, and by ensuring the information is strictly controlled under the BWC.