Here are selected matters of which the UNSC is seized:

Small arms (24 September 1999; 5 February 2020).

Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (22 April 2004; 27 September 2021).

Non-proliferation (29 March 2006; 30 June 2021)

Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts (12 September 2001; 19 August 2021).

Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (14 October 2006; 11 December 2019).

The India-Pakistan question (6 January 1948; 5 November 1965)

The situation between Iran and Iraq (26 September 1980; 31 January 1991).

The situation in the India/Pakistan subcontinent (4 December 1971; 27 December 1971).

In January, Muhammad Omar, Pakistan’s First Secretary to the UN in Geneva, gave the most recent iteration of Islamabad’s explanation concerning the Khan network debacle:

The so-called Network comprised of several people from over two dozen countries spanning four continents. A.Q. Khan‟s involvement in this international network was an individual act, not sanctioned by the State of Pakistan. 

Pakistan thoroughly investigated his involvement and shared its findings with the IAEA and other concerned countries. It helped in exposing the international associates of this clandestine supply network and he was placed under strict restrictions which remain in place to this day. Other countries‟ nationals involved with the network did not meet the same fate and in most cases escaped punishment altogether. The AQ Khan issue is a closed chapter. Since this incident, Pakistan has taken a series of effective measures to preclude any possibility of such an occurrence in the future. 

This document submitted by Pakistan to the IAEA in 1978 has some Information about the country’s nuclear power program.

This statement from India’s PermRep to the CD explains that

India, is [sic] a responsible nuclear weapon State and as per its nuclear doctrine, follows a policy of maintaining a credible minimum deterrence, based on a no-first-use posture and non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States.

This 1967 report from the Joint Commission on Atomic Energy, titled Impact of Chinese Communist Nuclear Weapons Progress on United States National Security, makes for interesting reading, particularly this section comparing the French and Chinese nuclear weapons programs:

I suspect that this summary paragraph was meant to draw the most attention:

This 2008 speech by Thomas Fingar is pretty informative,. For example, there’s his description of Intellipedia in response to a question from the moderator.

Intellipedia is a classified version of Wikipedia that we started up about two and a half years ago. And part of it was sort of responding to the way our younger workforce lives in the digital realm.

<snip>

We want people to have the equivalent of an eBay reputation.

These references by the moderator were current at the time:

That concept of reputation – one can spin that out a little bit. The Intelligence Community version of Friendster or MySpace or whatever where the more friends you have, the better you are thought of.

Anachronisms are funny.

This September OPCW background document is a great primer for the CWC.

Michael Maloof, former Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group official during the GW Bush administration, explained during this interview published in 2006 that the 2002 case for Iraqi WMD possession was, in his opinion, weak:

The argument for WMD, however, all of a sudden began to emerge. Some of us who had been following Iraq for years, particularly on the export control side, thought, well, that’s not the best argument. … In fact, I had sent a memo saying this was not our strongest argument. Simply because you had inspectors going in and out, we would see elements going in, because we were watching the transfer and the diversion of technologies — we knew they were going through front companies and countries in Africa. They were going to be building it back up and saving it, holding it, until which time the sanctions could be lifted. Then they’re going to go back into production, into their nuclear production, into their chemical/biological and missile productions. … But never did they have a program constituted and operational that we could determine. …

From this same report:

This 1960 AEC document expresses concern about gas centrifuges’ potential contribution to nuclear proliferation.