Decibel Magazine has “an interview”:http://www.decibelmagazine.com/features_detail.aspx?id=4908 with Ice-T where he discusses, among other topics, some current foreign policy issues.

It’s pretty sweet. Here’s what he had to say about the hunt for Osama bin Laden and the status of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program:

*Ice-T:* …we ain’t lookin’ for bin Laden, right? He set it off, and we kinda left him out in the cold. We already know the politics of the Taliban at the end of the day, but bin Laden got off. I mean, we’re allowed to fight back. If you bomb us, we’re allowed to f*ck with you, but they ain’t even lookin’ for bin Laden. And he’s like, “F*ck you” — still. [Laughs] He’s in, like, a Puffy video right now or some shit.

*Decibel:* Wherever he is, he’s a hero to the people who are hiding him.

*Ice-T:* Exactly. In the meantime, we’re trying to play some PlayStation and have a life, but Bush and Cheney and all these motherf*ckers got foreign policy issues that quite possibly could… You know what the f*cking thing is? Right now is the only time in my life where we’re really in a position where we could all die. Vietnam wasn’t it, but right now, with North Korea and all these motherf*ckers, this is real shit. A nuke could go off within the next three years real easy. And now that the Middle East is buck wile, the United States doesn’t even know what the f*ck to do. They can’t even clean up New Orleans, man.

Now get back to your PlayStation…

I have a feeling that telling “clowns”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/945/iran-focus-part-1-how-close-is-iran-to-the-bomb like “Charles Krauthammer”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/14/AR2006091401413_pf.html that exaggerated Iran intel could increase support for a bombing campaign is kind of like “Ordell Robbie admonishing”:http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0119396/quotes his girlfriend while she smokes herb on the couch:

Ordell Robbie: That shit’ll rob you of your ambition.

Melanie: Not if your ambition is to get high and watch TV.

I’m sure all of you saw “yesterday’s _Post_ article”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/13/AR2006091302052.html regarding the “IAEA letter”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/document091406.pdf criticizing this “HPSCI report”:http://intelligence.house.gov/Media/PDFS/Release082306.pdf (which Jeffrey mocked “here”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1171/tcb-on-fleitz-of-fancy) about US intelligence on Iran.

You can read the letter “here”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/document091406.pdf, but the piece nicely adds value. For example:

bq. Privately, several intelligence officials said the committee report included at least a dozen claims that were either demonstrably wrong or impossible to substantiate. Hoekstra’s office said the report was reviewed by the office of John D. Negroponte, the director of national intelligence.

One scary item that I haven’t seen mentioned much is that the HPSCI is busy on a similar report about North Korea:

Hoekstra’s committee is working on a separate report about North Korea that is also being written principally by Fleitz. A draft of the report, provided to The Post, includes several assertions about North Korea’s weapons program that the intelligence officials said they cannot substantiate, including one that Pyongyang is already enriching uranium.

The intelligence community believes North Korea is trying to acquire an enrichment capability but has no proof that an enrichment facility has been built, the officials said.

Ick.

I ain’t no lawyer, but I thought I’d try and provide an answer to a comment made the other day in response to “this post”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1194/rumsfeld-reports-on-iaea.
I thought I would make a post out of my response, lest it be lost in the comments section.

Hass said:

Sorry but there is a great deal of debate over the legality of PSI – even in its present form. The PSI docs claim that it is consistent with international law however under Article 110 of the Law of the Sea Convention the interdiction of vessels is legally only permitted if they’re engaged in five possible activities, all of which are themselves illegal such as carrying contraband (drug trafficking on the high seas is prohibited by the 1988 Vienna Convention.) Otherwise interdiction requires the consent of the flag State in international waters.

The US has tried to fit the PSI into international law by dressing it up in the language of international law and later by claiming it constitutes “self-defense” but few are buying that. Even some in the US worry that it could just as easily be applied to the US.
Since the PSI is selectively applied to states which are designated (by whom?) of “proliferation concern” this raises even more doubts that the PSI constitutes a general norm or standard of international law. It is at best a multilateral agreement which is enforceable only among its participants but which is otherwise contrary to international law

First of all, arguing that there is a “debate” about the legality of interdictions isn’t the same thing as the argument made in the original comment. Leave the goalposts where they are, please.

[Hass originally said, “But hasn’t the Bush administration instituted the “Proliferation Security Initiative” outside of the UN Law of the Sea system to (illegally) interdict missiles and other “wmd-related” material from going to countries we don’t like on an ad hoc basis?”]

Second, I’d like to see how widespread any debate over the PSI’s legality really is. According to “this State Dept. fact sheet”:http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/46839.htm, 60+ countries have voiced support for the PSI, which includes “this statement of principles.”:http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/23764.htm

There _has_ been a debate about the legality of on interdictions on the high seas. But that’s not really the focus of PSI. To the extent that the initiative deals with those sorts of interdictions, it works within existing legal authority by, for example, U.S. bilateral boarding agreements.

As my colleague Wade Boese “has written”:http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/PSI.asp:

Legal Authority: The initiative does not empower countries to do anything that they previously could not do. Most importantly, PSI does not grant governments any new legal authority to conduct interdictions in international waters or airspace. Such interdictions may take place, but they must be confined to what is currently permissible under international law. For example, a ship can be stopped in international waters if it is not flying a national flag or properly registered. It cannot be stopped simply because it is suspected of transporting WMD or related goods. PSI is primarily intended to encourage participating countries to take greater advantage of their own existing national laws to intercept threatening trade passing through their territories and where they have jurisdiction to act. In situations where the legal authority to act may be ambiguous, Bolton said participants might go to the UN Security Council for authorization.[3]

PSI participants are working to expand their legal authority to interdict shipments by signing bilateral boarding agreements with select countries to secure expedited processes or pre-approval for stopping and searching their ships at sea. The United States has concluded such agreements with Belize, Croatia, Cyprus, Liberia, the Marshall Islands, and Panama. Liberia and Panama possess the largest fleets of registered ocean-going vessels in the world.

To be fair, “there is evidence”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_11/PSI.asp that Bolton was pushing the boundaries on high-seas interdictions:

bq. Still, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton holds out the hope that the initiative will lead countries to act more aggressively within current law and, in effect, change it. In comments published Oct. 21 by The Wall Street Journal, Bolton said, “As state practice changes, customary international law changes.”

For more information, Jofi Joseph dropped a bunch of PSI knowledge “here”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_06/Joseph.asp.

I love this part of today’s “BW piece by Joby Warrick:”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/29/AR2006072900592_pf.html

Current and former administration officials say that compliance with the treaty hinges on intent, and that making small amounts of biowarfare pathogens for study is permitted under a broad interpretation of the treaty. Some also argue that the need for a strong biodefense in an age of genetic engineering trumps concerns over what they see as legal hair-splitting.

“How can I go to the people of this country and say, ‘I can’t do this important research because some arms-control advocate told me I can’t’?” asked [Penrose “Parney”] Albright, the former Homeland Security assistant secretary.

I guess he could consider that whole “law” thing that such advocates are probably thinking about, but whatever.

FYI, Jonathan Tucker “dropped some relevant knowledge”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_10/Tucker.asp about the lab in question a couple years ago.

While the usual suspects fantasize in their collective right-wing whack-shack about a North Korean ballistic missile test, a working GMD, etc., it would be useful to take a look at what North Korea’s MFA said 1 June.

The fact that North Korea invited Chris Hill for a visit was widely reported at the time. But I don’t remember anyone noting that the statement also said that Pyongyang has made a “strategic decision” to give up its nuclear weapons program.

Here’s the relevant part of the “statement”:http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2006/200606/news06/02.htm#1:

Of late officials of the U.S. administration never open their mouths without crying out for the “resumption of the six-party talks.” They bluster that Pyongyang needs to make a strategic decision and Washington is seeking a new approach toward the DPRK in a bid to build up public opinion.

This, however, is bringing into bolder relief the U.S. true intention to torpedo the six-party talks, not pleased with their process.

[snip]

We will not need even a single nuclear weapon once we get convinced that the U.S. does not antagonize us and confidence is built between the DPRK and the U.S. and, accordingly, we are no longer exposed to the U.S. threat. This is what we have already clarified more than once.

The DPRK has already made a strategic decision to abandon its nuclear program and this was reflected in the above-said joint statement.

We are fully ready to discuss the issues of bilateral relations, peaceful coexistence, the conclusion of a peace agreement, the provision of light water reactors and other points mentioned in the statement along with the issue of abandoning the nuclear program on the principle of “simultaneous action”.

What remains to be done is for the U.S. to create conditions and climate whereby the DPRK may return to the talks and fulfill its commitment, free from any pressure.

I can’t say that I’ve done the lexis search, but I’m pretty sure this is the first time that North Korea has actually used the phrase “strategic decision.” Anyway, the whole thing is pretty interesting – go “read it”:http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2006/200606/news06/02.htm#1.

Here’s “your reward”:http://www.snakesonablog.com/2006/06/22/snakes-on-the-colbert-report-ii/ for educating yourself.

*Update:*

From the comments section… a reader points out that North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gae Gwan “used the phase”:http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/08/14/gwan.transcript/index.html last summer.

I actually reported his comment in “this piece”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_09/NKoreaTalks9-05.asp on the 6PT. Guess the memory’s not what it used to be….wish I had an excuse other than old age.

I still think the latest comment is important, given the timing and source – a written FM statement is, I think, considered more authoritative.

Well-spotted, though.

Knight-Ridder “reported yesterday”:http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/news/nation/14747136.htm on “this article”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_06/ReorgRunAmok.asp by Dean Rust.

Read the whole thing, but I think this excerpt give some idea of his conclusion:

Yet, the botched implementation has already led many experienced career officers to leave the newly constituted ISN bureau, with others closely on their heels. This resource of knowledge, experience, and advice was consciously built up over the past 30 years in the State Department and the former Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), which was merged into the State Department in 1999 to strengthen its ability to address weapons proliferation. The dissipation of this resource will hamper the State Department’s role at home and abroad for years to come.

Frankly, one could argue that this reduction in the State Department’s role is precisely the outcome some were seeking. It is no secret that some in the administration have little faith in treaties and institutional approaches to arms control and nonproliferation. What better way to strip the State Department of its capabilities in these areas, including its experienced officers, than under the guise of reorganization?

Wade and Miles “asked”:http://www.armscontrol.org/interviews/20060518_Joseph.asp?print Joseph whether “the reorganization was politically motivated and will weaken U.S. efforts to address global weapons dangers.”

Joseph: The reorganization was not politically motivated. The call for the merger of the arms control and nonproliferation bureaus surfaced for the first time in a review by the [State Department Inspector General (IG)]. The objective of the merger was, and remains, to restructure these two bureaus so that they and the very talented people that reside in them can make the greatest contribution to dealing with today’s national security threats. I would start from the basic question: how can the State Department and, specifically, how can the bureaus [under the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security] make the greatest contribution to our national security? At the top of the list of the threats we face is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, whether it is Iran, North Korea, other rogue states, or terrorists. We have restructured these two bureaus. We have created new offices in these bureaus to deal with the new threats that we face today to ensure, with regard to our traditional tools of nonproliferation, that we are making the greatest contribution. Whether that is in terms of strengthening the treaty regimes, or improving our export control assistance to other countries, or in the context of new missions promoting the effectiveness of the Proliferation Security Initiative, or implementing Security Council Resolution 1540, or expanding programs that will help to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

ACT: You mentioned the IG report. Why were the responsibilities of the Verification and Compliance Bureau increased while the IG report recommended that the bureau should have its functions and role narrowed?

Joseph: We looked at the issue across the bureaus and it seemed to me and to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that the best approach was to create a new bureau that focused on proliferation threats. This is the International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau. The traditional arms control implementation functions we believed fit more appropriately with the verification bureau. It was those offices that were transferred into that bureau.

That interview has a bunch of other interesting items. Take a look.

Newsweek published “an interview”:http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12758097/site/newsweek/ the other day with former South African president F.W. de Klerk.

He discussed several topics, including South Africa’s past nuclear weapons program.

Asked about the country’s decision to give up its weapons, he said:

I wasn’t part of the inner circle that developed [the program]. It was not my decision to build [the bomb], and I did not have the power to stop it. I was never enthusiastic about it. But as it was explained [to me] then, it was built never to be used, but to have it as a deterrent†to almost be used as a shield. It was built in the face of a definite threat, a definite strategy by the U.S.S.R., to directly or indirectly gain control of the whole of southern Africa … When I became president this threat changed in the sense that the Berlin Wall came down. Suddenly the U.S.S.R. was no longer this world power …

Interestingly, he addressed the oft-repeated claim that South Africa gave up its weapons because it didn’t want the ANC to have them:

Some people accuse me of doing it [because] I realized that our constitutional negotiations would lead to a [Mandela-led] African National Congress government and [that] I was not prepared to let them control such a weapon. It’s not true.

First of all, the threat had changed, we didn’t need [the bomb], it had become a millstone around our neck. [Also,] I wanted South Africa to return as soon as possible to the international arena, and I wanted to convince the rest of the world that we really were not playing with words, we really were prepared to undertake negotiations which would result in fundamental change. I wanted to achieve international support for the change process in South Africa, and I wanted to ensure that the leading countries of the world would keep an eye over the negotiation process and that if [there were] a threat of the negotiations deteriorating into further conflict, then they would step in to assure that a negotiated solution is guaranteed.

The former president also commented on the Iran situation. Asked whether isolation and negative incentives could persuade Iran to compromise on its nuclear program, de Klerk noted that South Africa developed nuclear weapons

because of the stick… [the] result of growing isolation from the rest of the world. I’m not a believer in sanctions [which were imposed against South Africa] as being a very successful method of exercising pressure. My viewpoint about the value of sanctions and international isolation is that they should be reserved for very serious situations, and if that doesn’t work in 18 months or two years, then it should be accepted that as a strategy it has failed to achieve its objectives. I believe in engagement, and I believe in negotiation.”

A quick follow-up to “Jeffrey’s post”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1047/politicizing-intel about intelligence and political pressure. Paul Pillar, former National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia, said during a “7 March CFR appearence”:http://www.cfr.org/publication/10097/intelligence_policy_and_the_war_in_iraq_rush_transcript_federal_news_service_inc.html:

MR. BASS: In your Foreign Affairs piece, you talk about a politicized and pressurized environment between the intelligence community and the Bush administration, which, you argue, generated a fair amount of ill will. And you said that this was all done quite subtly, in the piece.

I wonder if you could explain to us, perhaps with some examples, what this looked like in the real world, what this looked like in your day to day job? How did you feel that sort of subtle pressure on a day-to-day basis, memo to memo, meeting to meeting, e-mail to e-mail?

MR. PILLAR: Well, probably the main thing day to day — and this is something that the Silberman and Robb commission mentioned as a phenomenon they observed, although they didn’t carry the casual linkage as far as I’m carrying it — differential treatment that different draft intelligence assessments get as they go through the procedure of being coordinated and approved. And you have to remember, anything that sees light of day as a published — published in the sense of a classified paper — intelligence assessment goes through usually multiple levels of review, various supervisors, branch chiefs and so on, weighing in, approving or disapproving, remanding, forcing changes. That can be a speedy process or it can be a long, very torturous process.

And one of the things the commission observed was that assessments that tended to support or conform with the case being made for war had an easier time making it through that gauntlet than those that did not. And the only thing I’m adding to what the commission found was to pose the question, what is the most important reason why that was the case? And I think the most important reason, besides the overall mind-set that turned out to be erroneous, was the desire to avoid the unpleasantness of putting unwelcome assessments on the desks of policymakers.

MR. BASS: So how does this actually work? Because some of the gauntlet that — you’ve described there is a gauntlet that’s within the bureaucracy of the intelligence community, not directly in the purview of the policymakers —

MR. PILLAR: Well, it’s all within the intelligence community — what I’m talking about — yeah.

MR. BASS: So you feel that the pressure from the policy side to give us answer A rather answer B has sort of permeated down through the bureaucracy?

MR. PILLAR: Through every level, yes. From the most senior levels through, you know, levels like my own to the level of the working analysts. I mean, it was quite apparent from — certainly from, I would say, early 2002 — if not that, mid-2002 — that we were going to war, that the decision had been made, and there is other reporting to this effect that supports that. And you know, intelligence analysts, they get paid to try to make sense of, you know, government decisions. Usually it’s foreign governments, but — (laughter). But you know, it would be a pretty obtuse intelligence analyst who couldn’t have discerned by fairly early in 2002 where the U.S. government was going and what the preferences of our own government were. So it was all too apparent.

MR. BASS: Who’s putting the screws on in this process? Who’s sending this pressure going through? The pressure isn’t done amorphously; it has to be done individually and —

MR. PILLAR: No, but it’s not — it’s not a matter of screws, Warren. That’s where —

MR. BASS: That’s too harsh a way of phrasing it.

MR. PILLAR: That’s where the inquiries of the Senate Intelligence Committee and the Silberman-Robb commission, which overall did an excellent job, fall a little bit short. The question was posed, basically, to analysts: Were your arms twisted? And the answer that came back, unsurprisingly, was no. Unsurprising for two reasons.

One, it’s particularly damning for any analysts to admit foursquare that his or her analysis has been politicized. I mean, that’s an even more damning admission than to say you’ve made a more mundane kind of analytic error because it gets right to your analytic and professional integrity.

Also unsurprising because, certainly in my experience, the great majority of cases of actual politicization — successful politicization — are unvariably subtle. If you get someone trying to twist arms and be blatant about it, it’s almost always unsuccessful if for no other reason than you get a bunch of analysts’ dander up and in more of a resistance mode rather than a conforming mode. So it’s not turning screws, it’s not twisting arms.

I thought this next part was quite interesting, and it says a lot about how ‘wingers tend to view the world – the real problems are uncooperative bureaucrats and insufficiently righteous individuals opposing their policies.

As opposed to, say, facts.

For example, the IC said that Iraq wasn’t procuring uranium from Niger because the IC opposed the invasion of Iraq. It was not because Iraq was not procuring uranium from Niger.

Pillar said:

You know, one of the reasons I think that this issue of politicization has tended to be reduced to the question of turning screws and twisting arms is it’s almost looked at as some kind of game. You know, you have the intelligence team against the policy team, and the question is, was there a foul that the refs didn’t see? And if the intelligence team didn’t score points when they were supposed to score points, was it because they were fouled by the policy team?

Well, it’s not a game. The intelligence people and the policy people are supposed to be on the same team on behalf of the same national interests. And we ought to be concerned, you know, even if there are no flagrant fouls, there’s no place where the ref is going to pull out his handkerchief and throw it on the ground. We ought to be concerned any time that there is an environment created that discourages, rather than encourages, intelligence analysts from producing their best, most objective product. And even if it falls short of a flagrant foul, that’s an issue of importance.

Also, note “Josh Marshall’s follow-up”:http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/archives/008284.php to the CBS Drumheller piece. He talks about what the Robb-Silberman Commission did – or didn’t do – with the information he gave them.

BTW, not only has this great country produced “Snakes On A Plane”:http://snakesonablog.com/, but it has also given us the “urban combat skateboard”:http://www.defensetech.org/archives/002321.html. Oh yeah.

I just recalled that I found “this ITAR-TASS interview”:http://www.itar-tass.com/eng/level2.html?NewsID=3720423 with DPRK Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sung last month. My impression is that Paek doesn’t give too many of these, at least that are available in English.

This portion well summarizes Pyongyang’s take on its diplomacy with Washington and Tokyo, at least as it stood in late February:

Q. – In your view, is there a possibility to resume the next round of the 6-partite talks in the near future? And if so, may they bring about a concrete outcome having in mind in the first place attainment of the agreement between DPRK and the USA?

A. – The denuclerization of the Korean peninsula is our final goal. Inalterable and consequent is our stand to observe the clauses of the Joint Statement agreed upon through such hard labor as a result of the Fourth Round of the 6-partite talks. However, after adopting the Joint Statement the USA openly transgress the spirit of the Statement and exert even more pressure against our Republic therefore creating serious obstacles on the way of moving the 6-partite talks forward.

The “illegal trade version” and the financial sanctions against the DPRK that followed are in essence a campaign of conspiracy aimed to “bring down the regime” in the DPRK and to achieve “first-order dismantling of the Nuclear Program”. There is no .justification for the financial sanctions by the USA that put a barrier across the road to fulfillment of the Joint Statement adopted as a result of the Fourth Round of the 6-partite talks.

Inalterable is our will to fulfill the Joint Statement of the 6-partitel talks. We are ready to have talks at any time provided the stumbling blocks on the road to the progress of the 6-partite talks and the fulfillment of the Joint Statement are removed.

Q. – Is there any chance for further consultations between Pyongyang and Tokyo relating to normalization of bilateral relations? Do you consider the possibility of establishing constant high level contacts with Japan prior to solving the problem of official reciprocal recognition?

A. – The normalization of relations between DPRK and Japan fully depends on the approach by Tokyo. The main obstacle for the normalization of bilateral relations is that Japan still does not in a proper way repent for its past crimes against our people and tries to avoid the question of drawing the line to the past under the guise of economic cooperation.

Japan ought to rationally assess the course of time, to repent in good faith and to draw the line under its past crimes, to abstain from hostile activities against DPRK including the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula. Only then it will be recognized as a “full member of the international community”, and the problem of normalizing relations between the DPRK and Japan will also be solved.

This is “my latest take”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_04/nkustalksinch.asp on the situation.

Chris Nelson included “this interview”:http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/pac0612.pdf with Richard Armitage from _The Oriental Economist_ in a report last week.

Read the whole thing, but here’s one of the more interesting portions:

TOE:Would you clarify a controversial episode regarding North
Korea policy? Early on, you testified to Congress that the
Bush administration would eventually hold bilateral talks
with North Korea. President Bush was said to be very angry
with you. Is that true?

RA:Some people in the administration were very angry. But
members of Congress were very happy. All of our allies in
Asia were delighted. And, what I said eventually became our
policy. But it is true that after I initially made my comments, I
knew that some people in some quarters of the administration
were very unhappy.

TOE:So, what is the relationship between the Six-Party Talks and
the bilateral talks with North Korea?

RA:I was very clear in that testimony that, in the context of
the Six-Party Talks, of course we would have bilateral talks
with the North Koreans. And that is exactly what has
happened. We’ve had bilateral talks with the North.
It took a while. Some people in the administration are
frightened that diplomacy is a signal of weakness. I disagreed.
I was convinced that if we knew who we are, and we know
what we are and what we are about, we can make diplomacy
work for us. In the end, diplomacy is the art of letting the other
guy have our way.

TOE:Will the Six-Party Talks work?

RA:They are a good exercise. We have five of the six parties
of a common mind, that North Korea should not have nuclear
weapons. That’s a good starting point. It provides a good
reason for us to get together a talk. I think the process is very
worthwhile. Having said that, it is not going very far, very
fast. The same splits that existed in the Bush administration
when I was in office still exist.

I give my highest compliments to Chris Hill, the State
Department’s new Asia chief. He is doing a tremendous job.
But he has the same problems that we faced when Jim Kelly
and I were there.

TOE:What problems did you face?

RA:There is a fundamental disagreement over how to
approach the North Korea problem. There is a fear in some
quarters, particularly the Pentagon and at times in the vice
president’s office, that if we were to engage in discussions
with the North Koreans, we might wind up with the bad end of
the deal. They believe that we should be able to pronounce our
view, and everyone else, including the North Koreans, should
simply accept it. This is not a reasonable approach.

Those of us at the State Department concluded: From the
North Korean point of view, the nuclear issue is the only
reason we Americans talk with them. Therefore, the North
Koreans would be very reluctant to let go of the nuclear
program. We knew it was going to be a very difficult process.
But you have to start somewhere. You start by finding out
what their needs and desires are, and seeing if there is a way of
meeting those needs and desires without giving away
something this [sic] is sacred to us.