I haven’t listened to it, so I have no idea how much I rambled. The IR theory part especially drew on some very old memories.

Anyway, Sean-Paul and Ian are really nice guys and the podcast can be found “here.”:http://agonist.org/sean_paul_kelley/20070405/radio_agonist_with_paul_kerr

Jeffrey has a great “post”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1440/targhuna-cw-facility up about Libya’s once-suspected CW facility at Tarhuna.

I would add that the “report”:http://www.wmd.gov/report/report.html from the _Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction_ contains a “chapter”:http://www.wmd.gov/report/report.html#chapter2 about US intel on Libya’s NBC weapons. The report doesn’t mention Tarhuna specifically, but some of its findings are interesting – particularly in light of the issues Jeffrey highlighted.

For example, the report says that

bq. The Intelligence Community’s central judgment that Libya possessed chemical weapons agents and chemical weapons aerial bombs was correct, but Libya’s *actual chemical agent stockpile proved to be smaller in quantity than the Intelligence Community estimated.*

One wonders if that overestimate has something to do with the false belief that Tarhuna was a CW production facility. One sentence in this paragraph _might_ indicate that such is the case:

bq. *Analysts based their estimates of Libya’s chemical weapons capabilities on assessments of chemical production capabilities and access to precursors.* Analysts judged that Libya had produced, at most, roughly 100 metric tons of mustard agent. 10 They also believed that Libya had produced small quantities of sarin, 11 but assessed that this would have been of very low quality and therefore would have degraded quickly. 12 Analysts generally did not believe that Libya had chemical warheads for missile delivery, but they assessed that Libya could probably weaponize existing chemical agents in some fashion. 13 They further concluded that Libya had produced approximately 1,000 250-kg aerial chemical weapons bombs. 14

But who knows?

Anyway, the report also has some apparently-relevant (given the discussion of aerial imagery) commentary regarding the effectiveness of “technical collection techniques:”

The Intelligence Community’s performance with regard to Libya’s chemical and biological programs was more modest, due in part to *the limited effectiveness of technical collection techniques against these targets.*

As discussed above, the Intelligence Community possessed some limited information suggesting that Libya was continuing work on limited chemical and biological programs. *The overall paucity of intelligence on these programs, however, may be attributed in no small measure to the general ineffectiveness of technical collection efforts.*

That being said, *it should be noted that there are few distinguishing characteristics that enable the identification of chemical or biological facilities through imagery or other technical means.*

Happy Monday.

Watch it “here.”:http://www.comedycentral.com/motherload/player.jhtml?ml_video=84011&ml_collection=&ml_gateway=&ml_gateway_id=&ml_comedian=&ml_runtime=&ml_context=show&ml_origin_url=%2Fmotherload%2F%3Flnk%3Dv%26ml_video%3D84011&ml_playlist=&lnk=&is_large=true Stewart actually gets him to laugh more than once.

DFeith has his “own website.”:http://www.dougfeith.com/

!/images/8.jpg!

What a train wreck. Take this example:

The CIA has made important errors over the years – think of the Iraqi WMD assessments. To guard against such errors, *policy officials should be praised, not slapped, for challenging CIA products.*

More on Feith “here.”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1348/feith-osd-update

[_Thanks to SLK for the tip._]

Maybe everyone else already knows this, but I thought I’d pass it on. A spokesperson for “China’s MFA”:http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t298262.htm specified the countries that are to head up the working groups described in the “recent joint statement:”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1353/six-party-joint-statement

bq. On the question of Working Groups, the parties concerned agreed that China would head the Working Group on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the ROK the Working Group of Economic and Energy Cooperation and Russia the Working Group on Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism. The Working Groups on the Normalization of DPRK-US Relations and DPRK-Japan Relations will be undertaken by these countries involved respectively. The six parties agreed to launch all the working groups within 30 days. Further discussion has to be made on operation, membership and venue of the WGs.

You’re reading an arms control blog on a Sunday. Or blogging on a Sunday.

Per the request of one commenter, “here it is.”:http://www.iranian.com/Opinion/2006/December/Zarif110/index.html

“Jane”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1336/how-long-would-it-take-japan and “Jeffrey”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1338/the-sankei-article-on-japanese-nukes have taken their shots. Have a look.

That ongoing effort is being “broadcast on CSPAN2.”:http://c-span.org/watch/index.asp?Cat=TV&Code=CS3&ShowVidDays=30&ShowVidDesc=&ArchiveDays=30

Will someone please point out that India’s population size, type of government, and economic growth don’t mean that it gets to have nuclear weapons?

Anyway, ACA sponsored a related event on Tuesday. “Check out the transcript”:http://www.armscontrol.org/events/20061114_India_Transcript.asp for more details.

I would point out that Zia Mian discussed “this report”:http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/ipfmresearchreport01.pdf which, I think, pretty much demolishes “this one”:http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18443&prog=zgp&proj=zsa by Ashley Tellis.

Bottom line: India doesn’t have enough uranium for both its nuclear weapons and nuclear power programs. That is why the agreement aids India’s nuclear program.

If you don’t believe me, check out this line from a “previous Tellis report”:http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/CEIP_India_strategy_2006.FINAL.pdf:

The energy dialogue represents the best means of reaching a U.S. – Indian modus vivendi on civilian nuclear power. Given its huge energy requirements, the growing pressures to avoid burning dirty coal in order to protect the environment, and the need to reduce carbon emissions that exacerbate global warming, New Delhi has little alternative but to rely increasingly on nuclear power. Unfortunately for India, two major challenges threaten this objective.

One of which is “India has the misfortune to have been poorly endowed with natural uranium.”

Tellis adds:

While the difficulties of mastering the thorium- based fuel cycle will preoccupy India for many years to come, New Delhi is confronted by more pressing threats. The critical problem facing India right now is the severe shortage of natural uranium, which, if unresolved, could bring the operation of many stage 1 PHWRs to a gradual halt. Not only would this worsen India’s electricity production problems—with all the consequent implications for economic growth—but it would also decisively undermine the three-stage program on which the Department of Atomic Energy has staked the nation’s energy independence for the secular future.

Interestingly, check out his description of a series of considerably less-ambitious steps (relative to the nuclear deal) that would aid India’s nuclear program:

If the administration were to settle for even such conservative reforms as these, it would not only send an important signal to India about larger American intentions but would materially contribute to preserving the future balance of power in Asia—a prospect that motivated former U.S. ambassador to India Robert D. Blackwill to ask recently, “Why should the U.S. want to check India’s missile capability in ways that could lead to China’s permanent nuclear dominance over democratic India?”23 Even if the United States cannot actively aid India in developing its strategic capabilities, it ought to *pursue policies having exactly that effect.* Currently, the easiest way for the administration to do this is simply to leave New Delhi—and its international partners—alone.

[Emphasis mine.]

Ick.

*Update*

“Here’s an article”:http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20061117/ap_on_go_co/us_india_nuclear_6 about the final vote.

ACA just posted “an analysis”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_11/NKTestAnalysis.asp from Richard L. Garwin and Frank N. von Hippel on the DPRK nuclear test.

It contains some evidence that I don’t think has been made public before. Here’s an example:

bq. …it is not surprising that a range of yields has been reported. One authoritative estimate from Terry Wallace, a seismologist at Los Alamos National Laboratory, based on an unclassified analysis of open data, estimates a yield between 0.5 and 2 kilotons, with 90 percent confidence that the yield is less than 1 kiloton.[7] A second authority, Lynn R. Sykes of Columbia University estimates a yield of 0.4 kilotons, with 68 percent confidence that the yield is between 0.2 and 0.7 kilotons and a 95 percent probability that the yield is less than 1 kiloton.[8]

I also liked this observation:

bq. One notable byproduct of the test is that it has demonstrated that university and other independent seismic detection systems, as well as those of governments and the International Monitoring System of the Vienna-based Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization very effectively detect underground explosions in the sub-kiloton range.

But read the whole thing…I can’ t do it justice. And I need time to help Jeffrey pick out a third vacation home, now that our “fear-mongering has pushed revenues through the roof”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1260/shorter-bill-arkin.

_Jeffrey Adds_: “Perhaps North Korea’s weapon designers tried to go directly to a weapon in the 500-1000 kilogram class that could reach South Korea on a Scud missile…” “Sounds familiar, eh?”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1233/so-like-why-didnt-it-work