In the same speech that I mentioned the other day, President Macron noted that

Since 1995, France and the United Kingdom, Europe’s only nuclear powers, have clearly stated that they can imagine no circumstances under which a threat to the vital interests of one would not constitute a threat to the vital interests of the other.

I want today to formally reiterate that assessment. The high level of mutual trust, enshrined in the Lancaster House Treaties in 2010, the 10th anniversary of which we celebrate this year, is reflected in our daily and unprecedented cooperation on nuclear issues. We will steadfastly maintain this cooperation and Brexit will have no impact at all in this regard.

More from the UK on the Lancaster House Treaties.

Some excerpts from President Macron’s 2020 speech on France’s Defense and Deterrence Strategy:

Seeking peace, France is committed to a disarmament approach, which furthers global stability and security. France has a unique track record in the world, in keeping with its responsibilities and interests, having dismantled irreversibly its land-based nuclear component, its nuclear test facilities, its fissile material for weapons production facilities, and having reduced the size of its arsenal, which is currently under 300 nuclear weapons. These decisions are in line with our rejecting any type of arms race and our keeping the format for our nuclear deterrent at a level of strict sufficiency.

Every day, I take on this ultimate responsibility, which is at the core of the duties of President, with the strongest determination. It is carried out through nuclear deterrence. Like the transparency and the trust we owe to the international community, which is part of our responsibilities as a “nuclear-weapon State” under the NPT, exercising deterrence requires a strictly defensive, clear and predictable doctrine, the main foundations of which I am recalling here today.

Should the leader of any State underestimate France’s deep-rooted attachment to its freedom and consider threatening our vital interests, whatever they may be, that leader must realize that our nuclear forces are capable of inflicting absolutely unacceptable damages upon that State’s centres of power: its political, economic and military nerve centres.

Our nuclear forces have been configured to that purpose with the required flexibility and responsiveness. Should there be any misunderstanding about France’s determination to protect its vital interests, a unique and one-time-only nuclear warning could be issued to the aggressor State to clearly demonstrate that the nature of the conflict has changed and to re-establish deterrence.

Within this framework, France draws on a daily basis on the two components of its nuclear forces, which are complementary. I have taken and will continue to take the decisions necessary to maintain their long-term operational credibility at the level of strict sufficiency required by the international environment.

Attorney Dov Weisglass, who was an aide to then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, told al-Montior about an April 2004 letter from GW Bush about Israel’s nuclear weapons program:

Netanyahu was a senior member of the Sharon government at the time (2005), and according to Weisglass, he was well aware of the deal with then-US President George Bush regarding the evacuation of Gaza and northern Samaria. The US quid pro quo included letters from Bush, received in April 2004, recognizing established Israeli settlement blocs in the West Bank, committing continued US support for Israel’s policy of ambiguity regarding its nuclear program and pledging to maintain Israel’s qualitative weaponry edge against its enemies.

Not new, but Fars News includes part of its text:

“Iran is not after a nuclear bomb. Why would Iran want a nuclear bomb? Moreover, when an atomic bomb is detonated, it does not just kill enemies. Rather, it kills innocent people as well, and this goes against Islamic beliefs and the principles of the Islamic Republic of Iran. An atomic bomb does not discriminate between good and bad people, and it is not something that the Islamic Republic would use,” a part of the fatwa said.

The Islamic Republic is relying on something that is not affected by bombs, foreign invasions and other such things. Such things only strengthen what the Islamic republic is relying on. The Islamic republic is relying on the people,” it added.

For those wishing to conduct some tests involving high explosives, this LANL publication has you covered.

Indian External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar recently commented on former PM Vajpayee’s post-1998 tests diplomacy:

Within a space of two years after the tests, we had engaged all the major countries of the world, had actually brought them around. When you had the visit of a president (Bill) Clinton, PM (John) Howard, PM (Yoshiro) Mori, visit of president (Jacques) Chirac. It was actually the post-test diplomacy, which I think anybody who is in the field of diplomacy, should look at and seek to draw lessons,” he said.

GAO published this report in 1963. It’s titled Manned Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Program of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense.

The UN has one here.

Not sure if this is new, but the 2022 State Dept compliance report contains a definition of a BW program:

The United States’ definition of a state biological warfare (BW) program is a leadership-approved effort intended to acquire, develop, modify, produce, or retain biological warfare agents for use or potential use as a weapon. A biological warfare program would probably include one or more of the following:

Researching, acquiring, developing, modifying, producing, retaining, or testing BW agents and/or BW agent dispersal devices for use as a weapon;

Facilities producing or intended to produce BW agents and/or BW agent dispersal devices for use as a weapon;

Training, doctrine, or plans for use of BW agents as a weapon; and,

Use or attempted use of a BW agent as a weapon.

Here’s a December 2022 DAE response to a parliamentary question concerning “the problems faced by the country’s nuclear power programme in terms of
achieving the desired efficiency:”

The problem faced by the country’s nuclear power programme in earlier period
was due to the technology denial and international embargo regime that
persisted from 1974 to 2008 and the constraints of availability of financial
resources. The programme then had to depend solely on budgetary support
and also the challenges posed by set of people primarily opposing nuclear
power. However the earlier constraints have now been overcome and the
nuclear power programme is poised for rapid expansion.