Late to the party, but I thought it was worth noting this State Dept sanctions notice which has some useful details about Pakistan’s missile program:

Belarus-based Minsk Wheel Tractor Plant has worked to supply special vehicle chassis to Pakistan’s long-range ballistic missile program. Such chassis are used as launch support equipment for ballistic missiles by Pakistan’s National Development Complex (NDC), which is responsible for the development of Missile Technology Control Regime Category (MTCR) I ballistic missiles.

PRC-based Tianjin Creative Source International Trade Co Ltd has supplied missile-related equipment to Pakistan’s long-range ballistic missile program, including stir welding equipment (which the United States assesses can be used to manufacture propellant tanks used in space launch vehicles), and a linear accelerator system (which the United States assesses can be used in the inspection of solid rocket motors). Tianjin Creative’s procurements were likely destined for Pakistan’s Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO), which develops and produces Pakistan’s MTCR Category I ballistic missiles.

A November 1 Commerce FR notice has a good summary of Russian CW use in Ukraine, as well as the broader RCA issue:

The U.S. Department of Commerce is expanding controls under the EAR to include certain chemical precursors that are essential for the ‘‘production’’ of chemical riot control agents (RCAs) and chloropicrin that Russia has deployed against Ukraine in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). These new regulatory restrictions, which are specific to Russia and Belarus, aim to limit the use of these chemical precursors in the context of the war in Ukraine

Not that I am a collector, but I don’t recall seeing this view.

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In September, DAS Richard Verma discussed the 123 agreement:

It was President Clinton who – once and for all delinked U.S.-India and U.S. – Pakistan policy.

Indo-Pak would be set aside in favor of a robust set of policy initiatives that, as I noted, were not only significant but they were creative, too.

There was no more creative, and – yes – difficult policy decision than to construct the U.S.-India civil nuclear deal.

This was a landmark initiative to deliver safe and reliable nuclear energy to India, while simultaneously bringing India into the international atomic energy compliance and safety regimes.

It took a bold change in thinking in India, and it took leadership here at home, with President Bush and so many others and then Senator Biden from his perch on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to lead the efforts in D.C. and capitals around the world.

As has been noted by scholars here at Hudson and in think tanks across D.C. and Delhi, the deal was critical as it showed that our countries were willing to bend with history and take extraordinary steps that would have lasting effects.

For whatever reason, the new DIA report titled Nuclear Challenges contains two slightly-different descriptions of Iran’s nuclear program.

Here’s one:

Currently, Iran almost certainly does not have nuclear weapons and has agreed not to seek, develop, or acquire nuclear weapons.

Here’s another:

While Iran does not have a nuclear weapon, it continues to develop ballistic missile systems to increase their accuracy and lethality.

The Draft Review of the Operation and Status of the Ottawa Convention has a bit about the state of Ukraine’s APL stockpile:

The importance of destroying stockpiled anti-personnel mines as soon as possible following entry into force has been spotlighted by the current unprecedented situation faced by Ukraine, where part of Ukraine’s stockpiled anti-personnel mines are no longer under Ukraine’s effective control and are now in temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine.

According to Iran, the United States is still buying Iranian heavy water:

…Iran is also among the top producers of high-quality heavy water in the world despite the enemies’ plots to block Tehran’s progress. Tehran says the United States is purchasing Iran’s heavy water for its nuclear reactors through an intermediary.

Here’s some USG material about entities associated with Russia’s chemical and biological weapons programs.:

RADIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE TROOPS OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (RCB DEFENSE TROOPS) is a specialized Russian military unit responsible for identification of and decontamination from radioactive, chemical and biological hazards. The RCB DEFENSE TROOPS have been involved in the day-to-day operations of Russia’s chemical weapons program and also have facilitated the use of the chemical weapon chloropicrin by Russian armed forces against Ukrainian troops.

SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF APPLIED ACOUSTICS (FGUP NIIPA) is a Russian government scientific research institute that carries out research and development of military products and develops methods for the export of dual-use goods and technologies. FGUP NIIPA has been involved in the procurement and inventory of chemicals that could be used in the production of chemical weapons agents.

FEDERAL STATE BUDGETARY INSTITUTION 48TH CENTRAL SCIENTIFIC AND RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (48TH TSNII) is the leading Russian Ministry of Defense scientific research institute responsible for Russian military protection against infectious diseases and biological threats. 48th TSNII and its facilities are associated with the Russian biological weapons program.

Fars News recently published some photos of Iranian missiles. The story on the site allows one to enlarge the photos.

From long-range ballistic missiles to precision-guided systems, Iran enhanced its arsenal, reflecting its strategic military readiness.

I sent a letter to the NYRB about this piece by Charlie Savage.

I don’t think that they will publish it, so here’s the letter:

In his recent review of Steve Coll’s The Achilles Trap: Saddam Hussein, the CIA, and the Origins of America’s Invasion of Iraq, Charlie Savage ably explains how the Saddam Hussein government’s refusal to comply with UN-mandated weapons inspections during the early 1990s – particularly the regime’s secret destruction of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – fueled inaccurate U.S. assessments that Iraq possessed WMD and related programs. This background is obviously important, but Savage omits the significant role of the inspectors, whose work the world should acknowledge.

For example, Savage does not mention that UN inspectors, who returned to Iraq in 2002 under a new UN Security Council mandate, provided a mechanism for verifying U.S. prewar Iraq WMD assessments. Indeed, less than two weeks before the March 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission,(UNMOVIC), reported to the Council that inspectors had found no WMD in Iraq. Blix added that UNMOVIC would only need “months” to resolve UN-mandated “remaining disarmament tasks.” It is also worth noting that, following completion of these tasks, Iraq would have been subjected to a UN-mandated long-term monitoring regime designed to prevent Iraqi reconstitution of its WMD programs.