Category Archives: Russia

Iran and Bushehr

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Just wanted to add a little to a “good post”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1444/policy-changes-podvig-on-russia-and-bushehr from Jane about the Bushehr project. Specifically, I think that discussions of Russian motivations for completing the reactor frequently ignore Russia’s desire to maintain/establish its reputation as a reliable nuclear supplier for -countries other than Russia- potential customers outside of Iran.

As Pavel Podvig says in the “_BAS_ column”:http://www.thebulletin.org/columns/pavel-podvig/20070326.html that Jane cites:

*Rosatom most likely understands that abandoning Bushehr now would deal a serious blow to its reputation as a commercial partner.* In this situation, resorting to delays and hoping that the situation will somehow resolve itself is the only option.

I think there’s a lot to this…I first thought of it when I heard Vladimir Orlov’s “presentation”:http://www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/2005conference/2005_conference.htm#Iran at the most recent Carnegie conference. He didn’t make the supply credibility argument but did point out that the project isn’t worth all that much to Russia:

bq. Economically, we are not gaining much from nuclear cooperation with Iran. I’m sorry, but the numbers, the amounts we were discussing about only Bushehr content are much lower than they were publicized. And probably in the mid-90s that was something not of little importance for the Russian impoverished ministry of atomic energy. Currently, the situation in Russia and its economic growth is quite different, so actually what we got from Iran economically from Bushehr is not that much attractive.

I would be remiss if I didn’t point out Jane’s argument that Russia has already done a few things to damage its reputation as an energy supplier:

bq. Russia’s cut off of gas to Ukraine in January 2006 and of oil through Belarus in January 2007 has partners hesitating in relying too much on Russia in the future. Regardless of whose fault these dispute really were, Russia clearly has the capacity and the will to cut off very significant energy flows in times of disagreement.

This is in the context of fuel supply, rather than reactor construction, but it’s a good point.

Orlov, BTW, added this amusing anecdote:

bq. …[a] senior Russian official once asked – I think in the 101st time – but what finally Russia feels about nuclear cooperation with Iran. Are you still partners? He was probably so exhausted with that question, he said, oh yes. We, of course, are partners with Iran. From the times of Mr. Griboyedev, we are partners with Iran. And of course, without the context, it could be difficult to understand what it means. The context was simple. Mr. Griboyedev is a famous Russian poet of the 19th century who was also diplomat decapitated by Mog in Teheran. So we are of course strategic partners, but with some footnotes, right?

Happy Friday.

USSR: No Satellite Smashing

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Wade has a great “article”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_03/ChinaSatellite.asp in the new _ACT_ about the Chinese ASAT test. It comes complete with a box titled “The USSR’s Past Anti-Satellite Testing.”

Here’s the lead:

bq. The Soviet Union pursued anti-satellite (ASAT) programs for decades but apparently never smashed a satellite into bits as China did recently and the United States did in 1985.

Given what he told me, Wade should do a story just about the research he did for the piece.

Anyway, the rest is below:

Before instituting a moratorium on ASAT test launches in August 1983, the Kremlin conducted at least 20 ASAT tests beginning in 1968. The Soviet tests involved the use of interceptor vehicles with explosives designed to detonate near their intended target.

None of the Soviet tests resulted in a target’s complete destruction. Indeed, *Nicholas Johnson, NASA’s chief expert on orbital debris, told Arms Control Today Feb. 24 that “only one Soviet ASAT target ever released debris as a result of an ASAT engagement.” He reported that four pieces of debris were detected from a November 1968 test.*

Nevertheless, Johnson noted that even though targets were not obliterated, *the tests were not necessarily failures. “In [the November 1968 test] and other successful engagements, the target satellite might well have been ‘destroyed’ from an operational viewpoint,” he stated.*

The Pentagon assessed the Soviet Union as first attaining an operational ASAT capability in 1971. The now-disbanded congressional Office of Technology Assessment reported in an extensive September 1985 report on ASAT systems that “Soviet ASAT capabilities threaten U.S. military capabilities to some extent now and potentially to a much greater extent in the future.”
*Moscow continued to investigate ASAT systems, allegedly including lasers, after its 1983 test moratorium, but it is uncertain how extensive and productive those efforts were and what Russia’s exact ASAT capabilities are today.*

Russia and INF

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As someone who thinks that strategic nuclear issues don’t get enough attention, I was glad to see “Jane raise the issue”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1396/russia-questions-inf-again of Russia’s position vis a vis the “INF Treaty”:http://www.armscontrol.org/documents/inf.asp.

Anyway, ACA issued a “press release”:http://www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/2007/20070216_INF.asp about the issue:

“The White House and congressional leaders should urge Russia not to abandon the INF Treaty,” Kimball recommended. He also encouraged the U.S. and Russian governments to “engage in talks to accelerate the drawdown of their strategic nuclear weapons and to account for and eliminate their tactical nuclear weapons arsenals.” The size and security of Russia’s tactical nuclear arms holdings are unknown, while the United States deploys roughly 480 tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

In addition, the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) is set to expire in December 2009. If START lapses and Russia scuttles the INF Treaty, the sole agreement left to restrict U.S. and Russian nuclear force levels would be the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty. This agreement lacks verification provisions and its ceiling of 2,200 operationally deployed strategic warheads expires in December 2012. The United States currently claims to operationally deploy approximately 3,900 strategic warheads, and it keeps thousands of additional warheads in reserve. Russia fields some 4,300 strategic warheads, according to its latest accounting under START.

“Without the transparency and limits of the START and INF accords, the United States and Russia risk returning to the distrust, worst-case assumptions, and arms competition of the past,” warned Wade Boese, ACA research director.

“Russia’s overreaction to the possible fielding of up to 10 unproven U.S. missile interceptors already underscores the fragile state of U.S.-Russian security relations,” Boese stated.

He recommended that in addition to talks on extending START or its verification regime, “the former rivals should explore measures to address Russian concerns about any future stationing of U.S. anti-missile systems in Europe.” Boese concluded, “Such a process would be a much more constructive approach than carelessly scrapping the INF Treaty.”

Big Ups

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are in order for a few bloggers. First, Sean-Paul Kelley and the rest of “the Agonist crew.”:http://www.agonist.org/ Second would be “Stephen Heidt,”:http://nobcentral.blogspot.com/ a friend of mine who I wish lived closer to this continent.

Their blogs have been well-worth reading for quite some time. And the fact that they linked to me obviously demonstrates their genius.

I should also point people in the direction of “Michael Roston.”:http://lookingforsomeonetolietome.blogspot.com/ It would be to everyone’s benefit if he blogged more because he’s a great writer.

Finally check out “this post”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1327/dsb-task-force-nuclear-weapons-rule from Jeffrey about the “DSB report”:http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2006-12-Nuclear_Capabilities.pdf on the US nuclear arsenal. He correctly points out that one way to deal with the DSB’s concerns about Russia’s nuclear weapons

bq. might be to accept Russian proposals to move to lower force levels, perhaps reducing that Russian ability to destroy the United States or, at the least, making the process take longer than ordering a pizza.

I would point out that one consequence of this administration’s asinine approach to strategic arms control is that we will have no more START I verification procedures after 2009 and no strategic arms control to speak of after 2012 when “SORT”:http://www.armscontrol.org/subject/sr/#SORT expires.

Bravo.

Polonium-210 And Olmert Nuclear Gaffe

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No, there is no connection, apart from the fact that these are two subjects I don’t need to write about, now that “Jane”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1324/polonium-210-mysteries-continue and “Jeffrey”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1321/israel-and-nuclear-opacity have addressed them. So go read.

Oh, and Jeffrey “says he still likes me”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1325/administrivia.

You should also all check out “this band.”:http://www.messupthemess.com/

Have a good rest-of-weekend.

Putin on Iran

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You will all thank me for this.

Putin was asked the following question during a “2 June press event”:http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2006/06/02/1121_type82914type82917type84779_106433.shtml: “will Russia participate in economic sanctions against Iran if Iran does not agree with the existing offer? And will Russia participate in negotiations concerning Iran?”

He replied:

VLADIMIR PUTIN:

There is a proverb that says if a grandmother had certain reproductive organs, she would have been a grandfather. Politics does not accept subjunctive mood.

[Read the rest of the answer]

Have a good evening.

Remember Russia?

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A conversation I had yesterday with an esteemed arms control expert, as well as “this article by my colleague Wade Boese”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_01-02/NA_US_Russia.asp, reminded me to write about a subject I’ve been thinking about recently.

While it is good to continually point out that the Bush administration screwed the pooch on Iraq and neglected more serious threats from North Korea and Iran in the process, it is worthwhile to point out that there is precisely ONE entity that presents an existential threat to the United States: Russia.

The solution for dealing with this existential threat? The Bush administration’s circus act/foreign policy team decided to write some talking points, call them the “U.S.-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_06/factfilejune02.asp, and declare the problem solved.

Now, the problems with SORT have been obvious for a while (“no verification in the treaty, expires in 2012, is only in effect for one day, etc.”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/index.php?id=332). And Wade’s article points out that the negotiations for implementing the treaty aren’t going so well.

I know that few, if any, Russia experts think that the Russians will be able to deploy a bunch of nuclear weapons anytime soon. But I still don’t think that we ought to bank totally on these intelligence projections, especially since “the lack of verification measures”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/index.php?id=337 will leave the IC with considerably less capability to monitor WTF is gong on with the Russian strategic arsenal.

Now don’t misunderstand me – I don’t think Russia is going to up and attack us anytime soon. But the fact remains that these weapons *are* there and intentions change faster than capabilities. And then there’s always the risk of accidents, etc.

It is also worth noting that US/Russian/Soviet nuclear negotiations have never been easy. But if US/Russian relations are so damn good right now, it might have been a good time to try a little more arms control.

If you want some perspective on why we didn’t, check out “this interview with outgoing Undersecretary of State John Bolton”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_03/boltonmarch02.asp. In essence, he says treaties are useless.