Perhaps a reason to be a little more hopeful…”according to AFP,”:http://www.spacewar.com/2006/090207204944.k14vpd5z.html Bruce Bueno de Mesquita has a “gaming and computer model” which predicts that
bq. By the start of next year, Iran will stabilize its nuclear program at a point where it makes enough weapons-grade fuel to build national pride by showing it can, but not enough to actually produce a bomb…
It also predicts that “the power of [Iranian] president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad will quickly fade.”
I remember reading some of Bueno de Mesquita’s stuff when I was in grad school. All I recall is that it was interesting, but dense.
The “plot”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1837/psi-part-deux-red-sea-regatta thickens. According to “various”:http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/cyprus-ship-violates-un-sanctions-on-iran-cypriot-official/2009/02/08/1233423572271.html “reports”:http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gh2n81Y5aFLUr13PtHzTeJK71luA, the _Monchegorsk,_ the vessel carrying unspecified weapons from Iran, now sitting in the Cypriot port of Limassol, is–as its name suggests–Russian-owned.
This is surely old news to readers more attentive than Yours Truly, but of interest because it raises the (usual) questions about the interest and ability of national authorities to enforce UNSC sanctions resolutions against Iran. According to the “Cyprus Mirror”:http://www.financialmirror.com/News/Cyprus_and_World_News/13865,
According to diplomatic sources, Cyprus requests from the UN Sanctions Committee to assess whether the findings of the inspections lie within the provisions of the Security Council Resolutions on Iran (1696/2006, 1737/2006,1747/2007 and 1803/2008), and seeks its recommendations on how to proceed with the issue.
Without taking the trouble to re-read all of these, I’m pretty sure we can narrow it down to “1747”:http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/unsc_res1747-2007.pdf, which
5. Decides that Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer directly or indirectly from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft any arms or related materiel, and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of Iran;
I haven’t seen any mention of the nationality of the crew. But you get the point. Hey, have you heard the one about a Russian merchant vessel carrying arms from Iran to Gaza in the middle of a war with Israel?
Hmm… maybe not so funny.
Clif Burns calls it the “hot boat-ato”:http://www.exportlawblog.com/archives/457. That _is_ funny, unless you happen to be the Cypriot authorities.
On an unrelated note, the arms-laden Ukrainian vessel “MV Faina”:http://www.moscowtimes.ru/article/1010/42/374314.htm has been ransomed from Somali pirates. Finally.
Here’s your “musical bonus”:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9KdHuZXWxGo&feature=related. Enjoy.
The AP reports that representatives of ten Western countries have just spent “two days in Copenhagen”:http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2009/02/05/europe/EU-Mideast-Arms-Smuggling.php to discuss “an international naval force to stem the flow of smuggled arms to Gaza.”
Experts from the U.S., Canada and eight European countries met in Copenhagen to discuss ways to stop arms smuggling to the Hamas-controlled territory. No decision was taken but an international naval force was one of the options on the table, said Michael Zilmer-Johns, a senior diplomat at the Danish Foreign Ministry.
“This is one of the tools that might be considered,” he told reporters after the meeting ended. “There’s a problem and there’s a need to solve it.”
Israel and the European Union sent observers to the workshop, while Egypt declined an invitation. Organizers gave no reason.
This comes on the heels of an attempt by the U.S. Navy to detain a Cypriot-flagged ship sailing from Iran in the Red Sea. “Per Reuters”:http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL4307569:
The Cyprus-flagged Monchegorsk has been docked off the Mediterranean island for almost a week as authorities check its cargo. The United States, which earlier boarded the ship in the Red Sea, said its navy found weapons on board which it could not confiscate for legal reasons.
Without the happenstance of the vessel steaming past the shores of Cyprus while flying its flag, it seems there would have been little ground for further action. According to “David Eshel at AvWeek’s Ares blog”:http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&newspaperUserId=27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7&plckPostId=Blog%3a27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3a768e59ff-db7f-4090-9e55-d59deae27195&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest, the ship had set out under other colors entirely:
According to unofficial intelligence reports, the _Iran Shahed_ set out from the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas Dec. 29, the second day of the Gaza conflict, changing its identity several times until hoisting a Cypriot flag.
[snip]
On Thursday afternoon, though, as the ship passed 100 km. off the coast of the Cyprus port of Limassol, it was stopped by the Cypriot Navy, which was legally allowed to intercept it since it was flying a Cypriot flag. Cyprus’s decision to intercept the ship, officials said, was made after the United States and several European countries applied pressure on the government in Nicosia. The officials said that the ship was believed to be carrying a number of shipping containers packed with weaponry.
It sounds like dumb luck and fast thinking won the day. Is that the plan for the future?
The Copenhagen meeting seems to represent partial fulfillment of the mid-January “U.S.-Israel MOU whose text popped up in _Ha’aretz_”:http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1056175.html. The bit in question:
2. The United States will work with regional and NATO partners to address the problem of the supply of arms and related materiel and weapons transfers and shipments to Hamas and other terrorist organizations in Gaza, including through the Mediterranean, Gulf of Aden, Red Sea and eastern Africa, through improvements in existing arrangements or the launching of new initiatives to increase the effectiveness of those arrangements as they relate to the prevention of weapons smuggling to Gaza. Among the tools that will be pursued are:
* Enhanced U.S. security and intelligence cooperation with regional governments on actions to prevent weapons and explosives flows to Gaza that originate in or transit their territories; including through the involvement of relevant components of the U.S. Government, such as U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Africa Command, and U.S. Special Operations Command.
* Enhanced intelligence fusion with key international and coalition naval forces and other appropriate entities to address weapons supply to Gaza;
* Enhancement of the existing international sanctions and enforcement mechanisms against provision of material support to Hamas and other terrorist organizations, including through an international response to those states, such as Iran, who are determined to be sources of weapons and explosives supply to Gaza.
Now, you might be asking, why does all this sound so familiar? Because it’s “PSI, Part Deux”:http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm.
That endeavor, you might recall, also came on the heels of the catch-and-release of a maritime arms shipment, in this case “North Korea’s _So San_”:http://www.time.com/time/photoessays/scudraid/.
A couple of semi-deep thoughts present themselves:
First, in the right (wrong?) geographic and political setting, mundane artillery rockets turn out to be true strategic weapons, the stuff of serious international concern even if they don’t quality as “WMD.”
Second, the failure to create a strong legal architecture for interdiction is still being felt. The entire idea of PSI was to get something (by way of cooperation) for nothing (by way of binding commitments). This false start may explain, in part, why UNSCR 1540 hasn’t really gotten off the ground, as “Aaron Arnold”:http://www.wmdinsights.com/I26/I26_G4_UNSCR1540_1.htm and “Elizabeth Turpen”:http://www.wmdinsights.com/I26/I26_G5_UNSCR1540_2.htm discussed back in August.
It’s early yet, but let’s hope it works out better this time around.
_(Bonus points if you recognized the origins of the phrase “Red Sea Regatta”:http://books.google.com/books?id=mA6R4gJ9YUUC&pg=PA139&lpg=PA139&dq=red+sea+regatta&source=bl&ots=VjwyAfObr4&sig=04mYHqqoP7St5vLBr-D_u92agYI&hl=en&ei=7r-LSbijJtW5twehnNWcCw&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=1&ct=result#PPA139,M1.)_
Update: Here’s a “musical bonus that seems fitting”:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EFkUS1sSoPA.
Rosatom’s Sergei Kiriyenko has “told the Russian media”:http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-02-05-voa37.cfm that the Bushehr reactor will start up in 2009.
This echoes a “statement made a few weeks ago”:http://english.rednet.cn/c/2009/01/15/1690587.htm by Iran’s ambassador to Russia.
Kiriyenko adds that he’ll visit Bushehr at some point this month.
Laura R also has a post up about Iran track II discussions. Lots of people know about these and I’m not sure how significant they really have been. But the post has a few names and other details that I hadn’t heard before. Take a “look.”:http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/01/29/americas_secret_back_channel_diplomacy_with_iran
I just started reading niacINsight – NIAC’s “blog”:http://niacblog.wordpress.com/ about Iran. It has some useful stuff; “take a look.”:http://niacblog.wordpress.com/
The ISIS crew has clearly been busy. They just put out three case studies (which you can find “here”:http://isis-online.org/publications/expcontrol/index.html) on illicit procurement by Iran and Pakistan. They are timely, given the lack of public evidence about post-Khan network procurement.
FoKerr _JP_ asked me to elaborate on my “assertion”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1813/deep-iran-thought that “capabilities influence intentions.”
Here’s the full paragraph from the original post:
bq. Put another way, some in Iran probably want a nuclear weapon, or at least a weapons option, but there is scant evidence that they want one at all costs. Therefore, Iranian officials’ preferences for a nuclear weapon are not immutable. Capabilities influence intentions.
As we know, a state’s propensity to undertake a certain course of action is a function of the government’s capabilities and intentions (I actually learned it as “opportunity and willingness,” which I think is a better formulation.) But those two variables are frequently not independent; the more difficult it is to take a course of action, the less likely it is that a government will bother to take (or continue with) that action.
In the case of Iran, I think there is good evidence that at least some elements of the Iranian government wanted a nuclear weapon _if_ that weapon could be developed in secret. The evidence that Tehran wants to develop a weapon overtly is not nearly as good. If that is true, then complicating Iran’s efforts to develop a nuclear weapon in secret could dissuade Tehran from trying.
Parenthetically, it is also entirely possible that a strategic decision to actually field an Iranian nuclear arsenal has been shelved, scrapped, or never existed in the first place.
It is probably the case that Iran pursued a nuclear weapons program until 2003. But that program was secret and it’s pretty obvious that Iran did not anticipate getting caught. Tehran has _not_ demonstrated a willingness to pursue an overt nuclear weapons program.
This matters because it makes an Iranian breakout scenario pretty unlikely. Furthermore, the more likely it is that Iran will be caught developing a nuclear weapon (through measures such as IAEA safeguards, intelligence methods, additional monitoring methods, etc.), the less likely it is that Tehran will try.
Put another way, some in Iran probably want a nuclear weapon, or at least a weapons option, but there is scant evidence that they want one at all costs. Therefore, Iranian officials’ preferences for a nuclear weapon are not immutable. Capabilities influence intentions.
As an aside, a weapons option may be troubling, but the number of people you can kill with an option is zero.
*Update:* Thanks a lot to Steve Clemons for the “link.”:http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/2009/01/ventilating_tho/