Steve Clemons did some reporting about the recent resignation of Prince Turki al-Faisal, the Saudi ambassador to the US, and posted it “over at his place.”:http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/001826.php

There’s an Iran angle:

Sources also confirm to TWN that Ambassador Turki’s decision to resign not only had to do with his refusal to tolerate the unprofessionalism of Bandar and Massoud — but with the signals that Bandar and Massoud have sent to Cheney, David Addington and others on Cheney’s national security staff that Saudi Arabia would “acquiesce to, accept, and not interfere with” American military action against Iran.

While reports of how far Bandar has gone in supporting Cheney’s desire for military action vary, insiders report that Bandar has “essentially assured” the Vice President that Saudi Arabia could be moved to accept and possibly support American military action against Iran. Another source reports to TWN that Bandar himself strongly supports Cheney’s views of a military response to Iran.

This is the core of the deep divide between Prince Turki and Bandar — which is also a divide between Foreign Minister Saud and Bandar as well.

The tension is about Iran and how to contain Iran. While Bandar and Rihab Massoud allegedly have affirmed Cheney’s views and are perceived to be Bush administration sycophants, Turki was charting a more realist course for Saudi interests and advising the White House to develop more serious, constructive strategies toward the region that would produce stability and not lead to “a terrorist super-highway stretching from Iran through Iraq and rushing through Syria and Jordan to the edge of Israel” — as one source stated to TWN.

Ick.

I was at an “event”:http://www.americanprogress.org/events/2006/12/the_coming_crisis.html this afternoon sponsored by CAP and The Century Foundation. Among other topics, the panelists briefly discussed the likelihood of US military action against Iran.

Because US naval deployments to the Persian Gulf region have been cited by “some”:http://www.thenation.com/doc/20061009/lindorff as evidence of an upcoming US strike on Iran’s nuclear-related facilities, I was reminded of a transcript that I recently received of an October Q&A session with reporters conducted by Deputy Chief of Naval Operations Vice Admiral John G. Morgan, Jr.

Here’s the relevant portion of the transcript (emphasis mine):

Q: Can you give us an assessment of the Iranian naval force and shore-based naval weapons and forces? Is it something that concerns the Navy a great deal, a little bit? How much?

A: Bob we watch what’s going on in that region very closely. We study the Iranian naval activity. I have served in that region and I just talked with one of our admirals that works in that region now. The Iranian naval activity that we’ve seen has been very, very professional. There are professional exchanges between the US Navy. We talk to each other. We want to avoid any miscalculation. We want to avoid any form of accident. They are a professional force.

We look at trends as you can imagine. We try to determine if trends are shifting in one direction or another. *Our naval posture in the region has not changed recently.*

Q: Has theirs? Are they mining?

A: Their activity is normal. We’re very encouraged that there are a whole host of nations represented in the region. They’re contributing to that general maritime security. And that’s the current state of play.

Adding to Jeffrey’s “post”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1274/ncri-did-not-discover-natanz…

Annoyed for similar reasons, I pointed out “a while back”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/517/exiles-and-iran-intel that the NCRI on its own doesn’t appear to have produced a whole lot of actionable intelligence on Iran.

To an extent, though, I guess one can excuse people for thinking differently. After all, The Decider himself “said in March 2004”:http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/03/20050316-3.html that Iran’s nuclear program “became discovered, not because of their compliance with the IAEA or NPT, but because a dissident group pointed it out to the world…”

Anyway, it’s worth noting an additional item in the Hibbs article that Jeffrey cites: the IAEA didn’t seem to know much about what was in the buildings at Natanz.

Hibbs writes:

The IAEA was concerned about reasserting its rights to return to the Natanz site, one official said, because the information available suggests that ”it will be a number of years at least” before an enrichment plant could be operable there, and before what appear to be buildings built for hosting cascade halls for centrifuge uranium enrichment would be filled with machines. The construction of a heavy water plant at Arak is said to be somewhat farther along.

The IAEA in February ”must get inside the buildings at Natanz,” one Vienna official said. But because there is a possibility they are empty, he asserted ElBaradei is taking a certain political risk in going there, regardless of whether Iran has told the IAEA it can return to Natanz. ”What will he or can he say to the world after he has seen it?” the Vienna official asked.

This jibes with some reporting I did at the time. I wrote “in this _ACT_ piece”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_04/iran_apr03.asp that

bq. IAEA officials were “taken aback” by the advanced state of an Iranian gas centrifuge uranium-enrichment facility at a complex at Natanz during a February visit, according to a U.S. State Department official interviewed March 20 [2003].

This seems to make sense – the US IC may have provided some procurement data to the IAEA and told them about the structures in question. But it’s entirely possible that the US didn’t know how far the Iranians had gotten – or at least didn’t bother to voice their concerns to the IAEA.

p=. ***

One other relevant item… Hassan Rowhani, formerly Iran’s lead nuclear negotiator, talked about Western countries’ discovery of Iran’s enrichment program in a “2004 speech:”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/file_download/30

bq. With regard to Natanz and how it was discovered, there were a number of things. The monafeqin [NCRI/MeK] also played a role here. They collected information through different channels. First, they had comings and goings in the area of Natanz and found out that something was going on there. They even got close to this area (the same area where Dr… [as published] pointed out that they wanted to build a silo to store wheat). They went there, taken pictures, and collected information. They also obtained information from some individuals via the telephone. Thus, unfortunately, information was exposed. In addition, one or two employees at the [Iranian] Atomic Energy Agency were spies for other countries. That is to say, they had taken pictures at the digging site and during the subsequent stages of construction. They [the West] collected information thorough various channels, including by satellite, and one of those channels was the monafeqin.

_NPR_ had a “good segment”:http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6108983 [Via “Laura Rozen”:http://www.warandpiece.com/blogdirs/004900.html ] earlier today about, among other things, the Pentagon’s new Iran desk. It notes that several of its staffers worked for OSD’s Office of Special Plans.

[FYI, one of those staffers, Abram Shulsky, wrote “this gem”:http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/files/leo_strauss_and_the_world_of_intelligence.pdf#search=%22shulsky%20leo%20strauss%20and%20the%20world%20of%20intelligence%22 about intelligence -gathering- analysis a few years ago. Ick.]

Another highlight: Negroponte said that he would be “terribly surprised” if unvetted intelligence on Iran was reaching US policymakers.

Yeah, that’d be effing shocking.

Part of the segment also features a hilarious defense of the OSP from none other than D Feith. Priceless.

Laura’s post reminded me of a “similar one from Josh Marshall”:http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/archives/008507.php a few months back.

Here’s the relevant excerpt:

Here’s a topic I’d like to know more about.

As you may know, Vice President Cheney’s daughter Elizabeth is the deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs. She also has the title of “Coordinator for Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiatives.” Basically that means she’s in charge of democratizing the Middle East.

She has a budget of, I believe $75 million, for bringing about ‘regime change’ in Iran.

I also noticed this recent aside in The Nelson Report in which Chris Nelson wrote that his sources “say [Undersecretary of State Nick] Burns has been fighting an apparently losing battle with Undersecretary for non-proliferation Bob Joseph on a variety of issues, and that Vice President Cheney’s office seems to be sponsoring the hiring of exceptionally large numbers of political appointees, not career FSO’s, to staff the to-be-created Iran democracy projects to be run out of State.”

Pass the glue…

I mentioned in “this post”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1206/dni-on-iran-nuclear-estimate earlier that Negroponte was asked about Israeli estimates RE: Iran’s nuclear potential.

I neglected to mention that Tzipi Livni, Israel’s Foreign Minister “was on CNN this weekend”:http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0609/17/le.01.html discussing that very topic:

BLITZER: How much time do you believe the international community has before Iran crosses into an area of no return, in effect has a nuclear bomb?

LIVNI: The crucial moment is not the day of the bomb. The crucial moment is the day in which Iran will master the enrichment, the knowledge of enrichment.

BLITZER: And how long is that?

LIVNI: A few months from now.

BLITZER: What does that mean, a few months?

LIVNI: A few months, I mean…

BLITZER: Six months?

LIVNI: No, I don’t know for sure, because it takes time and this something that they have to try, in doing so…

BLITZER: Because other Israelis have said that would be the point of no return.

LIVNI: I don’t want to use the words “point of no return,” because the Iranians are using it against the international community. They are trying to send a message that it’s too late; you can stop your attempts because it’s too late.

It’s not too late. They have a few more months. And it is crucial because this is in the interests of the international community. The world cannot afford a nuclear Iran. It’s not only a threat to Israel. The recent understanding, also, of moderate Arab states is that Iran is a threat to the region. And I believe that this is time for sanctions.

BLITZER: Is this the biggest threat facing Israel?

I missed this when it came out a couple of weeks ago.

Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte “told NPR”:http://www.dni.gov/interviews/20060901_interview.pdf that the IC’s estimate regarding Iran’s nuclear program is the same as it was a year ago.

He said:

MR. SIEGEL: …According to U.S. intelligence
agencies, how soon will Iran have a nuclear weapon given its present program? Well, Negroponte says the US made its estimate a year ago.

AMB. NEGROPONTE: These are estimates. These are judgments. They’re not hard and cold simple facts. But our best estimate at the time, and it continues to be the judgment of the Intelligence Community, is that sometime beginning in the next decade, perhaps out to the middle of the next decade would be a good time frame, a good estimate of when they might have such a capability.

*MR. SIEGEL: Sometime between four and 10 years from now you would assume they could achieve a nuclear weapon.

AMB. NEGROPONTE: Five to 10 years from now.*

MR. SIEGEL: The International Atomic Energy Agency reported on its inspections this week. They reported on rather little progress by the Iranians. Does that conform to U.S. intelligence or does it in any way alter your estimate?

AMB. NEGROPONTE: This is a judgment that was formed over a period of time based on all sources of intelligence that we have, and I think those basic pieces remain in place today, both the determination to acquire such a capability, and the efforts that are under way to achieve that. Now mind you . and this was why I was careful to say at the outset that these are estimates and judgments, because you don’t know what you don’t know. And Iran is by definition, from the point of view of the Intelligence Community, a hard target. They engage in denial and deception. They don’t want us to necessarily know everything that they’re doing. So we don’t, for example, know whether there’s a secret military program and to what extent that program has made progress.

Negroponte also discussed Israeli estimates regarding Iran:

MR. SIEGEL: When Americans hear of, or read of, say, an Israeli estimate that the Iranians are two years away from a nuclear weapon, do you think the Israelis are just making different inferences from the same evidence you see .

AMB. NEGROPONTE: No .

MR. SIEGEL: or they know differently?

AMB. NEGROPONTE: No, I don’t . I think that we basically operate from the same knowledge base. We also happen to consult with the Israelis quite closely. We have intelligence-sharing arrangements, procedures.

I think that sometimes what the Israelis will do. and I think that perhaps because it’s a more existential issue for them, they will give you the worst-case assessment.

We would agree that perhaps an equally valid assessment would be the same one that we put forward.

MR. SIEGEL: But you’re talking about differences in assessment and analysis of information.

AMB. NEGROPONTE: Correct.

MR. SIEGEL: . not differences in information?

AMB. NEGROPONTE: That . I would say that, yes. I think that’s fair.

Obviously, I don’t know what sources the US IC has on Iran, but I would point out that Iran’s diminished cooperation with the IAEA during the past few months has made the program a lot more of a black box, both to the public and (I bet) the US IC.

That’s why Tehran should resume implementing its additional protocol ASAP – the lack of public information, I think, hurts Iran at least as much as anyone else. That lack makes it tough for the public to resolve “debates”:http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/15529884.htm concerning Iran’s nuclear capabilities – especially when there’s no neutral third party to investigate “claims”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/14/AR2006091401533_pf.html that Tehran has secret nuclear programs, etc.

That’s a problem. I think that the pace of Iran’s program gives us time for international diplomacy can work. But absent more Iranian cooperation, advocates for diplomacy will be increasingly hard-pressed to point to reliable public estimates of the program.

Following up on “yesterday’s”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1197/iran-suspension-offer post, “this AP story”:http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/iran_nuclear indicates that Iran’s proposal may not have been all that:

Tehran said over the weekend that it was considering suspending enrichment, which can produce fissile material for nuclear warheads, for up to two months. The willingness to consider such a halt was seen as an important opening.

But officials from delegations familiar with the outcome of the weekend’s negotiations between Iranian and European negotiators said Tuesday that Iran had also made clear it would not halt enrichment before broader, six-power talks aimed at persuading Iran to agree to a long-term moratorium. They demanded anonymity in exchange for divulging confidential information.

Iran faces the threat of U.N. sanctions if those talks fail.

The officials spoke to The Associated Press as the
International Atomic Energy Agency’s 35-nation board reconvened at a session that would focus on Iran, likely on Wednesday.

In other news, I am having trouble figuring out what’s new about “Rice’s comments from yesterday.”:http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/72040.htm “Several”:http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/12/world/middleeast/12diplo.html news “reports”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/11/AR2006091100766.html have suggested that she was articulating a new policy, but I don’t see it.

She said:

QUESTION: Secretary Rice, there’s a report that the Iranians have floated the idea of a two-month suspension of their enrichment activities after talks begin. Does that idea have any interest at all — hold any interest at all for you?

SECRETARY RICE: Well, I have had a chance to talk with Javier Solana after his talks with the Iranians, and the issue is are the Iranians prepared to suspend so that negotiations can begin. And I think they thought that the atmosphere was good for the talks, but I don’t have any — I don’t think there is an outcome yet that would permit negotiations to begin because the condition for negotiations to begin is that there has to be a suspension of the Iranian enrichment and reprocessing activities.

And that is the condition set not by the United States but by the IAEA Board of Governors and now by the Security Council. I should just note that work is continuing among the members of the Security Council coming out of the political directors meeting that took place that Nick Burns attended a couple of days ago, and that work is going to continue. But we’ve always said we would keep open the path for discussions, and if the Iranians wish to suspend so that we can begin negotiations, that would be a good thing.

QUESTION: So just to clarify, this offer, which seems to be an offer to suspend for a month or two, is not sufficient?

SECRETARY RICE: I don’t think there is an offer, Jonathan, at this point. And the point is there would have to be a suspension. If there is a suspension, then we can have discussions, but there has to be a suspension. And as far as I know, the Iranians have not yet said that they would suspend prior to negotiations, which is what the issue has been.

QUESTION: Sorry. One more clarification on this. If the Iranians said — if they were in fact willing to suspend, negotiations could begin? Their offer, as we understand it, has to do with what happens next, that there could then be two months worth of negotiations but they wouldn’t — their suspension would be time-limited.

SECRETARY RICE: First of all, it’s suspension. Verified suspension. That’s the condition. Secondly, it’s suspension for suspension. We’ve said that if the Iranians are in a state of suspension, then we will be prepared not to have activity in the Security Council, but there has to be a suspension if there are going to be any negotiations. As for time limitations, I don’t — I haven’t heard any Iranian offer so I don’t know what to make of that. But the question is: Are they prepared to suspend verifiably so that negotiations can begin? That’s the issue.

QUESTION: (off-mic)

SECRETARY RICE: Our clock would be running, too.

“This Reuters piece”:http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/nuclear_iran_usa_dc has the State Dept. throwing some cold water on the reported Iranian offer.

Anyway, I think it’s a little interesting that Rice didn’t directly criticize the limited-duration suspension. But it’s not _that_ interesting, because the “P5+1 are only asking”:http://www.armscontrol.org/pdf/20060606_Iran_P5+1_Proposal.pdf Iran to agree to suspend its enrichment activities for the duration of the talks.

I did some reporting about that “here”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_07-08/IranResponse.asp. You should also check out “this 7 June _ACT_ interview”:http://www.armscontrol.org/interviews/20060607_schulte.asp with Amb. Greg Schulte where he addressed the suspension issue:

ACT: What do you think of their responses so far?

Schulte: … As the president [George W. Bush] said, the initial response after the package was presented to Iran sounded positive, but we’re giving them the opportunity to respond. We want them to make the positive decision, but they need to manifest this by a willingness to negotiate seriously, and they need to manifest this by verifiably and fully suspending their enrichment-related activities.

ACT: Does this suspension have to be permanent?

Schulte: We’re just asking for a suspension.

I think it’s clear from Rice’s statements that the US wants Iran to suspend before negotiations begin/the UNSC stops pushing for sanctions, which is really the sticking point.

Here’s more:

QUESTION: Madame Secretary, we seem to be moving, if the suspension does not go forward, toward sanctions. Do you think that the menu of sanctions that the UN Security Council is considering are strong enough to get Iran to suspend? And if they don’t, what are our options after that? Should Americans start getting used to living with a nuclear-armed Iran?

SECRETARY RICE: Nobody is going to become accustomed to the idea of a nuclear-armed Iran. That’s why we’re on this course. I do think you will see that there will be a series of sanctions that are commensurate with Iranian behavior and with what the Iranians do in response to the Security Council resolution. The international community can bring a lot of isolation on Iran, both formally and informally, both through the Security Council and through likeminded states taking action even if the Security Council does not.

And so this is the beginning of a road. I continue to hope that the Iranians are going to take the opportunity put before them, which is to suspend and to begin negotiations. It’s only in that way that we can explore whether there really is an answer to this problem through negotiation. But I’m quite certain that you’re going to see, if this does not work out, that you’re going to see sanctions and that those will be commensurate with Iranian behavior.

It may well be, Helene, that it will be several resolutions. I wouldn’t suspect that everything is going to be in resolution number one, but I do think you’ll see in resolution number one an important signal to the Iranians that they are now under international not just scrutiny but international pressure and indeed international isolation. And as I’ve said, that can have effects both formally and informally.

But we’ll see what comes out of these talks. From our point of view, we have nothing to lose by – as we work towards the sanctions resolution – having Javier Solana explore with the Iranians whether there’s a way to get to negotiations. That’s just fine. But the time is coming very soon when we’re going to have to vote a Security Council resolution, when it’s ready, when it’s been consulted and prepared.

Regrettably, no package jokes. Instead, I give you “Devvo”:http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=8212038174455494428 [warning, profanity included].

By now, most of you have probably seen “the AP,”:http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20060911/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iran_nuclear_47 “Reuters,”:http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/nuclear_iran_dc and “AFP”:http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20060911/wl_mideast_afp/irannuclearpoliticsenrichment_060911110202reports reports that, during a meeting b/t Solana and Larijani, the latter said that Iran would consider suspending its enrichment program for up to two months.

“Another AP article”:http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20060911/ap_on_re_mi_ea/nuclear_iran_3&printer=1
and “this AFP piece”:http://www.spacewar.com/2006/060911175213.a4onwrp3.html offered some more details.

According to the 2nd AP story, a “diplomat familiar with the issue” said that the Iranians “are essentially seeking assurances that they would not be bombed while they are talking.”

For its part, AFP makes Larijani’s offer sound decidedly unappealing:

In giving details of a closed-door meeting between top Iranian nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani and European foreign policy chief Javier Solana last weekend in Vienna, the diplomat said Iran “had a long list (of conditions) including (a) complete and total halt in activity at the UN Security Council, an absolute stepping down from going for sanctions and that Iran would have the right to nuclear fuel technology on its soil.”

“In return for this, Larijani said the Iranians would consider, consider not actually carry out, a two-month halt in enrichment. It was all very conditional,” the diplomat said, in relating a briefing from Solana.

[snip]

There was not any new offer on the table from the Iranians. It was all incredibly conditional and all temporary,” the diplomat said, adding that the suspension would come before negotiations.

With respect to Iran’s reaction,”AFP reported that”:http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20060911/wl_mideast_afp/irannuclearpoliticsenrichment_060911110202that Iran’s ambassador to the IAEA, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, denied that Larijani made the suspension offer.

The “response from Iran’s MFA”:http://www.mfa.gov.ir/output/INDEX.HTM seemed a little softer to me:

Referring to suspension of Iran uranium enrichment activities as a precondition for resumption of nuclear talks), the spokesman said

“The era of suspension is over. The question of the suspension (of uranium enrichment) is a thing of the past.”

“Iran will not take a step back,” stressed the official.

He added, “If the Europeans have points of view (about suspension) we are ready to hear them, but we, too, have questions to ask,” Asefi stressed.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid-Reza Asefi expressed hope on Sunday in the second round of Larijani-Solana talks in Vienna, the European side “will adopt a reasonable policy.”Asefi was referring to the nuclear talks between Iran`s Secretary of Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Ali Larijani and the European Union (EU) foreign policy chief Javier Solana in the Austrian capital.

The two officials held the first round of their talks on Saturday behind closed doors. Addressing domestic and foreign reporters at his weekly press briefing, Asefi described the talks as “good”.

However, the spokesman warned “If the Europeans insist on improper grounds during the second round of talks (due to begin within hours Sunday), then the case would proceed in another way.”

“In the nuclear case we enjoy some rights that we pursue them in the talks,” Asefi stressed.

He expressed hope the second round of Larijani-Solana talks would lead to “mutually agreed upon” consequences.

Obviously, other details RE: scope and duration will need to be seen before one can render a proper judgment on Iran’s offer. I would note that, during its previous negotiations with the E3 (and prior to restarting its conversion facility in August 2005), Iran failed to make good on more than one threat to abandon its suspension agreement.

ISIS has “a copy of Iran’s response”:http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/iranresponse.pdf to the “P5+1 package”:http://www.armscontrol.org/pdf/20060606_Iran_P5+1_Proposal.pdf offered to Iran 6 June.

There’s also a “brief analysis”:http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/confusedbuthopeful.pdf which you should read.

From the interview Jeffrey quotes in “his recent post,”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1175/get-enriched-or-die-tryin-2,there are a couple of items worth highlighting.

1. Saidi mentions that Iran might construct HW-moderated _power_ reactors – a claim I don’t recall having seen before.

He says:

Therefore, unlike in research light water reactors, which need over 20 per cent enriched fuel, we basically do not require enriched fuel for heavy water reactors. In other words we could use uranium oxide as fuel for these reactors – *be they power or research reactors.*

Pointing to the technical know-how for such reactors, the member of Iranian negotiating team said: Such reactors could be indigenous, which would be more cost-effective and justified. On the other hand, *the research heavy water reactor could pave the way for us to build power heavy water reactors* in the future.

Saidi also offered what I think is an additional explanation for why it’s building its HW research reactor – the one it has now is too old.

Iran has said the HWRR is going to be used for producing medical isotopes. The US has countered that Iran’s not even using its Tehran research reactor to full capacity. (Amb. Greg Schulte reiterated this claim “29 August.”:http://www.usun-vienna.rpo.at/

But Saidi countered with this:

Noting the old age of Tehran’s research reactor, he said: Due to its old age, Tehran’s five-megawatt research reactor should, in principle, be set aside in the next five years.

Saidi also observed that HWRs are superior to LWRs because the former don’t need enriched uranium. That particular feature is, of course, one reason why we don’t want Iran to have HWRs.

2. Saidi must have thought he was on a roll, because he also indicated that Iran plans to pursue more-advanced centrifuges:

bq. Noting that Iran does not restrict itself to first, second or third generation machinery, he said: We will *conduct research in all kinds of centrifuge machinery* that could offer better and higher quality and which are more compatible with our indigenous expertise.

Nice.

*HWPP Supplementary*

You likely saw “Jeffrey’s”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1172/heavy-water-plant-not-nuclear-reator and “Cheryl’s”:http://whirledview.typepad.com/whirledview/2006/08/a_heavy_water_p.html very good takes on Iran’s heavy water -reactor- production plant.

“MNA quoted”:http://www.mehrnews.com/en/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=371762 AEOI head Gholamreza Aghazadeh 26 August giving some details about the HWPP:

bq. “The production capacity of this plant is currently 16 tons of deuterium with 99.8 percent purity,” explained the AEOI director. “The full capacity of this power plant is 80 tons of deuterium water per year.”