ISIS has it “here.”:http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/TechnicalCooperationFeb2007.pdf

I recently found myself thinking about the following two _ACT_ excerpts while speaking to some colleagues about Iran.

The first is called “How Long Until an Iranian Bomb?” It’s from an October article and can be found “here.”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_10/IAEAIranIntel.asp

In the interview, Negroponte reiterated U.S. estimates that Tehran will have the “capability” to produce a nuclear weapon “five to 10 years from now,” unless circumstances change. A Department of National Intelligence spokesperson said that the intelligence community is evaluating this assessment as part of its work on a new National Intelligence Estimate, Newsweek reported Sept. 25.

By contrast, Israeli government estimates suggest that Iran could master the enrichment process within six to 12 months and produce enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a nuclear weapon in as little as three years, according to a knowledgeable Western official.

Asked about differences between the two government’s estimates, Negroponte said that both countries “basically operate from the same knowledge base” but that Israel will “sometimes…give you the worst-case assessment.”

Some U.S. officials have also argued for less-optimistic timelines. For example, Bolton said that the international community should not “assume that the intelligence estimates that put [ Tehran’s ability to acquire nuclear weapons] off for many years are necessarily going to be right.”

Additionally, Joseph told the House International Relations Committee in March that several “wildcards,” including potential assistance from foreign entities, could “accelerate” the intelligence community’s notional timeline.

The “second excerpt,”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_06/IranDirectTalks.asp is from the June issue and called “Getting to Yes?”

The first part discusses Iran’s positions RE: a possible solution to the controversy over its enrichment program. But the part below describes a couple of expert opinions RE: Tehran’s nuclear intentions:

Iranian officials, however, have said that Iran would accept limits on the number of centrifuges in its pilot facility. For example, the Iranian diplomat indicated that Tehran would have been willing in March to limit the number of centrifuges to between 164 and 500. A former European diplomat who maintains contact with Iranian officials said in a May 22 interview that, according to an Iranian official “directly involved” in the matter, Khamenei agreed in the spring of 2005 that Iran would accept a limit of 164 centrifuges.

Iran is currently operating a 164-centrifuge cascade in its pilot facility and is building two others.

But Gary Samore, a former Clinton administration National Security Council aide who maintains contact with Tehran, told Arms Control Today May 17 that Iran is determined to have an industrial-scale enrichment capability and does not want a constraint on its enrichment facilities. According to Samore, Iranian officials say privately that they want to have a “breakout capability” for developing nuclear weapons. Interestingly, the Iranian diplomat who spoke with Arms Control Today also suggested that there are some officials in Tehran who may want Iran to have a nuclear weapons option.

A former senior intelligence official offered another view. Former National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia Paul Pillar told Arms Control Today May 22 that, in his judgment, Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program but is not on an “irreversible course.” Pillar cautioned that such assessments are only judgments, noting that U.S. intelligence about Iran’s nuclear programs is limited.

Because this blog is obvoiusly all about me.

Have a good weekend.

“Here it is,”:http://www.irna.ir/en/news/view/menu-234/0701315047185724.htm FWIW.

Laura Rozen has a “good summary”:http://news.nationaljournal.com/articles/0118nj1.htm of what ISOG and the OSD crew are up to RE: Iran. Some new details too, if memory serves:

Sources close to the administration’s Iran policy say the primary vehicle for U.S. government planning on Iran is the Iran-Syria Policy and Operations Group, an inter-agency body created in early 2006 that includes representatives and Iran specialists from the Office of the Vice President, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the State Department, the Treasury Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council, and other agencies.

The overall group has four or five subgroups, including a recently combined one that focuses on “public diplomacy and promoting democracy” in Iran. That subgroup doled out some of the $85 million that Congress approved to support pro-democracy efforts in Iran. A second subgroup is devoted exclusively to Syria. A third focuses on counter-terrorism issues, and a fourth has a military agenda. Formally overseen by a steering committee headed by National Security Council Middle East adviser Elliott Abrams and James Jeffrey, the State Department’s principal deputy assistant secretary for Near Eastern affairs, the so-called ISOG is managed day to day by David Denehy, a senior adviser at State’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and a former official with the International Republican Institute. Denehy has recently told some associates that he plans to move sometime early this year to the Office of the Vice President, where he would continue to coordinate the Iran-Syria group.

In addition to the ISOG, the Pentagon last spring set up a six-person Iranian directorate in the Office of the Secretary of Defense that includes three former members of the Office of Special Plans, a controversial unit established by former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld that produced discredited intelligence analysis linking Saddam Hussein to Al Qaeda.

U.S. officials say that multiple inter-agency meetings on Iran are going on every day under the auspices of the Iran-Syria Policy and Operations Group, and that the pace of activity has quickened. “There are so many meetings; we’re doing stuff, writing papers; actions are being taken,” said one person involved with the group. “It’s very intense.”

Previous post “here.”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1317/isog-in-action

[Via “War and Piece”:http://www.warandpiece.com/blogdirs/005566.html ]

In all of the discussions about picking more fights with Iran, people should take another look at this “article”:http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2007/01/02/us_unit_works_quietly_to_counter_irans_sway?mode=PF published in the _Boston Globe_ a little while back.

Observe:

For nearly a year, a select group of US officials has been quietly coordinating actions to counter the looming threat of a nuclear-armed Iran, including increasing the military capabilities of Arab allies such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain.

The group, known as the Iran Syria Policy and Operations Group, or ISOG, is also coordinating a host of other actions, which include covert assistance to Iranian dissidents and building international outrage toward Iran by publicizing its alleged role in a 1994 terrorist attack in Argentina, according to interviews with half a dozen White House, Pentagon, and State Department officials who are involved in the group’s work.

Pentagon officials involved with the group intend to ask Congress as early as February to increase funding for transfers of military hardware to allies in the Persian Gulf and to accelerate plans for joint military activities. The request, which is still being formulated, is expected to include but not be limited to more advanced-missile defense systems and early-warning radar to detect and prevent Iranian missile strikes.

For some reason, some people speculate that the ISOG might be involved in efforts to cause regime change in Iran:

The United States has repeatedly said its policy is not to overthrow the Iranian regime, but one former US official who attended a meeting during ISOG’s initial phase eight months ago said in an interview that he got the impression that regime change was a key goal of many of the meetings’ participants.

He said that some of the intelligence reports ordered by members of the group were so highly classified that they were accessible to less than a dozen people in the US government, suggesting that some of the group’s activities were far from routine.

But interviews with half a dozen current White House, Pentagon, and State Department officials indicated that ISOG’s aims are more modest. Several said that as much as they would like to see the regimes in Tehran and Damascus go, ongoing military activities in Iraq and Afghanistan have limited their range of options. The main goal now, they said, is Cold War style “containment” of Iran in the hopes that Iranians one day will opt to change their own government.

Part of the article’s description of ISOG’s composition and M.O. reminded me of “this post”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1209/npr-on-iran-intel I wrote a few months ago, in which I referenced “this piece”:http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/archives/008507.php from Josh Marshall.

Josh wrote:

As you may know, Vice President Cheney’s daughter Elizabeth is the deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs. She also has the title of “Coordinator for Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiatives.” Basically that means she’s in charge of democratizing the Middle East.

She has a budget of, I believe $75 million, for bringing about ‘regime change’ in Iran.

I also noticed this recent aside in The Nelson Report in which Chris Nelson wrote that his sources “say [Undersecretary of State Nick] Burns has been fighting an apparently losing battle with Undersecretary for non-proliferation Bob Joseph on a variety of issues, and that Vice President Cheney’s office seems to be sponsoring the hiring of exceptionally large numbers of political appointees, not career FSO’s, to staff the to-be-created Iran democracy projects to be run out of State.”

Here’s the _Globe_ on the same subject:

ISOG was modeled after the Iraq Policy and Operations Group, set up in 2004 to shepherd information and coordinate US action in Iraq. ISOG has raised eyebrows within the State Department for hiring BearingPoint — the same Washington-based private contracting firm used by the Iraq group — to handle its administrative work, rather than State Department employees.

Some lower level State Department officials saw the decision to outsource responsibility for scheduling meetings, record keeping, and distributing reports as an effort to circumvent the normal diplomatic machinery and provide extra secrecy for the group.

The article also identifies those administration officials who comprise ISOG:

bq. ISOG is led by a steering committee with two leading hawks on Middle East policy as chairmen: James F. Jeffrey, prinicipal deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern Affairs, who once headed Iraq policy, and Elliott Abrams, deputy national security adviser for “Global Democracy Strategy.” Michael Doran, a Middle East specialist at the White House, steps in when Abrams is away. Elizabeth Cheney, the vice president’s daughter, who was the former deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern Affairs, served as cochairwoman before she took a maternity leave earlier this year.

I’ve heard a little bit about this stuff, but anyone who knows anything is more than free to pass on their wisdom.

FWIW, here’s what Mr. Jeffrey said a “couple of months ago:”:http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/75902.htm

bq. The U.S. is not seeking regime change, what we’re seeking is a change in behavior across the board and the path to seeking this change is multilateral action primarily in the U.N. with the — what we call the P-5+1, one being Germany, but also through international efforts such as that at the U.N. that produced 1701 for Lebanon and multilateral actions –interactions with the countries of the region on the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians and in several other fields. We have a variety of bilateral sanctions that we’re trying to gain more international support for to deter Iran for — and pursuing the path of nuclear weapons. And we also have a variety of steps that we’re taking with our friends and allies in the region to strengthen their defense against a growing Iranian military threat.

You may recall that, after the Majlis “recently required”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1324/text-of-majlis-bill the government to “revise” its cooperation with the IAEA, Iran’s SNSC set up a committee to deal with the matter.

That committee has now taken its first step. ISNA reported yesterday that

bq. The Iran-International Atomic Energy Agency revision committee in its first step prevented the entry of 38 inspectors in to Iran.

Yesterday, ISNA didn’t say which inspectors were barred or why. But according to “this AFP story,”:http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070123/wl_mideast_afp/irannuclearpoliticsuniaea_070123141529 ISNA reported that “the barred inspectors are French, British, German and Canadian nationals.”

A couple of good wire stories from yesterday can be found “here”:http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/iran_nuclear and “here.”:http://today.reuters.com/news/articlenews.aspx?type=topNews&storyID=2007-01-22T122004Z_01_BLA240558_RTRUKOC_0_US-IRAN-NUCLEAR-INSPECTORS.xmlThe The two ISNA reports I could find on the web are “here”:http://www.isna.ir/Main/NewsView.aspx?ID=News-865274&Lang=E and “here.”:http://www.isna.ir/Main/NewsView.aspx?ID=News-865116&Lang=E

The IAEA emailed its reaction yesterday:

Media Advisory
Vienna, 22 January 2007 — Statement by IAEA Spokesperson, Melissa Fleming on Iran:

“Details of inspector designation is a confidential matter between the IAEA and the country concerned. In this case, we are discussing with Iran its request for withdrawing the designation of certain safeguards inspectors.

It should be noted however, that there are a sufficient number of inspectors designated for Iran and the IAEA is able to perform its inspection activities in accordance with Iran’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.”

Ultimately, I’m not sure how significant this is, although Iran obviously should be increasing, not decreasing, its cooperation with the IAEA.

One thing I have not seen mentioned is ISNA’s reporting on what appears to be the composition of the committee:

bq. The MP referred to the first meeting of the special committee following up the construction of nuclear power plants which was held yesterday and said: This meeting resulted in the MPs making such a decision. This meeting was held with the participation of heads of the Majlis Energy, Education and Research, Industries and Mines, National Security and Foreign Policy and the Planning and Budget committees as well as the officials involved in the construction of nuclear power plants, in order to follow up this Majlis ratification.

Moreover, the Majlis is forming a committee of its own:

The Borujerd MP said: We have also decided that the MPs, who have nuclear expertise, should set up a special technical committee to supervise and follow up the construction of nuclear power plants. According to Borujerdi, during the [Majlis] session, the MPs decided that Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization should study international tenders and announce their result as soon as possible. This way, apart from using domestic technical expertise, we will enjoy international know-how as well.

Sounds like a party…

The AP had a “story out”:http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2007/01/15/iran_said_to_install_uranium_centrifuges/ a few days ago discussing the Iranian enrichment progran’s apparent lack of progress. It was cited in the Nelson Report a couple of days ago (an excerpt from which can be found “here.”:http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/001879.php)

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I am also under the impression that Iran’s centrifuge program is progressing slowly. But I have to take issue with the AP’s interpretation of an item that appeared in the Iranian press:

Other signs point to technical difficulties at Iran’s nuclear facilities. Earlier this month, Vice President Gholamreza Aghazadeh, who heads the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, told reporters that about 50 centrifuges had exploded during a test.

“We had installed 50 centrifuges. One night, I was informed that all the 50 centrifuges had exploded. … Ahmadinejad called me and said: ‘Build these machines even if they explode 10 times more,'” Aghazadeh was quoted as saying by Iranian media.

The problem is that the centrifuges exploded last spring. And that event is mentioned as part of a larger discussion which clearly characterizes the enrichment program as advancing rapidly.

Here’s what the report, which appeared in _Ayande-ye Now_ 6 January, said:

The president’s deputy then mentioned the doubts of some of the order’s authorities about Iran’s ability to put the Natanz plant into operation and said: “In Bahman 1384 [February 2006], after the meeting of the heads of the three powers, we broke the suspension; in that meeting, they doubtfully said that we cannot put the chain of 164 centrifuges into operation until the next year.

In the beginning of Esfand [March] of the same year, we received the permission to put the chain of centrifuges into operation and in Farvardin 1385 [April 2006], we achieved enriched uranium.” Aqazadeh then said: “During those days, once they called me at two o’clock in the morning and said that all the 50 centrifuges have exploded because the ‘UPS’ “[uninterruptible power supply]”:http://www.y12.doe.gov/library/acronyms/letter.php?index=U in charge of controlling the electricity had not acted properly. Later we found out that the ‘UPS’ that we had imported through Turkey had been manipulated; and after this incident, we checked all the imported instruments before using them.”

He then added: “In Farvardin of the current year [April 2006], we put all the chain into operation, but we could not achieve the three and a half per cent enriched uranium product. I travelled to Mashhad, and I begged Imam Reza (peace be upon him); I was very upset. Mr Ahmadinezhad called me and I told him that we have had no result. He said: ‘Even if everything goes wrong ten times, do not worry, do it again.’ The same night they called me from Natanz and told me that they had reached a two and a half per cent enriched product.” The head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization mentioned the achievement of four per cent enriched uranium product…[paragraph breaks inserted]

The part about the imported UPS having been “manipulated” is interesting…have some people been sabotaging their exports to Iran?