Category Archives: DPRK

Unha-2/TD-2 Launch – Epic FAIL

Following up on “Josh’s post,”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1966/unha-2-an-overlooked-angle it looks like the NK Unha-2/TD-2 launch failed.

NORTHCOM has “this”:http://www.northcom.mil/News/2009/040509.html announcement:

PETERSON AIR FORCE BASE, Colo. — North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command officials acknowledged today that North Korea launched a Taepo Dong 2 missile at 10:30 p.m. EDT Saturday which passed over the Sea of Japan/East Sea and the nation of Japan.

*Stage one of the missile fell into the Sea of Japan/East Sea. The remaining stages along with the payload itself landed in the Pacific Ocean.*

*No object entered orbit* and no debris fell on Japan.

NORAD and USNORTHCOM assessed the space launch vehicle as not a threat to North America or Hawaii and took no action in response to this launch.

This is all of the information that will be provided by NORAD and USNORTHCOM pertaining to the launch.

FWIW, this launch was more successful than the 2006 TD-2 launch, in which the missile blew up ~42 seconds into flight.

*Update:*

Retired Lt. Gen. Henry Obering “argues that”:http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/04/05/north.korea.rocket/index.html the rocket “was able to go through the staging event,” signaling success in the rocket reaching long-range capability.

Maybe. I interpreted the NORTHCOM annoucement as saying that the last two stages hadn’t separated, though perhaps I was mistaken.

Unha-2: An Overlooked Angle

Up, up, and away: North Korea has launched its “space rocket”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1956/if-it-quacks-like-a-satellite. For real, “this time”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1963/japan-on-n-korean-launch-our-bad. The “instant report”:http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/05/world/asia/05korea.html of the _NY Times_ — most of which was presumably written beforehand — includes this striking tidbit.

While many analysts have looked at the launching through a military lens, some say another perspective involves political rivalries on the Korean peninsula. For years, South Korea has been gearing up to fire a satellite into orbit and join the space club. Its spaceport of Oinarodo is nearly ready, but a launching scheduled for this month was delayed, giving North Korea an opening.

“They’re racing to beat the South Koreans,” said Tim Brown, a senior fellow at “GlobalSecurity.org”:http://globalsecurity.org/, a private group in Alexandria, Va.

That’s probably just gravy, but regardless, it’s an in-your-face moment for the U.S., Japan, and South Korea, all at once.

Japan On N Korean Launch Announcement: Our Bad

“Strong work:”:http://uk.reuters.com/article/usTopNews/idUKTRE53314H20090404

Japan’s government apologized on Saturday for mistakenly announcing that North Korea had launched a rocket, as the nation’s military remained on alert for the expected move by Tokyo’s secretive communist neighbor.

_snip_

“We caused a great deal of trouble to the Japanese people. This was a mistake in the transmission of information by the Defense Ministry and the Self-Defense Forces,” Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada told reporters, using the formal name for Japan’s military. “I want to apologize to the people from my heart.”

Kyodo has “quite a bit”:http://home.kyodo.co.jp/modules/fstStory/index.php?storyid=431695 more:

bq. The government released information that ”North Korea appears to have launched a projectile” at 12:16 p.m. via its e-mail-based Em-Net emergency information system, but retracted it five minutes later, saying it was a ”detection failure.”

By way of explanation, mistakes were made.

Here’s an excerpt:

According to the Defense Ministry, the ground-based FPS-5 radar at the ministry’s Iioka research and development site in Asahi, Chiba Prefecture, picked up a trace over the Sea of Japan on the radar screen.

The information was immediately conveyed to the ASDF’s Air Defense Command in the suburbs of Tokyo, but *the person who received it mistook the information for satellite early warning information provided by the U.S. military.*

The satellite early warning information is based on data sent by the U.S. Air Force’s Defense Support Program satellite orbiting the Earth. Equipped with an infrared telescope, it is normally the quickest means to detect ballistic missile launches.

The *erroneous information then got passed onto the SDF’s Central Command Post at the Defense Ministry headquarters, from which it was conveyed to the crisis management center at the prime minister’s office,* according to the ministry.

The prime minister’s office sent an emergency e-mail message to local governments across the country and media organizations based on the false information.

One minute *after the Central Command Post received the launch information, it was notified that the trace had disappeared from the radar screen and that no satellite early warning information had actually been received,* the ministry said.

”They *should have confirmed on computer terminals that satellite early warning information had been received. The mistake could have been avoided if they had done so,”* a ministry official said.

The official said he does not know why the airman at the Air Defense Command mixed up the radar and satellite early warning information.

Read the “whole thing.”:http://home.kyodo.co.jp/modules/fstStory/index.php?storyid=431695

*Update:*

Geoff Forden has “more”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2241/dprk-blip-on-a-screen on the J/FPS-5 radar which reportedly “saw” the launch.

If It Quacks Like A Satellite

According to “Reuters”:http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSSEO16955920090331:

U.S. officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said a commercial satellite image of the Musudan-ri missile test site showed a Taepodong-2 missile with a bulb-shaped payload cover, consistent with a satellite payload, rather than a warhead.

The image was posted on Sunday on the website of the Institute for Science and International Security, or ISIS, a Washington-based group devoted to informing the public on security issues including nuclear weapons.

The bulb shape is similar to the nose cone standard for military and commercial satellite launches, concluded officials, including analysts at the U.S. Air Force’s National Air and Space Intelligence Center in Dayton, Ohio.

“Feel better now?”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1953/icg-be-mellow

If you missed it, the ISIS brief with the Digital Globe image of the space launcher is “here”:http://www.isisnucleariran.org/assets/pdf/MusudanRi_29March2009.pdf. Geoff’s analysis of the image is “here”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2233/dprk-reading-between-the-blurs.

As so often happens, “NTI”:http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20090401_2247.php was here first…

ICG: Be Mellow

The International Crisis Group tells us “not to overreact”:http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6030&l=1 to North Korea’s space launch, saying this would “promote hardliners in Pyongyang at a time when the North is facing strains over succession issues.”

bq. If the missile launch goes forward, domestic political pressures, particularly in the U.S. and Japan, will push for strong punitive measures. A tough response such as using missile defences against the rocket might please domestic constituencies but history has shown that pressure alone is very unlikely to influence Pyongyang’s behaviour in a positive way. It would likely result in the demise of the talks to end North Korea’s nuclear program and also worsen tensions on the Korean peninsula and promote hardliners in Pyongyang at a time when the North is facing strains over succession issues. In the worst case, it could risk a war with potentially devastating damage to South Korea, Japan and the world economy.

Secretary of Defense Bob Gates has got it covered:

WALLACE: The commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, Admiral Keating, says that we are, quote, “fully prepared to shoot down this missile.”

Are there any circumstances under which we will do that?

GATES: I think if we had an aberrant missile, one that was headed for Hawaii – that looked like it was headed for Hawaii or something like that, we might consider it. But I don’t think we have any plans to do anything like that at this point.

WALLACE: What if it were headed for the West Coast, for Alaska?

GATES: Well, we – I don’t think we believe this missile can do that.

WALLACE: And what about the Japanese? Obviously, they have some of our technology. Do we believe they’re going to prepare to shoot this down?

GATES: Well, again, based on what I read in the newspapers, what the Japanese are saying is that the – if that missile fails and it looks like it’s going to drop debris on Japan, that they might take some action.

WALLACE: Is there – you’re basically discussing this, Mr. Secretary, as if it’s going to happen.

GATES: The launch?

WALLACE: Yeah.

GATES: I think it probably will.

WALLACE: And there’s nothing we can do about it?

GATES: Nope.

WALLACE: And what does that say to you?

GATES: Well, I would say we’re not prepared to do anything about it.

See the “whole thing”:http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4390, if you like.

“Daniel Pinkston”:http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5063&l=1 is ICG’s man in Seoul.

[Update: Yes, I’ve gotten tired of pointing out that “we can’t employ missile defenses against the rocket, per se”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1912/shooting-at-kwangmyongsong-2, only against its payload, or a falling rocket stage.]

About That Missile Assembly Building

As I’m sure you’ve noticed, what North Korea is calling “Unha-2”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1877/kwangmyongsong-kwangmyongsong-kwangmyongsong is generally described in the Western media as “Taepodong-2.” (Here’s “just one example”:http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0328/p90s04-woap.html.)

This is the same name used for the missile that North Korea “unsuccessfully tested”:http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/07/04/korea.missile/ on July 5, 2006.

But are they really the same missile?

Here’s an orbital happy snap of the missile assembly building at the Musudan-Ri Missile Test Facility / “Tonghae Satellite Launching Ground”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1877/kwangmyongsong-kwangmyongsong-kwangmyongsong, dated “June 9, 2006”:http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/html/dg_no-dong_20060609-01.htm.

And here’s the same thing, dated “March 29, 2009”:http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/images/musudan-ri-vcb_ge1_090329-1.jpg.

It’s gotten longer, with an extension on the south end. Does that imply a taller missile?

Beats me. But it’s interesting to compare Geoff Forden’s “silhouette”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2233/dprk-reading-between-the-blurs of the just-unveiled rocket with Charles Vick’s “speculative sketches”:http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/images/taepo-dong-2.jpg ca. 2004. That first stage certainly looks bigger and taller than expected.

Now “they fuel”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1938/weekend-project and “we wait”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1880/northeast-is-red.

Batman Begins

With the much-anticipated North Korean space launch so long in coming, everyone’s running out of things to say. Glenn Kessler of the _Washington Post_ gets “a few different perspectives”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/27/AR2009032702953.html on Stephen Bosworth, everyone’s favorite part-time envoy, and his controversial part-time-itude.

“Been there”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1861/part-time-envoy, “done that”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1873/more-about-the-bosworth-appointment.

Buried at the end of the story is the good stuff, some comments from “Bruce Wayne”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1874/actually-its-simple himself. You read, I’ll interpret:

bq. “I will not be the day-to-day representative in the six-party negotiations,” Bosworth said, adding that he will focus more on broader policy issues, including bilateral negotiations with North Korea. “Ideally one would like to meet with the leader,” Kim Jong Il, he said. “I would like to reach higher in the foreign ministry than we have been able to.”

_Translation:_ Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan — considered, relatively speaking, the voice of reasonableness, and the most authoritative figure who routinely speaks to foreigners — has been hard to reach lately. Perhaps they want to make their point with that space launch first.

bq. The new envoy said key periods when he must be at the school are fairly predictable. “A lot of what I do for Fletcher, I can do on the road,” he said. “I don’t see a major problem. I think that it is manageable. I am fortunate in that I have extremely good people in both operations, and I will rely heavily on them.”

_Translation:_ You can send emails from the Beijing airport these days, you know, as long as you don’t mind “the Chinese reading them”:http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/29/technology/29spy.html.

Bosworth said it was a surprise to him when Clinton called and offered the job. By coincidence, he was visiting North Korea when rumors began circulating that he would be tapped.

“As I told the North Koreans, I had not had a single conversation with anyone in the Obama administration about anything. But as soon as I returned from Beijing, I was asked to call the State Department and ended up talking to the secretary,” he said. “She was very explicit that, in her view, this could be done in coordination with the deanship.”

_Translation:_ I’m doing this job on my own terms. I’m not planning to sit by the phone in Foggy Bottom, waiting for KJI to call, thankyouverymuch.

The “abovementioned visit was covered”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1844/track-i-and-a-half-in-pyongyang right here at your very favorite arms control/nonproliferation website. So was “the odd way that the South Korean press had the story before Bosworth did”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1882/narrowing-the-gulf.

bq. “We have got to deal with it,” Bosworth said, referring to the North Korean nuclear arsenal. “It has strategic urgency. You can’t simply let it cool, not only because of its implications for us but also because of its implications for countries in the area, including our two allies [Japan and South Korea]. So we’ve got to be seen to be dealing with this. That being said, it sure is not easy.”

_Translation:_ What he said.

Bonus item! The invaluable “FCNL Nuclear Calendar”:http://www.fcnl.org/NuclearCalendar/ mentions an upcoming talk, involving some other folks who were in North Korea around the same time as Stephen Bosworth and the High Council of Morts:

bq. March 30 Noon-2:00 p.m., Susan Shirk and Stephan Haggard, University of California, San Diego; Marcus Noland, Peterson Institute for International Economics; and Karin Lee, National Committee on North Korea, “The Political and Economic Situation in North Korea: Implications for U.S. Policy.” University of California Washington Center, 1608 Rhode Island Ave., NW, Washington. RSVP to Joseph McGhee by “email”:mailto:joseph.mcghee@ucdc.edu.

Incidentally, this event is _not_ listed at the “website”:http://www.ucdc.edu/ of the University of California Washington Center. C’mon, folks, get with the program…

Post Blows NK Headline

_Guest post from the Arms Control Association’s Peter Crail_

The Washington Post’s Blaine Harden wrote a decent “story”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/26/AR2009032600414_pf.html on North Korea’s expected rocket launch and various assessments of where Pyongyang stands in being able to miniaturize a nuclear weapon for its missiles. Unfortunately, he appears to have been sabotaged by his own news editors, who ran the story with a headline way out of left field: “North Korean Nuclear Test A Growing Possibility.”

Say what?

The story doesn’t suggest anything of the sort. Here’s the thrust of the article:

bq. While North Korea has been making missiles to intimidate its neighbors for nearly half a century, what makes this launch particularly worrying is the increasing possibility — as assessed by U.S. intelligence and some independent experts — that it has built or is attempting to build nuclear warheads small enough to fit atop its growing number of missiles.

Worrisome, but nothing suggestive of an upcoming nuclear test. There is also this qualification:

bq. Experts agree that North Korea is probably years away from putting nuclear warheads on long-range missiles that could hit the United States.

Then of course there’s a discussion of the TD-2 launch, a long-range missile that could hit the United States, including:

bq. North Korea says it plans to put a communications satellite into orbit, but that claim is widely viewed as a pretext for testing an intercontinental ballistic missile, the Taepodong-2. The U.S. director of national intelligence, Dennis C. Blair, told a Senate committee that a three-stage missile of this type, if it works, could strike the continental United States.

Okay, then what on earth explains the heading when the story continues on page A10: “Likelihood Grows that N. Korean Launch will be Nuclear” ?

Celebrating April Fool’s Day a bit early, I guess.

Here’s what DNI Blair also said in that “SASC testimony”:http://armed-services.senate.gov/e_witnesslist.cfm?id=3704 about the likelihood of the launch:

bq. I tend to believe that the — the North Koreans announced that they were going to do a space launch, and I believe that that’s what they — that’s what they intend. I could be wrong, but that would be my estimate.

And, STRATCOM Commander Kevin Chilton “provided some context”:http://armed-services.senate.gov/e_witnesslist.cfm?id=3699 for the launch:

SEN. REED: If it is a — turns out to be a launch of a satellite does that automatically assume that they have the capacity to launch a ballistic missile, intercontinental ballistic missile? Or is there much more work that has to be done to design a reentry vehicle and design a system that will deliver a missile?

GEN. CHILTON: Yes, Senator, there’s other elements that would have to be matured. As you point out rightly, a reentry vehicle, which is not a trivial thing. *Obviously, the difference between a reentry vehicle for a short or medium range and a long range are different because it’s a different, much hotter environment for a long range flight to survive.*

So working on the reentry vehicle and then weaponization is an issue as well.

But *we have no insights into their efforts in this area but certainly they also require a booster with that to perform its capability.*

SEN. REED: At this juncture we have their statement, which offers a range of possibilities.

And, in fact, from your previous testimony, this statement is a warning that they didn’t give prior to the previous launch, and it would be — the statement would be — ironically, I think, more consistent with the practice of nations who are preparing to launch vehicles. Is that correct?

GEN. CHILTON: You’re correct. *They did not make a similar statement last time, and today space-faring nations around the world do make announcements of their plans for launching into space.*

SEN. REED: So, again, this is hard to ascribe to North Korea, but they seem to be following, at least procedurally, what other nations do in terms of the preparation for a launch of a satellite or any type of space vehicle. Correct?

GEN. CHILTON: I would say that there’s — there may be an attempt there, not probably as specific, procedurally, as done. But I would also pile-on to General Sharp’s comment that, you know, there’s this — the U.N. resolution there that is really the big, big difference.

SEN. REED: Yeah. This might be completely inadvertently complying with “the rules of the road,” but it is something I think that should be — that you’ve noted, and I think it bears emphasis.

Weekend Project

According to an unnamed “South Korean military source,” “it takes a little while to fuel”:http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iZHXAkmISaqZKPlU6RhkfT2hi0JQ the “Unha-2”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1877/kwangmyongsong-kwangmyongsong-kwangmyongsong.

SEOUL (AFP) — North Korea is expected to set up its highly contentious rocket on the launch pad this weekend ahead of its expected firing in early April, a report said Wednesday.

[snip]

“It is highly likely that the rocket will emerge between March 28-31,” a South Korean military source told Yonhap news agency, adding it would take about three days to inject sufficient fuel.

Assuming that’s right, North Korea’s sorta-ICBM just doesn’t seem that threatening, does it?

Libya’s Theory of the Hard Cases

p{float: center;}. !/images/71.jpg!

Why the big struggles with Iran and North Korea over nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, and delivery systems? Libya’s ambassador to the UN has the Simple AnswerTM you’ve been looking for:

“We gave some devices, some centrifuges, for example for America, but what do you give us? Nothing,” said Abdelrahman Shalgham, who served as foreign minister for eight years before being named ambassador to the United Nations this month. “That’s why we think North Korea and Iran are hesitating now to have a breakthrough regarding their projects.”

(That’s Ambassador Shalgam in happier times, above, poised to corral the Secretary of State.)

These and other remarks appear in a “fine article”:http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/11/world/africa/11libya.html by Michael Slackman of the _New York Times._ Therein, we learn that welcoming Libya back into the family of nations wasn’t enough. Partly, Libyan officials would like to see more rapid progress in civil nuclear cooperation. But most of all, they are surprised to see the continuation of the State Department’s routine hectoring on human rights:

One diplomat in Libya, who spoke on the condition that he not be identified because he was not authorized to speak to the news media, said the government was shocked that the United States still criticized Libya’s human rights record. Libya is a police state where security services operate with impunity and political opposition is not allowed.

“When you were enemies, we didn’t care,” the diplomat said after the State Department issued its latest “human rights report”:http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/index.htm this month. “But now, you are supposed to be friends. We were surprised. There were “16 pages”:http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/nea/119121.htm targeting Libya.”

(The links are in “the item as it appears at nytimes.com”:http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/11/world/africa/11libya.html.)

Tripoli is 1,200 miles east and a universe away from “Casablanca”:http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0034583/. One hears genuine shock and betrayal in these words. So in the interests of international understanding, allow me to assure our new Libyan friends that it’s not about them. Pretty much the “entire world”:http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/index.htm is represented in the State Department’s annual human rights report, with the glaring but scarcely surprising exception of the United States itself. For that, we have “Mark Danner”:http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/15/opinion/15danner.html. [Update: And “China”:http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-02/26/content_10904741.htm, too!]

Friends, enemies, and everything in between show up in the annual report. Even “Canada”:http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/wha/119151.htm. Even “Switzerland”:http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eur/119108.htm. As far as I can tell, the one and only country that gets a pass is “the Holy See”:https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/vt.html.

Life’s not fair, you know?

Does the Ambassador Have a Point?

p{float: right; margin-left:10px;}. !/images/72.jpg!

Now, having said all that, Ambassador Shalgham may have a little bit of a point. Exhibit A: North Korea. Since 2005, the United States has had not one but two special envoys for North Korea. One of them, Jay Lefkowitz — that’s his mug shot, right there — has “human rights as his special charge”:http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/66929.htm. This has not stopped him from addressing the nuclear track, which he sees as properly “interwoven with human rights and aid”:http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122999769691029167.html:

Today, a Helsinki-style model should be replicated with North Korea, and the U.S. should promote linkage among security, economic and human-rights issues. Significant economic assistance to North Korea should be offered, including development assistance, World Bank loans, trade access and food aid, but it must be given only in return for tangible, verifiable progress on all issues on the agenda. And human-rights progress should not be measured by bureaucrats meeting and reading prepared statements, but by tangible steps that move North Korea closer to the norms of the international community.

“This”:http://www.aei.org/events/eventID.1635,filter.all/event_detail.asp “sort of thing”:http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/01/17/korea.nuclear/index.html does not go unnoticed “in Pyongyang”:http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2008/200801/news01/29.htm#1, where it is seen as evidence of a “hostile policy”:http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2005/200508/news08/29.htm#8:

Such U.S. behavior is a very disturbing act as it is little short of challenging the DPRK which has shown generous magnanimity and flexibility for a solution to the nuclear issue and an act of throwing a hurdle in the way of the six-party talks. The U.S. seems not to be interested in the dialogue and the settlement of the nuclear issue at all but more keen on standing in confrontation with the DPRK and bringing about a “regime change” and “bringing down the system” in the DPRK. If the U.S. persists in such behavior, it will compel the DPRK to change its mind. The U.S. should abolish at once such unreasonable post of “envoy” and abandon its ambition to “bring down system in the DPRK.”

Mr. Lefkowitz doesn’t get many invitations to Pyongyang.

Square That Circle! Or Not.

So what to do when nonproliferation objectives seem to conflict with human rights objectives, or other important goals, for that matter? Your humble correspondent here won’t pretend to have Simple AnswersTM to these knotty questions. What answers he might have are neither simple nor really within the scope of an arms control blog. So let’s just conclude.

Certain other countries absolutely see America’s interest in human rights and democracy as a threat, and the mistrust this creates can seriously complicate the pursuit of other objectives. It’s not just North Korea. Take the Russians, for example, or “the Iranians”:http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=news.item&news_id=238778. [Link fixed.] (Mark Haas has placed “this phenomenon in broader historical perspective”:http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/cup_detail.taf?ti_id=4350.)

So before we make a serious effort to negotiate, we might want to figure out which issues we really want on the table.

And let’s recognize that some issues are likely to force themselves onto the agenda regardless. “Like this one”:http://iran.bahai.us/2009/03/13/bahai-leaders-on-trial-coverage/. [Update: “Or this”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/15/AR2009031501737.html.] This being America, complicating factors like public opinion and civil society can’t be wished away. It’s a Free Country,TM with all that entails.

Nothing’s simple, really.

Related topic: Dan Byman of Georgetown U. has asked, “Do Counterproliferation and Counterterrorism Go Together?”:http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/taps/psq/2007/00000122/00000001/art00002. He’s giving “a talk on the subject”:http://cissm.umd.edu/papers/display.php?id=425 at the University of Maryland College Park this coming April 30. Thanks, “FCNL Nuclear Calendar!”:http://www.fcnl.org/NuclearCalendar/

Cross-posted to “ArmsControlWonk.com”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2221/libyas-theory-of-the-hard-cases. See the “comments at ACW”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2221/libyas-theory-of-the-hard-cases#comment.

Late update: Here’s the “official Iranian view on human rights”:http://isna.ir/Isna/NewsView.aspx?ID=News-1313839&Lang=E.