I’m not blogging for the moment, but the blog is back online. If people could refrain from misrepresenting its contents, that would be welcomed.
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Author Archives: kerr
No More Blog
At least for now, because of Michael Rubin. It’ll go black when Hexive makes it happen. It’s been fun.
M Rubin, CRS, and This Blog
So it’s come to this.
I have never made a secret of the fact that I work for CRS and have this blog. I never talk about CRS on here because CRS has nothing to do with this blog. I mean nothing. At. All.
But Michael Rubin has now “made an issue”:http://corner.nationalreview.com/post/?q=NTQyMzc1MWIwOWExMTE5YWU0ODVhZWMzYjNmNTE4Njk of my day job. In fact , he impugns my integrity and implies that I should be fired. I think that’s kind of uncool. In any case, I now feel compelled to say a few things.
He says:
bq. Back to Paul Kerr, this should set the record straight. I am surprised that Congressional Research Service analysts not only blog, but also engage in hackery which appears motivated by either partisanship or a desire to advocate policy rather than analyze. From now on, I certainly would take with a grain of salt CRS reports on non-proliferation if they are authored by Kerr and would question why CRS hires bloggers. Granted, the blog is not on a CRS website (although Kerr’s interjections into other blogs suggests he spends much CRS time involved with blogs) but the many partisan links provide a window into the confluence of Kerr’s analysis and politics and should concern any staff member who expects the Congressional Research Service to uphold its reputation for straightforward analysis. CRS should not stand to legitimize analysis formed more by blogger groupthink than by careful reading and fact.
Rubin can read my stuff however he wants. I would welcome feedback from him. But let me be clear about a few things: I am not motivated by partisanship or politics. The work I do is good; if there are ever any inaccuracies I would be happy to correct them, but you won’t find many of those. I do work for both Republicans and Democrats alike and they all seem pretty happy with the results. If they weren’t, I would definitely hear about it.
A few other things:
* On this blog, I do not take policy positions on anything in my portfolio. In fact, I was careful not to do so in my post about Rubin’s oped.
* Despite what Rubin implies, I do not blog or comment on blogs at work. I do read some blogs at work as part of my job.
* The links on this site are not to partisan websites. There’s a reason for that.
* CRS hired me, as far as I know, because I worked for ACA for 5 years and CSIS for 2 years. I also had a blog, which, I guess, means they hired a blogger. But that’s not the part of my cv they focused on, I’m pretty sure.
* Neither Josh nor I write anything about Congress or politics. There’s a reason for that.
I actually agree with Rubin when he says “CRS should not stand to legitimize analysis formed more by blogger groupthink than by careful reading and fact.” If any of my analysis is ever informed by anything other than “careful reading and fact,” I imagine I will be looking for a new line of work.
Have a nice Friday.
*Update:* Michael and I exchanged friendly emails on this subject. I got no hard feelings.
M Rubin on Iran
Michael Rubin “takes issue today”:http://corner.nationalreview.com/post/?q=NTQyMzc1MWIwOWExMTE5YWU0ODVhZWMzYjNmNTE4Njk with “this post”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/2000/m-rubin-and-iran-hackery.
I took issue with the idea he expressed in this “oped”:http://www.michaelrubin.org/5274/what-iran-really-thinks-about-talks, which can be summarized by these sentences:
bq. Iran’s responsiveness to diplomacy is a mirage. After two years of talks following exposure of its Natanz facility, Tehran finally acquiesced to a temporary enrichment suspension, a move which Secretary of State Colin Powell called “a little bit of progress,” and the EU hailed.
The only point I was trying to make is that Iran did compromise during its 2003-2005 negotiations with the E3. I provided some evidence which, I think, is relevant to the above point. Rubin says it’s not relevant, so maybe I’m missing the point of his article. In any case, he doesn’t refute it.
I also disagree that the interview with Rowhani supports his article’s contention. I still think that’s the case.
I will address his comments about my employer and my integrity in another post.
SLVs and ICBMs
This could be a really good post with a lot of depth, but I am busy. However, Josh’s productivity is making me feel guilty enough to post something brief.
First, though, a thank-you to Nathan Hodge who was kind enough to “mention me”:http://blog.wired.com/defense/2009/04/north-korea-fue.html#more a little while back. As he noted, I took issue with one phrase in his original post: “once you have mastered satellite launch, you’ve pretty much figured out how to build an ICBM.”
I told him that mastering a satellite launch
bq. helps with the “launch” part, but not the “re-enter the atmosphere and destroy the desired target” part.
This is simply because SLVs aren’t designed to do the “blow up a lot of shit” thing that ICBMs tend to be good for. If you can build such things, that is. It’s not easy – a fact that “this piece in Yonhap”:http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2009/04/05/2/0301000000AEN20090405005400315F.HTML discussed a few weeks ago.
I would also commend “this OTA report.”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/file_download/7
Happy reading. And don’t even think about any unconscious motives behind your interest in missiles…
Josh adds: I’m not sure I’d call it “productivity,” exactly. And speaking for myself, at least, I’m still trying not to think too hard about my “interest in SBX”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1999/everything-you-always-wanted-to-know-about-sbx.
If you believe what’s been written about the “Musudan IRBM”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1884/irbm, then the NKs have a big leg up on the re-entry vehicle problem already.
M Rubin And Iran Hackery
Whatever one thinks about the Iran nuclear situation, “this WSJ piece”:http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123958201328712205.html from Michael Rubin is pure hackery.
There are too many errors to bother with, but here are a few fun facts:
First, Tehran did fulfill many, though certainly not all, of its pledges in its 2003 and 2004 agreements with the E3. For example, Iran did cooperate with many aspects of the IAEA’s investigation and signed and implemented an additional protocol to its CSA.
Second, Iran did make several proposals to the E3 in 2005. I know it might be hassle to ferret them out, so “here they are.”:http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals Oh, and there’s “this one”:http://www.armscontrol.org/pdf/2003_Spring_Iran_Proposal.pdf from 2003 that I think 1 or 2 people may have mentioned before.
Farideh Farhi has “more.”:http://icga.blogspot.com/2009/04/on-irans-sincerity-in-nuclear-talks.html I’ve read an English translation of the Aftab News interview with Rowhani that Rubin quotes from (I am not at liberty to post it, unfortunately). Dr. Farhi is correct that it doesn’t come close to supporting Rubin’s claim that “Rowhani, Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator at the time, acknowledged his government’s insincerity.”
Rubin is also the primary drafter of “this,”:http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/ht/a/GetDocumentAction/i/8448 in case anyone needs a reminder.
*Update:*
I realized that I was not clear about one issue: Iran’s well-known lack of enthusiasm for suspending its enrichment program does not equate to insincerity or an unwillingness to compromise. Whether talks are worth pursuing is a different issue.
Two Random NK Missile Thoughts
A bit overshadowed by the “news of the day”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1991/nk-boots-iaea-again, but I had two questions about the recent North Korean missile launch that I wanted to get down on, um, paper:
1. I have not read every report that there is to read, but no one seems to say that the second two stages of the missile separated. That is interesting, given that the last two stages of the TD-1 that was tested in 1998 also failed to separate. Is North Korea having the same problem with this missile?
2. On the same day in 2006 that North Korea tested the TD-2, Pyongyang also tested “six other missiles.”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_09/NKMissileTest Why just the one this time?
And speaking of “said news”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1991/nk-boots-iaea-again of the day, it’s worth remembering that North Korea tested its nuclear explosive device about three months after the failed July 2006 missile test. Just saying.
*Update:*
Josh and I are really “good”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1991/nk-boots-iaea-again at “coordinating.”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1992/nk-can-this-bad-marriage-be-saved
NK Boots IAEA Again
Well. “This don’t look good:”:http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/PressReleases/2009/prn200903.html
bq. The Democratic People´s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has today informed IAEA inspectors in the Yongbyon facility that it is *immediately ceasing all cooperation* with the IAEA. It has requested the removal of *all containment and surveillance equipment, following which, IAEA inspectors will no longer be provided access to the facility.* The inspectors have also been asked to *leave the DPRK at the earliest possible time.*
Adding insult to the injury:
bq. The DPRK also informed the IAEA that it has decided to reactivate all facilities and *go ahead with the reprocessing* of spent fuel.
UNSC President’s Statement on Nork Launch
Reuters “has it.”:http://in.reuters.com/article/oilRpt/idINN1333144920090413
Full text:
The Security Council bears in mind the importance of maintaining peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in northeast Asia as a whole. The Security Council condemns the 5 April 2009 (local time) launch by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), which is in contravention of Security Council resolution 1718 (2006).
The Security Council reiterates that the DPRK must comply fully with its obligations under Security Council resolution 1718 (2006).
The Security Council demands that the DPRK not conduct any further launch.
The Security Council also calls upon all Member States to comply fully with their obligations under resolution 1718 (2006).
The Security Council agrees to adjust the measures imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006) through the designation of entities and goods, and directs the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) to undertake its tasks to this effect and to report to the Security Council by 24 April 2009, and further agrees that, if the Committee has not acted, then the Security Council will complete action to adjust the measures by 30 April 2009.
The Security Council supports the Six Party Talks, calls for their early resumption, and urges all the participants to intensify their efforts on the full implementation of the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement issued by China, the DPRK, Japan, Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States and their subsequent consensus documents, with a view to achieving the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner and to maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in northeast Asia.
The Security Council expresses its desire for a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the situation and welcomes efforts by Council members as well as other Member States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue.
The Security Council will remain actively seized of the matter.
Department of Awesome Predictions on N Korea
Remember the Rumsfeld Commission “report”:http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/bm-threat.htm from almost 11 years ago?
This was great:
bq. There is evidence that North Korea is working hard on the Taepo Dong 2 (TD-2) ballistic missile. The status of the system’s development cannot be determined precisely. Nevertheless, the ballistic missile test infrastructure in North Korea is well developed. Once the system is assessed to be ready, *a test flight could be conducted within six months of a decision to do so. If North Korea judged the test to be a success, the TD-2 could be deployed rapidly. It is unlikely the U.S. would know of such a decision much before the missile was launched. This missile could reach major cities and military bases in Alaska and the smaller, westernmost islands in the Hawaiian chain. Light-weight variations of the TD-2 could fly as far as 10,000 km, placing at risk western U.S. territory in an arc extending northwest from Phoenix, Arizona, to Madison, Wisconsin.* These variants of the TD-2 would require additional time to develop and would likely require an additional flight test.
Even better:
bq. A new strategic environment now gives emerging ballistic missile powers the capacity, through a combination of domestic development and foreign assistance, to acquire the means to strike the U.S. within *about five years* of a decision to acquire such a capability.
“Slap of reality.”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1968/unha-2td-2-launch-epic-fail