Author Archives: kerr

That 2004 Rouhani Speech

The Wonk published it a while back. By “it,” I mean a speech that current Iranian President-elect Hassan Rouhani gave in 2004 when he was Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council. The speech is an absolute gold mine of information on all sorts of topics, but this post is only about the speech’s date, which was 2004.

At least three credible sources (here, here, and here) have incorrectly written that Rouhani gave the speech in 2005. But that’s actually the year in which the speech, which Rouhani gave to the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council, was published.

Now, it’s true that the document Jeffrey published does not give a date for the speech. We can, though, infer a date from the text.

However, we first need a (very simplified) summary of some recent history…Iran reached two different agreements with the E3 which included provisions that Iran would suspend its enrichment program. The first was concluded in October 2003. The second, and more detailed proposal, was concluded in November 2004. From its context, we can reasonably infer that Rouhani’s speech was given sometime in fall 2004 before Iran reached the second agreement.

First, Rouhani argued that the E3 were “pressuring Iran to broaden the scope of its suspension, and they included that demand in the recent September [IAEA Board of Governors] resolution.” That’s a pretty clear reference to this resolution, which the board adopted in September 2004. The board did adopt a resolution in September 2005, but that resolution was adopted after current President Ahmadinejad had taken office. Since then-Iranian President Khatami was in the audience for the speech, though, we know that Rouhani wasn’t referring to that resolution.

Second, Rouhani refers several times to a proposal that Iran was discussing with the E3; for example, he mentions the “package that the Europeans have offered us.” We know that Rouhani was discussing the November 2004 proposal because his description of that package includes references to European support for Iranian membership in the WTO and European counter-terrorism cooperation with Tehran – items which do not appear in the 2003 agreement.

Third, Rouhani mentions several times that about a year had passed since the 2003 agreement.

I’m not (just) being pedantic here; the date of the speech matters from a substantive standpoint. But I’ll address that in a later post.

Pakistan Inter Services Public Relations

“ISPR”:http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-main_page is a good source for official Pakistani information about its missiles. For example, “this”:http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=2240 February 11 press release (scroll down) describes the most recent test of Pakistan’s Hatf IX (NASR) ballistic missile.

bq. Pakistan today conducted a successful test fire of Short Range Surface to Surface Missile Hatf IX (NASR). The test fire was conducted with successive launches of two missiles from a state of the art multi tube launcher. NASR, with a range of 60 km, and inflight maneuver capability can carry nuclear warheads of appropriate yield, with high accuracy. This quick response system, which can fire a four Missile Salvo ensures deterrence against threats in view of evolving scenarios.

This part struck me as new:

bq. NASR has been specially designed to defeat all known Anti Tactical Missile Defence Systems.

On the “Adventure and Sports” section of the ISPR site, one can also find an “announcement”:http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-article&id=27 for a ski course, complete with an outstanding video.

Sherman Kent on Proliferation

A friend pointed out “this Sherman Kent piece”:https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/sherman-kent-and-the-board-of-national-estimates-collected-essays/6words.html to me recently.

The whole thing is really worth reading….this is one of my favorite parts:

bq.. How fertile the human mind in devising ways of delaying if not avoiding the moment of decision! How rich the spoken language in its vocabulary of issue-ducking! “I have a sneaker that . . . ,” “I’d drop dead of surprise if . . .”–expressions with sound but upon reflection almost without meaning. How much conviction, for example, do you have to have before you become possessed of a sneaker; *how much of the unexpected does it take to cause your heart to fail?*

p. This passage is perhaps the most relevant to proliferation:

bq.. Some years back we were obliged by force majeur to compose some tables *setting forth how the Blanks might divide up an all-but-undreamed-of stockpile of fissionable material among an as-yet-unborn family of weapons.* There were of course the appropriate passages of verbal warning, and then, on the chance that the numerical tables should become physically separated from the warning, the tables were overprinted in red, “This table is based on assumptions stated in . . . . Moreover, it should not be used for any purpose whatever without inclusion, in full, of the cautionary material in . . . .” More recently we have issued a document which not only began with a fulsome caveat but was set off by a format and color of paper that were new departures.

Arms Control Today Article

Apologies for the persistent inconsistency with this blog.

Anyway, I have an article in this month’s “Arms Control Today,”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_01-02/Looking-Back-Iraq-Disarmament-Without-Resolution titled “Iraq: Disarmament Without Resolution.” It’s about the Iraq WMD thing.

Iraq on Iran’s Nuclear Program Back When

While re-reading part of “the 2004 ISG report,”:http://www.foia.cia.gov/duelfer/Iraqs_WMD_Vol1.pdf I found a discussion about the Saddam Hussein regime’s views on Iran. Some of it concerns Iran’s perceived chemical and nuclear weapons capabilities.

bq.. Saddam was very concerned about Iranian military production capabilities, particularly *its nuclear weapons program*, according to former Vice President Ramadan. A Ministry of Defense conference concluded in January 2003 that Iranian WMD posed a looming menace to Iraq and the region, according to a sensitive source. Attended by 200 senior officers, *the conference discussed Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, acquisition of suitable delivery systems, and possession of missiles capable of carrying CW or BW warheads over a range of 1,000 kilometers.* Saddam believed that *Iran had benefitted from the breakup of the former Soviet Union by gaining access to WMD* as well as conventional technologies.

Iraqi military troops trained with the *expectation that Iran would use CW if Iran invaded*. If Iraq came under chemical or biological attack, the army would attempt to survive until the international community intervened. Tariq ‘Aziz also expressed hope that the close UN monitoring of Iraq might force international intervention in this scenario. Saddam felt that the United States would intervene to protect oilfields, according to a former senior Iraqi official.

A former Corps commander stated that Saddam believed the next war would be fought in a chemical environment with heavy reliance upon missiles. *Iraq assumed that Iran could manufacture CW and would use it,* according to a former senior Iraqi intelligence officer. The Iraqis had identified Iranian nuclear and chemical facilities as well as 240 factories in Iran that they assessed produced missile components.

p. The report also contains a few enlightening paragraphs about Iraqi intelligence collection against Iran. An excerpt:

bq. IIS conducted extensive collection operations against Iran, according to a former IIS senior officer and various captured documents. Intelligence collection as a whole *targeted Iran’s weapons programs, its nuclear program,* economic issues, and international relations. Human intelligence sources were the primary means of intelligence collection against Iran, supported by signals intelligence
conducted by the IIS Directorate for Signals Intelligence (M17).

Interestingly, the MEK was a source on Iran’s unconventional weapons programs:

bq. IIS had assigned 150 officers to work the Iranian target, according to a former senior IIS officer. The IIS *relied heavily on the MEK* and independent assets in every province to monitor Iranian military and WMD development.

The report also discusses the regime’s use of open-source information. It didn’t always work very well, especially when it came to Iran’s nuclear program:

bq. Iraqi intelligence collected on the Iranian nuclear program in 2001, but *did not contradict Iranian claims that their reactors [sic] being used for peaceful purposes*, according to the former deputy director of the IIS. Regardless, *Iraq assumed Iran was attempting to develop nuclear weapons.* IIS assets often *passed along open source information as if it were intelligence, allowing disinformation to reach the upper levels* of the former Regime.

Hopefully, you’re doing something other than reading this blog on New Year’s Day.

A Theory of Law

One last post for 2012. There will be more in 2013.

A reader wanted to know why I hadn’t thought of “this.”:http://www.greenbag.org/v16n1/v16n1_ex_post_kerr.pdf Orin S. Kerr, observing that law review editors frequently demand citations for claims that are “obvious or obscure” or “made up or false,” proposes a solution:

bq. Legal scholars need a source they can cite when confronted with
these challenges. It should be something with an impressive but generic title. I offer “this page,”:http://www.greenbag.org/v16n1/v16n1_ex_post_kerr.pdf with the following conclusion: If you have been directed to this page by a citation elsewhere, it is plainly true that the author’s claim is correct. For further support, consult the extensive scholarship on the point.

Quite a generous offer. I’m annoyed that I didn’t think of it, but at least another Kerr did.

Canada and Nuclear Cooperation Agreements

In case anyone’s interested, “this”:http://www.international.gc.ca/arms-armes/nuclear-nucleaire/nca-acn.aspx?lang=eng&view=d appears to be Canada’s policy statement regarding nuclear cooperation agreements.

bq. Before Canada will consider nuclear cooperation with any non-nuclear-weapon State, that state must make a legally binding commitment to nuclear non-proliferation by *becoming a party to the NPT or an equivalent international legally binding agreement* and accepting the application of *full-scope safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)* on all of its current and future nuclear activities.

There are lot of other similarities to U.S. 123 agreements:

bq.. any country wishing to enter into nuclear cooperation with Canada must conclude a legally-binding bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA) which includes:

* assurances that Canadian nuclear exports will be used *only for peaceful,non-explosive* end-uses;

* Canadian control over any Canadian items subject to the NCA that are re-transferred to a third party;

* Canadian *control over the reprocessing* of any Canadian spent nuclear fuel;

* Canadian control over the storage and *subsequent use of any separated plutonium*;

* Canadian *control over the high enrichment of Canadian uranium and the subsequent storage and use of the highly enriched uranium*;

* implementation of bilateral safeguards in the event that IAEA safeguards are unable to be applied;

* assurances that Canadian nuclear items will be subject to adequate physical protection measures to ensure that they are not stolen or otherwise misused.

The provisions of NCAs apply to items directly or indirectly exported from Canada. *They also apply to non-Canadian equipment or nuclear material used in conjunction with Canadian nuclear items and to equipment manufactured on the basis of technology provided by Canada or through “reverse engineering”* of such technology.

R Einhorn on DPRK Missiles….15 Years Ago

An astute reader dug out “these”:http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1997_h/s971021e.htm October 1997 responses to QFRs by then- Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation Robert Einhorn.

The bulk of the information concerns North Korea’s missile programs. Here’s a statistic that I don’t remember seeing:

bq. The DPRK has a *production capacity of four to eight Scuds monthly*, both for export and for its own armed forces, and has hundreds of Scuds in its current arsenal.

Also, given the recent concern about Syria’s CW and nuclear programs, I found this section interesting:

bq.. Question 7. Has there been any cooperation between North Korea and
foreign countries regarding chemical or biological weapons?

Answer. Although North Korea is an active supplier of
missiles and related production technology, it has not yet
become a supplier of nuclear, chemical or biological warfare-
related technology.

p. Have a nice weekend.