I thought it’d be useful to put them all in one place.

France (English and French).

United Kingdom

United States

Geek out with yer beak out.

Here’s the French version. Here’s the English version.

I lack the time to do this very useful document justice. Much of this information does exist in public US intel documents, but it’s a hassle to consolidate it all and there are issues with consistency.

I would point people to the delivery vehicles section…no other public official document has such a list of vehicles, ranges, and CW agents, as far as I know. Ditto for the composition of the Syrian CW agent stockpile. Also notable is that Syria is developing another mustard agent and a nastier form of nerve agent.

Lastly, the report’s observation that the regime “is adapting its tactics and the munitions in its stockpiles to a terror use against civilian population” is perhaps the element with the most far-reaching implications. One wonders if other regimes are getting ideas; governments, including the government of Syria, produced CW arsenals in the past for quite different reasons. There’s a decent amount of detail on that point, so take a look.

I’m late to the party on this, but for the sake of completeness, here it is.

There are at least a couple of noteworthy items…

First, when combined with the UK judgement that “[p]ermission to authorise CW has probably been delegated by President Asad to senior regime commanders,” the US assessment suggests that Asad was not directly responsible for the 8/21 attack. In fact, it seems to suggest that the military stopped using CW in response to an order from higher up:

We intercepted communications involving a senior official intimately familiar with the offensive who confirmed that chemical weapons were used by the regime on August 21 and was concerned with the U.N. inspectors obtaining evidence. On the afternoon of August 21, we have intelligence that Syrian chemical weapons personnel were directed to cease operations.

Second, the assessment describes the government’s use of chemical weapons as a “coordinated rocket and artillery attack.” Most of the public USG assessments describe Syria’s missile forces, but have said next to nothing about delivery via rockets and artillery.

Today’s report from the UK Joint Intelligence Committee, titled SYRIA: REPORTED CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE, may be found here. The report seems to provide a window into US intelligence assessments, stating that the UK agrees with the conclusions of the US intel community.

The report states that the “[t]here is some intelligence to suggest regime culpability in this attack. These factors make it highly likely that the Syrian regime was responsible.”

The report then appears to describe what the JIC means by that:

There is no obvious political or military trigger for regime use of CW on an apparently larger scale now, particularly given the current presence in Syria of the UN investigation team. Permission to authorise CW has probably been delegated by President Asad to senior regime commanders, such as [*], but any deliberate change in the scale and nature of use would require his authorisation.

Lastly, the report tells us that non-state actors are seeking a CW capability:

There is no credible evidence that any opposition group has used CW. A number continue to seek a CW capability, but none currently has the capability to conduct a CW attack on this scale.

Read the whole thing. It’s short.

Given the current UN inspections in Syria and their apparently-forthcoming report, some nerds may want information about the inspectors’ chain of custody procedures. Those may be found in Appendix VII of the UNSG’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons. The actual Chain of Custody Form is here.

I mentioned the Mechanism before, but thought this would be a useful addition.

This FP piece linked to some useful intel documents about Iraq’s use of chemical weapons during its war with Iran. It didn’t look to me as if the documents contain much that we didn’t know before, but perhaps I missed something.

Anyway, this January 1985 CIA assessment, titled The Iraqi Chemical Weapons Program in Perspective, is useful because it sums up what the CIA knew about Iraq’s chemical weapons program at the time. However, it is also significant because it contains something one doesn’t see all that often: official confirmation that Israel had chemical weapons.

According to page 14 of the assessment, the CIA assessed that Iraq would be “restrained…in using chemical weapons outside its borders, particularly against states such as Israel or Syria, which have chemical weapons stockpiles.”

Read the whole thing.

Following up on this post, the UN team investigating the alleged use of chemical weapons in Syria arrived in the country on August 18, according to Reuters.

Iranian Diplomacy published an interview on August 17 with Javad Zarif, Iran’s new Foreign Minister. The whole thing is enlightening, but here are the parts related to the nuclear program, including a bit about the fatwa:

Following his inauguration and in his first press conference, the President stated that one of his major priorities is to restart nuclear negotiations with the P5+1. Do you have any new proposals for this task?

We have had numerous discussions inside the government with the President with regard to how we should pursue the nuclear rights of the country and remove the oppressive sanctions imposed upon the Islamic Republic of Iran. Our basis for work is insisting on Iran’s rights and removing the logical concerns of the international community. As the Supreme Leader and the President himself have reiterated, this is easy provided that the objective is the resolution of the nuclear issue. We believe that the resolution of the nuclear issue requires political determination, and the election of Dr. Rohani in the Islamic Republic of Iran, with his record in this dossier, indicates that the people of Iran demand the resolution of the nuclear issue at the appropriate time. We hope that this political determination for the resolution of the nuclear issue also exists on the other side. In that case, we do not have any concerns about reassuring the world of the peacefulness of our nuclear program for, based on the “fatwa” of the Supreme Leader and Iran’s strategic needs, nuclear weapons have no place in our national security and can even disrupt it.

There are rumors that the nuclear dossier might be transferred to the Foreign Ministry from the High Council of National Security. Do you confirm such speculations and is there a specific plan to transfer this dossier?

I have not heard anything about this issue. This is a decision that is within the domain of the President’s authority. Nevertheless, considering my experiences in this case, I will make efforts to help in the advancement of this issue no matter what responsibility I might have. But decisions with regard to how we should pursue the nuclear dossier and the form and framework of negotiations are made at the higher levels of our political system.

Here’s what he had to say about bilateral talks with the United States:

If bilateral talks with the US are proposed on the sidelines of meetings such as the UN General Assembly or P5+1 negotiations, would you accept such a proposal?

The Supreme Leader has stated his opinion with regard to these negotiations several times. There is no issue with negotiation itself, but the question is what issues will be discussed in these talks and how much of a political determination does exist on the other side to resolve the problems. The issue is whether this political determination will take shape and whether the US administration is ready to stand against the pressure groups and prevent the radicals groups from gaining leadership of this movement. In fact, this issue is a test for the US administration to show its readiness to play a serious role in finding a solution.

I’ve actually been wondering if Iran plans to deal with the non-U.S. part of the P5+1 separately. Zarif kind of addressed that issue as well:

Do you not consider bilateral talks between Tehran and Washington as the secret prerequisite for the improvement of relations between Iran and Europe?

I consider political determination as the prerequisite for the improvement of relations. The methods can be evaluated but what is necessary is the formation of this political determination and its practical manifestation. Different methods can then be used to advance our goals. When it is not clear whether this political determination exists or not, the extent of the efficiency of new methods is not clear either. In Iran, the election of Mr. Rohani shows that the people have decided to have constructive interaction with the world and, through his speeches and choices, Mr. Rohani has also displayed his political determination to do so. Now, what is important is for the same determination to be formed on the other side.

You’ve probably seen the news from the other day that Syria has accepted the terms for a UN team to visit the country to investigate allegations of chemical weapons use. According to the announcement, the inspectors’ departure “is now imminent,” though the UN said the same day that a “date for the mission has not yet been announced.”

The announcement also described some of the missions’ terms:

As agreed with the Government of Syria, the team will remain in the country to conduct its activities, including on-site visits, for a period of up to 14 days, extendable upon mutual consent.

Take a look at the UNSG’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, the appendices to which were updated in 2007.

Just a quick note about a new-ish blog called Atomic Reporters.

In their words, Atomic Reporters “acts as an information broker improving journalistic understanding and coverage of nuclear issues.”

I heard about this initiative last fall. I mention it partly because it seems like a good idea and partly because they mentioned this blog:

Over at the Middle East Policy Council, Gareth Porter has written a baroque analysis about why theIAEA’s so-called “Alleged Studies” documents may be bunk. His list of eight red herrings that should trigger the agency’s smell-test alarm may be only accessible to Total Wonkerrs.

I’m biased, but I like the sense of humor.