In the same Der Spiegel interview I previously mentioned, Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif asserted that the Supreme Leader’s fatwa far outweighs some of his compatriots’ possible support for obtaining nuclear weapons:

Zarif: …Our decision not to build a bomb does not derive from NPT. It derives from our own moral and strategic convictions.

DER SPIEGEL: Did the killing of Soleimani change these strategic considerations?

Zarif: No. Moral convictions do not hinge on the illegal behavior of others.

DER SPIEGEL: There’s a faction inside the Iranian leadership that believes that nuclear weapons are the only way for Iran to defend itself against the U.S. They may well have an additional argument for that case now.

Zarif: As I told you, Iran is not a monolith – you will not find unanimity in Iran on most issues. But the revolutionary leader has issued a fatwa (Ed’s note: a religious legal opinion) prohibiting weapons of mass destruction.

Iranian officials, of course, frequently mention the fatwa, but it’s rare that they acknowledge some Iranians’ support for nuclear weapons.

A bit old, but Iran put out a fact sheet a few months back titled Fact Sheet on Iran’s Reduction of Some JCPOA Commitments. It’s worth reading if you want to understand Tehran’s articulated reasoning behind its decision to decrease implementing the JCPOA-mandated restrictions concerning Iran’s nuclear program.

I like this paragraph, but read the whole thing:

Since taking office as the US President, Donald Trump has been seeking to scupper the Iran nuclear deal known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), arguing it has been the “worst and most embarrassing agreement in the United States” history”.
He tried for so long to make Iran violate the JCPOA to shift the responsibility for scuppering the deal on the Islamic Republic and revive an international consensus against Tehran. This plot against international peace and security was thwarted thanks to Iran”s strategic restraint, vigilance and constant compliance with the JCPOA.

Lots of people know that Iran has threatened to withdraw from the NPT, should the E3 refer Iran’s JCPOA noncompliance [as the E3 characterizes it] to the UNSC. But Zarif clarified Iran’s position in this Der Spiegel interview:

DER SPIEGEL: How would Iran react to the reinstatement of UN sanctions?

Zarif: President Hassan Rohani clarified the actions we will take in a letter to the treaty partners.

DER SPIEGEL: Could you explain for our readers?

Zarif: Your readers should know that the Europeans will be responsible for all the consequences.

DER SPIEGEL: Iran has threatened to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) if that happens.

Zarif: It’s mentioned in the letter.

DER SPIEGEL: Does that mean that Iran would head in the direction of building a bomb?

Zarif: No. Our decision not to build a bomb does not derive from NPT. It derives from our own moral and strategic convictions.

Back in 2006, PBS published a bunch of interviews with various important people about the 2002 Iraq NIE:

He has you covered for this week:

I always like descriptions of other states’ WMD programs, especially the administrative aspect. . Here’s a good graphic from the UNMOVIC compendium which I’ve previously mentioned.

Radiation turns your body to dust/Watching fallout as it fills the sky/Now it’s time for this planet to die

A little while ago, I mentioned that Iran has some options for decreasing implementation of its JCPOA commitments:

Tehran’s been re-visiting its playbook from 2005 and 2006 when, shortly after the election of President Ahmadinejad, the government gradually resumed nuclear activities that it had suspended pursuant to Iran’s 2003 and 2004 agreements with the E3. During that time, Iran also stopped implementing its additional protocol and other transparency measures contained in the aforementioned agreements with the E3. The point is that, although Iran has been complying with all of its JCPOA-related monitoring and inspection requirements, there is precedent for Tehran to decrease such compliance.

Remember, Iran’s 5 January announcement described its latest JCPOA decision as “the final step to reduce [the government’s] commitments” to the agreement. I thought that the adjective “final” might mean that Iran would leave IAEA monitoring and inspection provisions in place while perhaps taking actions like producing LEU containing ever-increasing amounts of U-235. The tolerance of Iran’s political system for such monitoring/inspections may be greater than in the past. For one thing, the AEOI, which runs the nuclear program and is Tehran’s interlocutor with the IAEA, has had several years to become accustomed to the most recent monitoring/inspections. Also, if Iran doesn’t have a nuclear weapons program, or aspirations for such a program, then the political system may well not much care about the above-mentioned provisions.

But a pair of statements from Foreign Minister Zarif, at least for me, confused the matter somewhat. According to one from IRNA, the minister stated that Tehran would take no more steps to decrease its observation of JCPOA-mandated limits on its nuclear program:

the country’s five steps in compliance reduction would have no similar follow-ups, but Europeans’ measure to refer the case to the United Nations Security Council may be followed by Tehran’s decision to leave NPT as stated in President Hassan Rouhani’s May 2018 letter to other parties to the deal.

But I think one can reasonably interpret this Fars News statement as an indication that Iran may well be planning for a such a follow-up step:

“Iran is designing a new and more effective step that will be taken before leaving NPT in case the Europeans do not fulfill their responsibilities to the deal and continue their claims,” he [Zarif] highlighted.

This IRNA article dated January 22 seems to describe Zarif’s position similarly:

If the case is referred to the UN Security Council, the idea of withdrawing from the NPT would be brought up, but before that, other plans could be placed on the agenda, Zarif said earlier on Monday after attending a parliamentary hearing.

Regardless, cages are surely rattling and I want a transcript of what Zarif said.

I should have done this earlier, but I am highlighting a comment from Mark Hibbs in response to this post:

Mark HIbbsJanuary 16, 2020 at 10:16 am

According to people talking yesterday in Brussels, it would appear that in EU circles it is being taken for granted that the timelines for the DRM are going to be extended.

If so, that’s apparently because there is 1.) no confidence that the issues dividing Iran , the EU3, plus Russia plus China (both opposed invoking the DRM) can be resolved a month’s time, and/or 2.) that all parties will reach the conclusion that it would be constructive to extend the timeline in the interest of creating a forum for longer-term discussion of the kinds of political issues ultimately at stake in Iran’s violations of its commitments as distinct from the technical/procedural/legal issues that the DRM was intended to address. 

What would any party to the agreement stand to gain in blocking a consensus to extend the DRM timeline? Perhaps Russia and/or China might consider doing that, if either wished to snuff out the DRM proceeding without it having reached a conclusion of Iranian non-performance after a month. China and/or Russia could in this way perhaps challenge the EU3 to force a decision over non-performance by Iran–a decision that the EU states may be loathe to make. Would the EU states seek a non-performance verdict if they are confident that Russia and or China would stand in the way of that consensus result? Optics would matter. China and Russia would have to decide whether their interests would be advanced or set back by objecting to a non-performance determination by the EU states. In any event, at this point it can be assumed that neither China nor Russia would step forth to trigger snap-back sanctions, and the EU3 themselves may also not want to walk that plank after a month should the DRM timeline run out without a consensus agreement to extend it.