A little while ago, I wrote about a December 2019 article, written by Torrey Froscher and published by the CIA on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Jeffrey sent me some insight about that piece and said that I could share it.

Some background: the article made this observation:

When North Korea’s nuclear program was in the formative stages, judging whether the intent was to develop nuclear weapons was a mystery, not a puzzle. Most of the analysis in the early years of the program, as described above, was agnostic about its purpose or noted both civil and military possibilities. This apparently changed by the end of 1991, when the program began to be characterized in definitive terms as a nuclear weapons program. The reason for the change is not made clear in the available record. 

<snip>

In contrast to previous nuanced and cautious assessments of weapons intent, a December [1991] NIC memorandum judged that potential economic sanctions “would not cause North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program.”

Here’s the December 1991 memo. Here’s what Jeffrey said:

Well, I found a simple enough reason.  In February 1991, Kim Yong-ham, at the time the DPRK foreign minister, told Tanzanian officials  “Now that the U.S.S.R. no long provided security, the D.P.RK. was going ahead with a program to acquire its own nuclear weapons.”

Given the specific reasoning offered, I think something like this would be very hard to ignore.

I would guess this was not the only foreign government to whom North Korean officials made such comments.  Froscher may be professing ignorance because the IC have gotten a more direct version, either through HUMINT or SIGINT, as opposed to a third party account like this.

Jeffrey was kind enough to send me a document. The whole thing is below, but I think this is the main paragraph:

Old news, but this site contains documents relevant to former Deputy Secretary of State William Burns’ 2019 book. And it’s searchable.

The late Ambassador Donald Mahley wrote a piece for ARENA back in November 2004. Titled “Dismantling Libyan Weapons: Lessons Learned,” it (unsurprisingly) has some good material on Libya’s Rabta CWPF and also on the broader Libyan disarmament case..

The whole thing is below.

Rabta also constitutes an interesting lesson from the Libyan experience…the lesson here is twofold. First, intelligence did not fail when it identified Rabta early on as a chemical weapons facility – despite the then vehement denials of the Libyan government and the doubt of numerous countries who wanted “smoking guns” to accept the intelligence assessment. Second, even when it was actively producing chemical weapons, Rabta was a “dual-use” facility. The chemical agent production lines were separated from the main part of the plant, behind separate walls. Fully dedicated facilities are not required.

With regard to the full extent of the program, an observation is in order. Prior to the December 19 [2003] announcement, there had been dialogue and even visits by select U.S.and UK officials. However, Libya obviously had not made a truly authoritative “full disclosure” decision until it was so announced in December. When we arrived in January [2004], we were voluntarily taken to additional resources that had not been discussed earlier. Our interlocutors were candid in advising us that they had not received instructions to be completely open earlier, so had only followed the instructions they had been given. The point here is not whether there was less-than complete disclosure earlier, but to point out that the incomplete disclosures were coherent and internally consistent, and involved all the major facilities that would have been required for a complete program. The additional materiel disclosed in January would have taken a lengthy dialogue and on-site set of procedures to uncover without Libyan cooperation. The lesson to learn? It is relatively easy, evenin a country where the bulk of the territory is open desert, to conceal elements of aWMD program if there is national dedication to do so. The idea that a single or even repeated short-time international inspection routine is sufficient to provide high confidence nothing has been missed is truly viewing the situation through rose-colored glasses. It is a tough job that requires considerable time and expertise.

Old, I know, but former IAEA DDG for Safeguards Bruno Pellaud made these comments in a 2013 interview about Israel’s nuclear weapons:

Their own bomb provides them with a sort of immunity and in reality, for them, Iran is a danger not only because of the risk of a bomb, but because of its influence over neighbouring states – over Hezbollah, Syria and Lebanon. Israel is behaving in flagrant bad faith. When I was in Vienna, every three months I had a visit from their ambassador who told me: “The Iranians are three months away from having the bomb”. That went on for six years. And now Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu is continuing to exaggerate, but there is no value to it

This report published by State last month briefly exhorts India and Pakistan to refrain from possessing tactical nuclear weapons.

This interview with Azad Jammu and Kashmir President Sardar Masood Khan doesn’t really have anything about nuclear weapons. But it does mention a connection I hadn’t made…. President Khan was Pakistan’s Chief Negotiator for the Nuclear Security Summit, as well as Chair of the 2006 BWC RevCon.

OK, the title implies more depth than there is. But the Indian Army’s 2018 Land Warfare Doctrine has a couple of items about nuclear weapons and India’s security environment. Here’s one:

A concerted effort is being made by our adversaries to shrink the space for conventional wars, through prosecution of unconventional operations at the lower end of the spectrum and threats of early and irrational use of nuclear weapons at the other. While conventional war will remain central in the construct of the spectrum of operations, the Indian Army will continue to prosecute effective Counter Insurgency/ Counter Terrorism operations to ensure deterrence through punitive responses, against state sponsored proxy war.

I think the other points to operations in a post-detonation environment:

The Indian Army will continue to enhance our capability to fight in a Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) environment. Field formations/units will be equipped to prosecute operations through a Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear contaminated zone, to maintain tempo of operations.

This report from the Nuclear Fuel Working Group provides some recent numbers on U.S., defense uranium needs, for those who are interested in that sort of thing:

Defense Needs: The U.S. has well-defined defense needs that also depend on a healthy nuclear fuel cycle in the long-term. There are currently two defense needs for uranium: low-enriched uranium is needed to produce tritium required for nuclear weapons, and highly- enriched uranium is used to fuel Navy nuclear reactors. Agreements with foreign suppliers prohibit the use of uranium for military purposes. DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration is responsible for both these missions, and has sufficient stockpiles of unobligated uranium fuel to support tritium production until 2041 and Navy propulsion until the 2050’s. Ensuring a viable industry mitigates risk to future supply chains.

The Pakistan Army issued the 2020 edition of its Green Book not long ago. Although published by the army, the Green Book does have a disclaimer:

There’s a good amount of worthwhile material in here. If I recall correctly, the intro by Chief of Army Staff Javed Bajwa, NI (M), received some press attention, probably because of statements like this one:

Kashmir is a nuclear flashpoint and in total disregard to international norms, Mr. Modi has not only endangered the immediate neighbourhood, but has also raised the ante for the entire World.

Here’s the whole paragraph:

A search of this report finds “Pakistan” twice and “India” and “Israel” 3 times each.