Author Archives: kerr

Iran: How’s That Centrifuge Program?

Short answer: Dunno.

Since that answer wouldn’t have cut it with Miles (Pomper, _ACT_ editor), I “wrote a bit more”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_06/Iran.asp for the most recent issue of _ACT_.

p=. *The Cascades*

This is obvious, but one “European diplomat” told me that Iran has _not_ demonstrated that it can run its centrifuges for an extended period of time. The 8 cascades in the commercial Natanz facility are _not_ linked together, another such diplomat told me. [The IAEA DG Mohamed ElBaradei’s “last report”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1441/iaea-report implies this, but doesn’t say so explicitly. I wrote about the report “here”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1443/more-thoughts-on-iaea-iran-report and “here.”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1442/thoughts-on-iaea-iran-report ]

We know that the Iranians missed their target date of installing 3,000 centrifuges by the end of May, but they may yet complete the task in short order. Unless they don’t.

I wrote that

bq. a diplomatic source in Vienna close to the IAEA told _Arms Control Today_ -April- May 25 that *Iran is able to build one 164-centrifuge cascade every 10 days. At that rate, Iran will be able to install approximately 3,000 centrifuges by the end of June,* the source said.

More recently, ElBaradei “told reporters”:http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/iran_nuclear&printer=1;_ylt=AtPjTy3FawLY6oJ7olTApRBbbBAF that Iran “could have *just under 3,000 uranium-enriching centrifuges running in series by the end of July,”* _AP_ reported.

[ Jeffrey has a good “post”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1545/18-cascades-for-iran-by-august up about this subject, which includes a link to the audio file of ElBaradei’s remarks. Also, check out “this post”:http://verificationthoughts.blogspot.com/2007/06/iranian-centrifuge-construction.html from Andreas Persbo. He has two pretty cool tables illustrating Iran’s possible future progress in installing centrifuges. ]

Incidentally, Gholamreza Aghazadeh, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, said in April that Tehran will take up to 4 years to install all 50,000+ centrifuges in the facility.

p=. *So How Good Are Those Centrifuges?*

Some of us have wondered about Iran’s ability to make centrifuges of sufficient quality and quantity. Unfortunately, there’s not a lot of clarity on this subject either. I wrote that

[A] Vienna diplomat said that *Tehran can produce enough centrifuge components for its projected enrichment needs.* But a knowledgeable source told _Arms Control Today_ that *Iran may not be “fully independent” in making such components.*

Asked about the quality of Iran’s centrifuges, the Vienna source added that *Iran “can make functional machines.”* Separately, a European diplomat said that *it is not clear that Iran can do so, explaining that “quite a high number” of centrifuges have crashed at rates “higher than one would expect.”*

p=. *The UF6*

There have also been “questions about”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1445/iran-and-uf6-a-bit-more the quality of Iran’s UF6.

That’s still the case. I wrote that:

bq. Whether Iran’s uranium hexafluoride is of sufficient purity is unclear. The Vienna diplomat said that *Iran is using its own feedstock, noting that the material is “good enough” to produce enriched uranium.* But the two other European diplomats told _Arms Control Today_ that *Iran is probably using uranium hexafluoride obtained from China more than a decade ago.*

Helpful, I know.

One interesting sidenote: I also found out that, according to “one diplomat,” Iran is currently attempting to convert its own uranium oxide into UF6. The process, however, “has not been perfected,” the diplomat said. Iran had previously been converting uranium oxide acquired from South Africa, he added.

Anyway, it’s Friday. Go home.

CTBTO funding

Scott Paul has a “good post”:http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/002183.php up over at the Washington Note about the US slackitude in funding the “CTBTO.”:http://www.ctbto.org/ He correctly points out that the funding shortfall “threatens to undermine global efforts to monitor nuclear tests, especially in areas where the U.S. lacks access, like China, North Korea, and Iran.”

Back in March, a “a senior diplomat based in Vienna” “told _ACT_”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_03/CTBTO.asp that

bq. “While it is difficult to understand how shortfalls in contributions from specific countries will affect the CTBTO, less money is less money…*The main victim will likely be the completion of the remaining IMS stations, as well as maintenance and recapitalization for some existing stations,* some of which are nearly 10 years old”.

ACA put out a “press release”:http://www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/2007/20070521_CTBT.asp about this issue a few weeks ago which gave some specific numbers regarding the shortfall:

bq. According to documents on the CTBTO Web site, *U.S. arrears as of May 2007 total $38.3 million.* In addition, *the Bush administration in its current fiscal year 2008 budget request is only asking Congress for $18 million to fund the CTBTO even though the Vienna-based organization assessed the latest annual U.S. dues at $23.4 million.*

As Scott asked, “[D]o we really need fewer non-military tools to contain the proliferation of nuclear weapons?”

Chemical Warfare, 1980s Style

If you want a good, concise history of the US chemical weapons program, you could do worse than read Daniel Kevles’ recent (OK, April) “review”:http://www.nybooks.com/articles/20063 of Jonathan Tucker’s _War of Nerves: Chemical Warfare from World War I to Al-Qaeda_. (That’s not to slam the book at all – I just haven’t had time to read it. )

The review will help refresh your memory about the US CW program (it did in my case, at least.) For example, there’s a good summary about the US production of binary CWs.

p=. *Binaries*

Kevles describes binary CWs:

bq. Arms analysts were now calling the weapons developed since 1915 “unitary weapons,” in contrast to “binary weapons,” which were seen as those of the future. *The unitary variety was chemically complete, containing a single substance ready to do its lethal work. The binary variety consisted of two separate components, neither of which was toxic; they became lethal only when combined in, for example, a shell in flight.* Binary weapons could be stored in domestic and foreign military depots without posing the threats to the environment and public health that had provoked objections to the storage of unitary weapons.

Kevles also explains that President Nixon in 1969 “declared that the United States would restrict further production” of CWs, “keeping those it had only as a deterrent.” However, this pledge (spelled out in “National Security Decision Memorandum 35”:http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB58/RNCBW8.pdf) didn’t ban the development of new CWs. And, according to Kevles, it “left open a loophole for the use of binary weapons should they be developed.”

[ I _think_ the key sentence in “NSDM 35”:http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB58/RNCBW8.pdf is

bq. The Secretary of Defense…shall continue to develop and improve controls and safety measures in all Chemical Warfare programs. ]

Anyway, the US conducted research on binaries, but there was a debate as to whether to develop them. According to Kevles,

bq. *The heightened fear of the Soviet chemical arsenal stimulated a decade-long struggle over whether the United States should proceed with the development of binary weapons.* Blue-ribbon defense panels and anti-Soviet chemical hawks contended that the nation’s unitary arsenal was inadequate to deter a Soviet ground attack in Europe; binary weapons, they said, would be more acceptable to the public and to military planners. Some opponents castigated binary weapons just as their predecessors had denounced unitary ones, arguing that their use particularly threatened innocent civilians. Others warned that going ahead with them would jeopardize the disarmament talks on chemical weapons, which Nixon had encouraged and were underway in Geneva. *The opponents held the hawks at bay until, according to reports from refugees, the Soviets used chemical weapons against the mujahideen guerrillas after their invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. President Carter had previously blocked funding for binary weapons development. Now, in 1980, he signed an omnibus military construction bill that had passed Congress by large majorities in both houses and that included authorization for a pilot binary program.*

President Reagan finally got congress to approve a binary production program in 1985. Kevles writes that the legislation “passed the Senate easily” because “several senators…were persuaded that the US was falling behind the Soviets.” For its part, the House voted for the program “just a few days after Hezbollah hijacked TWA Flight 847, killing one of five navy men on the plane.”

Interestingly, I ran across “this 1988 article”:http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,966443-2,00.html from _Time_ about the US decision to resume nerve gas production that year. The author was skeptical of killing the arms control village in order to save it:

bq. The Administration is pursuing negotiations with the Soviets aimed at eliminating both stockpiles and production…*The best way to assure continued Soviet cooperation, concludes a defense official, is by “expressing our resolve to modernize. Only then do the Soviets become willing to talk.” Perhaps. But in the name of deterrence, the U.S. may find itself drawn into a particularly odious and dangerous kind of arms race.*

p=. *End of Binaries*

Kevles explains that

bq. The end of the cold war brought the long US–Soviet chemical arms race largely to a halt. *The key shift came in 1990, when the United States concluded a sweeping bilateral chemical disarmament agreement with the Soviets that committed the two countries to cease production of all chemical weapons, including binaries, and to reduce their chemical arsenals within eight years to five thousand metric tons.*

The text of that agreement can be found “here.”:http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/bda/text/bda.htm#intro

For anyone who’s still interested, “here’s a review”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_03/MARCH-BookReview.asp of Tucker’s book that Michael Moodie wrote for _ACT_. Also, Tucker wrote a “very good piece”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_01-02/Tucker.asp in _ACT_ a few months back about the need to strengthen the CWC.

Lastly, here’s Slayer’s 1985 version of Chemical Warfare:

Another New Blog

This time it’s “Nukes on a Blog,”:http://nukesonablog.blogspot.com/ a blog run by Leonor Tomero and Douglas Shaw. According to them, it is a “project of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation and Physicians for Social Responsibility.”

Looks promising.

Scooter Libby Letters

A bit off -topic, but Steve Aftergood has the “file o’ letters”:http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/libby/letters.pdf that were sent into Judge Reggie Walton RE: Scooter Libby’s sentencing. There are a bunch of names that will be familiar to the arms control community.

New Blog

“Nukes of Hazard”:http://nukesofhazard.blogspot.com/ is over at the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation’s place. Jeff Lindemyer and Kyle Atwell are the two criminal minds behind the enterprise.

Check it out, it’s full o’ useful information. And I’m on their blogroll, which must mean it’s cool.

Hilarious…

…in a sad, geeky way.

“Here is”:http://usinfo.state.gov/is/international_security/us_nuclear_policy.html a DOS page called “Limiting Nuclear Weapons.”

The first item?

“U.S. Pledges Major Effort To Complete India Nuclear Agreement.”:http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2007&m=May&x=20070523131655idybeekcm0.3887751

K Sadjadpour on IRGC

Bernard Gwertzman has a “great interview”:http://www.cfr.org/publication/13466/ with CEIP’s Karim Sadjadpour. A lot of it is about the IRGC.

This one paragraph about the Corps’ ideological composition caught my attention:

bq. The Revolutionary Guards comprise about 150,000 in number. They’re not a monolithic group. *There’s a common perception right now that the Revolutionary Guards are very closely aligned with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. But I would say it’s the opposite. President Ahmadinejad has to pander to the Revolutionary Guards to project his own power, because he doesn’t have a very strong popular base.* And it’s difficult to describe them as a group of 150,000 hardliners because *in 2001 three-quarters of them voted for the liberal Mohammed Khatami’s re-election as president.* In some ways, the Revolutionary Guards are more reflective of the Iranian society than we think…

I would have assumed that a group of 150,000 Iranians wouldn’t be monolithic, but I hadn’t seen those numbers before.

Speaking of matters Iranian that I don’t know much about, Karim also had a good “piece”:http://www.twq.com/07winter/docs/07winter_sadjadpour.pdf in _TWQ_ about Iranian public opinion RE: the nuclear program.

Please note that no one was kicked in the nuts during the writing of this post.

I Feel Neglected

I am annoyed that WhirledView did not give this blog a “Thinking Blogger award.”:http://whirledview.typepad.com/whirledview/2007/05/thinking_blogge.html These awards, Cheryl says, are given to “blogs that make us think.”

I find this omission unconscionable. Here is my response:

That’ll make you think.