Peculiar article in today’s _The Hindu_ that discusses nuclear cooperation prospects “between India and Kazakhstan”:http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/thscrip/print.pl?file=2008101656461200.htm&date=2008/10/16/&prd=th. In short, Kazakhstan wants to fill some of India’s “Aussie gap”:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7188835.stm.

And here is a plug for a slightly dated, but still awesome _Bulletin_ piece (authored by a good friend and former colleague) on “Kazakhstan’s Nuclear Ambitions”:http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/kazakhstans-nuclear-ambitions.

Since I am allowed a CNS plug once in a while, here are two absolutely splendid issue briefs that Stephen Schwartz wrote for the Nuclear Threat Initiative. Check out “*The Costs of U.S. Nuclear Weapons*”:http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_atomic_audit.html and “*Oversight of U.S. Nuclear Weapons*”:http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_congress_and_nuclear_weapons.html.

Happy Tuesday!

You’re probably sick of “this topic”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1672/dreaming-of-an-s-300-belarus-edition by now and you’ve likely seen this most recent “Russian denial of intent to sell the system to the Iranians”:http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3764075&c=EUR&s=TOP.

Nevertheless, just wanted to note that, according to Interfax, on 6 October, Israeli Foreign Ministry’s Deputy Director General for Russia and CIS Countries Pinhas Avivi confirmed to journalists something that I’ve figured was the case all along.

bq. “*[Israel has] a covert agreement with Russia that it would not sell offensive armaments to Iran and Syria*… [The agreement] stipulates Russia’s avoidance of steps that might change the balance of forces [in the Middle East].”

Avivi also reportedly stated that

bq. “The Israeli and Russian foreign ministries are permanent consultations with representatives of defense agencies. *The sides decide which weaponry can be called defensive and which can be called offensive at the consultations*.”

In addition, Avivi reportedly noted that Israel did not supply _offensive_ arms to Georgia as a quid pro quo for a Russian promise not to supply _offensive_ arms to Iran (or Syria). If one follows this logic, though, it seems that the Russians have went along with the Israeli argument that “UAVs sold to Georgia”:http://www.wmdinsights.org/I26/I26_RU1_Downing.htm are considered _defensive_, while the S-300s to Iran and Syria are considered _offensive_ by both sides. Weird.

OK, this isn’t too relevant to nonpro or arms control, but I had to share. Check it out the first entry, in Russian with English subtitles, below. (“Original link”:http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/sdocs/vappears.shtml.)

Wade Boese has an awesome and really timely article in October’s _Arms Control Today_ that discusses *the evolution of the Bush administration’s use of nonproliferation sanctions*.

Wade (whom I’ve admittedly never met, but whose work I’ve always found quite amazing) writes that during the second Bush term, the *Treasury Dept. has taken the sanctions baton from the State Dept.* He also notes that “over the course of the administration, *sanctions have decreased against Chinese entities and increased against Iranian entities*.” Most importantly, the article features great quotes from Chris Ford (and others) on *John Bolton’s nonpro sanctions obsession*. Anyway, “read the whole thing here”:http://armscontrol.org/act/2008_10/sanctions.

What I wonder about, however, is the *lack of discussion in the article of the sanctions trends against Russian entities*. Over 30 sanctions have been levied against Russian companies and private individuals during the past decade and, I would argue, these impositions were “more effective” than the sanctions against Iran or China in the sense that they’ve been more damaging to bilateral relations. Without the discussion of the Russia case, the nonpro sanctions story seems incomplete.

What I am also really curious about is *the reason behind the lack of State Dept. action on the last round of* “*INA sanctions*”:http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c15234.htm. These should have expired by now, but no _Federal Register_ notice has yet been issued. (And while I seemingly “jumped the gun in this post”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1673/last-round-of-ina-nonpro-sanctions-to-expire-monday, I am not admitting a mistake without an explanation.) Even if State, as Wade writes, has “taken a back seat,” surely this doesn’t mean that they won’t even issue expiration notices?

Hmm…

Yes, “today is _that_ day”:http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/october/4/newsid_2685000/2685115.stm. And you can make your very own “*Sputnik in a Biscuit Tin*”:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/7049002.stm to celebrate.

Frank Munger “has a neat video”:http://blogs.knoxnews.com/knx/munger/2008/09/how_secure_is_heumf.html in which he prods Y-12 officials on just how secure the “new Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility”:http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2008/9/10/7c57556f-6571-4114-bfab-29b5f3d32d4d.html is. I love how vague they are on the “DBT”:http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/design-basis-threat.html. Check it out.

“This bit”:http://blogs.knoxnews.com/knx/munger/2008/10/message_to_terrorists_dont_try.html is also a classic.

Asked what he’d say to people who might try to penetrate Y-12’s new high-security storehouse for bomb-grade uranium, Ron Wantland [head of Y-12’s operational security group] responded:

*”Think about a dozen times before you even wake up in the morning . . . Don’t even try it.”*

NNSA “announced today”:http://www.nnsa.energy.gov/2170.htm the completion of conversion to low-enriched uranium of two research reactors, one at UOregon and one at UWashington, as well as the initiation of decommissioning of the ZPPR at Idaho National Lab. I wonder what other surprises (“hopefully something like this?”:http://russianforces.org/nuclear/2008/09/russia_prepares_to_bring_spent.shtml) are in store for the “international RERTR meeting”:http://www.rertr.anl.gov/meeting_announcements/2008meeting/ that kicks off Monday in DC. Can’t wait. 🙂