Author Archives: J-Pollack

On Medvedev’s Mind

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Russian President Dmitry Medvedev tells America “what concerns him”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/30/AR2009033002443.html:

* Euro-GMD.

* NATO expansion.

* Lack of Adapted CFE ratification.

He also tells America what he likes:

* The Sochi “roadmap.”

* The resumption of arms reduction talks.

* “Collective solutions to the problems facing Afghanistan,” whatever that means.

* Creating a new international reserve currency.

Well, two or three out of seven is a start.

Not mentioned anywhere: Iran’s nuclear and missile programs.

“Better hit that reset button some more”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1926/skepsis.

ICG: Be Mellow

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The International Crisis Group tells us “not to overreact”:http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6030&l=1 to North Korea’s space launch, saying this would “promote hardliners in Pyongyang at a time when the North is facing strains over succession issues.”

bq. If the missile launch goes forward, domestic political pressures, particularly in the U.S. and Japan, will push for strong punitive measures. A tough response such as using missile defences against the rocket might please domestic constituencies but history has shown that pressure alone is very unlikely to influence Pyongyang’s behaviour in a positive way. It would likely result in the demise of the talks to end North Korea’s nuclear program and also worsen tensions on the Korean peninsula and promote hardliners in Pyongyang at a time when the North is facing strains over succession issues. In the worst case, it could risk a war with potentially devastating damage to South Korea, Japan and the world economy.

Secretary of Defense Bob Gates has got it covered:

WALLACE: The commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, Admiral Keating, says that we are, quote, “fully prepared to shoot down this missile.”

Are there any circumstances under which we will do that?

GATES: I think if we had an aberrant missile, one that was headed for Hawaii – that looked like it was headed for Hawaii or something like that, we might consider it. But I don’t think we have any plans to do anything like that at this point.

WALLACE: What if it were headed for the West Coast, for Alaska?

GATES: Well, we – I don’t think we believe this missile can do that.

WALLACE: And what about the Japanese? Obviously, they have some of our technology. Do we believe they’re going to prepare to shoot this down?

GATES: Well, again, based on what I read in the newspapers, what the Japanese are saying is that the – if that missile fails and it looks like it’s going to drop debris on Japan, that they might take some action.

WALLACE: Is there – you’re basically discussing this, Mr. Secretary, as if it’s going to happen.

GATES: The launch?

WALLACE: Yeah.

GATES: I think it probably will.

WALLACE: And there’s nothing we can do about it?

GATES: Nope.

WALLACE: And what does that say to you?

GATES: Well, I would say we’re not prepared to do anything about it.

See the “whole thing”:http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4390, if you like.

“Daniel Pinkston”:http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5063&l=1 is ICG’s man in Seoul.

[Update: Yes, I’ve gotten tired of pointing out that “we can’t employ missile defenses against the rocket, per se”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1912/shooting-at-kwangmyongsong-2, only against its payload, or a falling rocket stage.]

About That Missile Assembly Building

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As I’m sure you’ve noticed, what North Korea is calling “Unha-2”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1877/kwangmyongsong-kwangmyongsong-kwangmyongsong is generally described in the Western media as “Taepodong-2.” (Here’s “just one example”:http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0328/p90s04-woap.html.)

This is the same name used for the missile that North Korea “unsuccessfully tested”:http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/07/04/korea.missile/ on July 5, 2006.

But are they really the same missile?

Here’s an orbital happy snap of the missile assembly building at the Musudan-Ri Missile Test Facility / “Tonghae Satellite Launching Ground”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1877/kwangmyongsong-kwangmyongsong-kwangmyongsong, dated “June 9, 2006”:http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/html/dg_no-dong_20060609-01.htm.

And here’s the same thing, dated “March 29, 2009”:http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/images/musudan-ri-vcb_ge1_090329-1.jpg.

It’s gotten longer, with an extension on the south end. Does that imply a taller missile?

Beats me. But it’s interesting to compare Geoff Forden’s “silhouette”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2233/dprk-reading-between-the-blurs of the just-unveiled rocket with Charles Vick’s “speculative sketches”:http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/images/taepo-dong-2.jpg ca. 2004. That first stage certainly looks bigger and taller than expected.

Now “they fuel”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1938/weekend-project and “we wait”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1880/northeast-is-red.

A Modest Proposal

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I somehow missed it until now, but ACA’s Peter Crail had this very “clearly written piece”:http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=3386 on nuclear safeguards in Iran online a few weeks ago:

bq. In the months ahead, the United States and its allies may confront a choice. Do we want to get Iran to suspend its known nuclear activities, or do we want to achieve the transparency needed to detect any unknown activities? Both are important goals in their own right, but it may be increasingly important to shift our focus to the latter.

I guess the answer to that question depends on what the U.S. brings to the table. Assuming there even is a table.

Deep Missile Defense Thought

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Jeff Lewis asked me to distill something from “all”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1949/there-is-no-ballistic-missile-threat “the”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1943/tennis-with-the-net-up “recent”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1942/dome-sweet-dome “TW”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1941/the-pearl-harbor-golf-ball “postage”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1934/undermining-abm-part-deux “on BMD”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1932/olc-on-the-abmt for the ACW crowd.

Highlight:

bq. Strategic ballistic missile defense expresses a worldview in ways most weapons systems do not. It’s unilateralism. Acquiring, testing, and deploying strategic BMD just seem to fit with at-will revision of treaties like peanut butter goes with jelly. And the philosophy of an administration does more to shape BMD’s budgetary footprint than do military requirements as defined by the Armed Services or Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Read the “whole thing”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2232/defensive-transition.

Washington Post-It

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I’m taking license to share something off-topic.

Out here on teh Internets, it is often observed, we are heavily reliant on Ye Olde Newspapers for source material. Now, their track record is far from lovely, especially on the “nukey”:http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/02/politics/02nukes.html “germy”:http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/10/world/threats-and-responses-inspections-us-says-iraq-retools-rockets-for-illicit-uses.html “chokey-to-deathy”:http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/21/international/worldspecial/21CHEM.html beat, to say nothing of the occasional “headline about missiles”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1946/_wp_-blows-nk-headline. This stuff is technical, leaked intelligence is fragmentary, official sources have agendas, and so forth. But we rely on them anyhow, albeit with a critical eye. Couldn’t do without them, really.

So let us pause to acknowledge “the further downsizing”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/27/AR2009032702292.html of what should already be called the _Washington Post-It_. It’s like having a family member undergo a second or third amputation. You might not always appreciate their behavior, but it’s ever-so-painful to watch them being cut to pieces.

Batman Begins

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With the much-anticipated North Korean space launch so long in coming, everyone’s running out of things to say. Glenn Kessler of the _Washington Post_ gets “a few different perspectives”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/27/AR2009032702953.html on Stephen Bosworth, everyone’s favorite part-time envoy, and his controversial part-time-itude.

“Been there”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1861/part-time-envoy, “done that”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1873/more-about-the-bosworth-appointment.

Buried at the end of the story is the good stuff, some comments from “Bruce Wayne”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1874/actually-its-simple himself. You read, I’ll interpret:

bq. “I will not be the day-to-day representative in the six-party negotiations,” Bosworth said, adding that he will focus more on broader policy issues, including bilateral negotiations with North Korea. “Ideally one would like to meet with the leader,” Kim Jong Il, he said. “I would like to reach higher in the foreign ministry than we have been able to.”

_Translation:_ Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan — considered, relatively speaking, the voice of reasonableness, and the most authoritative figure who routinely speaks to foreigners — has been hard to reach lately. Perhaps they want to make their point with that space launch first.

bq. The new envoy said key periods when he must be at the school are fairly predictable. “A lot of what I do for Fletcher, I can do on the road,” he said. “I don’t see a major problem. I think that it is manageable. I am fortunate in that I have extremely good people in both operations, and I will rely heavily on them.”

_Translation:_ You can send emails from the Beijing airport these days, you know, as long as you don’t mind “the Chinese reading them”:http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/29/technology/29spy.html.

Bosworth said it was a surprise to him when Clinton called and offered the job. By coincidence, he was visiting North Korea when rumors began circulating that he would be tapped.

“As I told the North Koreans, I had not had a single conversation with anyone in the Obama administration about anything. But as soon as I returned from Beijing, I was asked to call the State Department and ended up talking to the secretary,” he said. “She was very explicit that, in her view, this could be done in coordination with the deanship.”

_Translation:_ I’m doing this job on my own terms. I’m not planning to sit by the phone in Foggy Bottom, waiting for KJI to call, thankyouverymuch.

The “abovementioned visit was covered”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1844/track-i-and-a-half-in-pyongyang right here at your very favorite arms control/nonproliferation website. So was “the odd way that the South Korean press had the story before Bosworth did”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1882/narrowing-the-gulf.

bq. “We have got to deal with it,” Bosworth said, referring to the North Korean nuclear arsenal. “It has strategic urgency. You can’t simply let it cool, not only because of its implications for us but also because of its implications for countries in the area, including our two allies [Japan and South Korea]. So we’ve got to be seen to be dealing with this. That being said, it sure is not easy.”

_Translation:_ What he said.

Bonus item! The invaluable “FCNL Nuclear Calendar”:http://www.fcnl.org/NuclearCalendar/ mentions an upcoming talk, involving some other folks who were in North Korea around the same time as Stephen Bosworth and the High Council of Morts:

bq. March 30 Noon-2:00 p.m., Susan Shirk and Stephan Haggard, University of California, San Diego; Marcus Noland, Peterson Institute for International Economics; and Karin Lee, National Committee on North Korea, “The Political and Economic Situation in North Korea: Implications for U.S. Policy.” University of California Washington Center, 1608 Rhode Island Ave., NW, Washington. RSVP to Joseph McGhee by “email”:mailto:joseph.mcghee@ucdc.edu.

Incidentally, this event is _not_ listed at the “website”:http://www.ucdc.edu/ of the University of California Washington Center. C’mon, folks, get with the program…

Amano-Minty-?

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Pretty much as “expected earlier”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1885/nuclear-applications-for-composite-materials, there’s no consensus candidate for the next IAEA D-G. Not yet, anyhow.

About a week ago, Borzou Daraghi of the _LA Times_ — yeah, I’m on a big _LA Times_ kick lately for some reason — “summed it up pretty nicely”:http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-fg-vienna-nuclear18-2009mar18,0,3259640.story:

Minty, a charismatic diplomat known for his outspokenness, has emerged as the favorite of developing countries. Most are sympathetic to Iran’s nuclear aspirations and suspicious of the West’s attempts to deny them nuclear technology while keeping its own weapons stockpiles untouched.

Amano, a low-key technocrat, has emerged as the West’s favored candidate for his commitment to restrict the agency’s duties to narrow technical issues and forgo the type of opinionated diplomatic mediation practiced by ElBaradei and his predecessor, Hans Blix.

“A great director-general is one who artfully navigates the politics of the situation to permit the IAEA to fulfill its technical mission,” said Jeffrey Lewis, an arms control expert at the New America Foundation. “I think (ElBaradei) has lost that sense of balance. His speeches now cover topics far outside the mandate of the IAEA, from missile defense to the Middle East peace process.”

(Do you think that “Nobel Peace Prize”:http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2005/elbaradei-lecture-en.html might have gone to his head a little? Not that his head was ever really that small.)

So now we’re waiting for a compromise candidate to emerge, but this could take awhile. In the meantime, here’s a “tidbit that David Crawford relates”:http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123807757585348167.html in today’s _WSJ_:

bq. In 2003, Mr. Minty, a political scientist, helped to broker an agreement with Iran that allowed the IAEA improved access to nuclear installations in Iran. In an interview, the 69-year-old Mr. Minty said the accord followed long conversations in Tehran. “There are no magical words,” he said. “Trust is more important.”

More when the white smoke goes up.

Tennis With The Net Up

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The GAO released an interesting document today, calling for “MDA to play by the regular rules of defense acquisition”:http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09466t.pdf. The “challenges identified” previously include:

* _Incorporating Combatant Command Priorities_: While DOD established a process in 2005 to address the combatant commands’ needs for ballistic missile defense capabilities, GAO reported in 2008 that the process was evolving and had yet to overcome key limitations to its effectiveness, including the need for more effective methodologies to clearly identify and prioritize the combatant commands’ needs. Additionally, when developing ballistic missile defenses, MDA lacked a departmentwide perspective on which of the commands’ needs were most significant.

* _Establishing Adequate Baselines to Measure Progress_: MDA’s flexible acquisition approach has limited the ability for DOD and congressional decision makers to measure MDA’s progress on cost, schedule, and testing. Specifically, as GAO reported in March 2009, MDA’s baselines have been inadequate to measure progress and hold MDA accountable. However, GAO also reported that new MDA initiatives to improve baselines could help improve acquisition accountability.

* _Planning for Long-Term Operations and Support_: DOD has taken initial steps to plan for ballistic missile defense support, but efforts to date are incomplete as difficulties in transitioning responsibilities from MDA to the services have complicated long-term planning. Additionally, although operation and support costs are typically 70 percent of a weapon system’s life cycle costs, DOD has not required that full cost estimates for ballistic missile defense operations and support be developed and validated, and DOD’s 6-year spending plan does not fully reflect these costs.

If the nuances are eluding you, the message comes down to this: the administration should start treating MDA as a military program rather than a political program.

If you’re perplexed by the title of this post, “see here”:http://www.bartleby.com/63/53/7153.html.

Dome, Sweet Dome

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“According to Anshel Pfeffer”:http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1074204.html in _Ha’aretz_, the Israeli Defense Ministry has announced that the “Iron Dome”:http://www.rafael.co.il/marketing/SIP_STORAGE/FILES/6/946.pdf short-range missile defense system will soon be up and running:

bq. Defense officials predict that the system will be up and running by next year and will protect 95% of people in the area around Sderot and Ashkelon from rockets and mortars fired from the Gaza Strip.

Unfortunately, this statement doesn’t appear to be accurate. Iron Dome can’t stop mortars — the interceptors just don’t fly out quickly enough. Some rockets also have flight times too short to be intercepted. This is part of why “thousands of houses”:http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/954799.html “in Sderot”:http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/956859.html, close to Gaza, are being heavily reinforced, a decision made back in February 2008:

bq. The fortification proposal approved on Sunday was based on the effective range of the “Iron Dome” anti-rocket system, which is currently under development. Recent tests found the system effective against rockets fired from more than four kilometers away, but not against those fired from closer range.

Oddly, it was Amir Peretz, a longtime Sderot resident who was then the Defense Minister, who “selected the Iron Dome system”:http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/820967.html. Perhaps it was the least bad option. Back in November 2006, a rocket from Gaza landed “right on Peretz’s street while he was at home”:http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3328341,00.html, killing a woman passing by and tearing the legs off one of the Defense Minister’s bodyguards.

Short-range missile defense has a troubled history in Israel. It’s clear that defensive systems go against the grain of the defense establishment, which is acutely conscious of the country’s lack of strategic depth, and believes strongly in hitting first. All this has been going on for years, but according to Pfeffer, development work has only recently kicked into high gear:

bq. The defense establishment recently acquired rabbinical approval for workers from Rafael, the Israel Arms Development Authority, to work on Saturdays and conducts the tests 24 hours, seven days a week.

The doctrine of carrying the battle to the enemy does much to explain why “Israeli responsibility for the alleged strike(s) in Sudan”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1940/best-of-intentions-ctd seems “so credible to many”:http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1074315.html, but there’s still no short-range defense in place, despite a decade-long requirement.