More from this 1987 interview with Agha Ibrahim Akram:

WHAT WAS YOUR PERSONAL REACTION TO THE NEWS… THAT THE INDIANS HAD EXPLODED A NUCLEAR DEVICE?

My reaction personally was the same as the national reaction. I think all Pakistanis talked alike on this issue that India has stolen a match, and there’s a positive danger of the Indians eventually becoming a nuclear power. We could see the euphoria in India. The Indians went mad with joy. “Wonderful! We made — we had a nuclear explosion. We’re entering the nuclear club.” Indira Gandhi was regarded as a deity, as a goddess. She had done it. Wasn’t that marvelous? And of course her whole idea was to get political advantage. But the feeling here was there’s no such thing as a peaceful nuclear explosion. This is the first step that India has taken towards becoming a nuclear power and we have to do something about it, to have the capability of responding. Until ’74 — we had never thought much of nuclear matters except as generating electricity in Karachi or places like that, purely for some uses and so on. We never thought of it as an important factor of strategic implication in South Asia. After the ’74 explosion at Bukhara in India. We suddenly realized that warfare from now on might not be as simple and as, as a gentlemen’s war as in the past. It had been a gentlemen’s war with India and Pakistan. We suddenly realized that there was a nuclear angle to it too. And the feeling was that it’ll never be the same again, that we don’t want to make the bomb but we have to have the capability of responding to India. But with this was a strong link and that was the Yom Kippur war of ’73. Because of it the oil prices shot up and in ’74 the effect of that was felt at almost the same time as the explosion, that we suddenly found that more than half our foreign exchange earnings were being spent in importing petroleum. It wasn’t so before that but with the rise in… the explosion of oil prices we suddenly realized that we had to have other forms of energy. So the requirement of nuclear energy for electricity, for power and the danger of the… or the threat from India who had just exploded the, the nuclear device combined together to, to, to make us, make us feel, to make us feel determined that we must go ahead and have a sizeable nuclear program for the production of energy, basically for energy but which might have the capability of stopping India also from going nuclear. ’74 was a watershed. It brought the shadow of the bomb to South Asia and that shadow is still there.

Agha Ibrahim Akram gave this interview in 1987.

THE TIME THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY DEBATE WAS GOING ON IN NEW YORK AND IN GENEVA. WHAT WAS PAKISTAN’S ROLE IN THAT AND WHAT WAS ITS FINAL CONCLUSION?

Akram:We — I don’t think it became to a very clear cut policy on the NPT for some years because we’re not quite sure of its implications for Pakistan. We became more conscious of the NPT in 1974 to which we’ll come again a little later but basically I don’t think we had given very much thought to the NPT, its implications, its pros and cons in Pakistan. We were actually — didn’t know enough about the consequences of the NPT to take a very firm decision. We took it later on in ’74 when India had the explosion but we’ll come to that a little later.

DO YOU WANT TO SAY THE MAIN REASONS FOR PAKISTAN NOT SIGNING?

Well basically our main… One main reason for not signing was that India did not sign it. If India were to sign it we would. We would now offer to India that if they will sign it we will. We’ve said let’s jointly sign the NPT. We’ve even said let’s have a special South Asian NPT. We don’t like the idea of signing the NPT because we don’t agree with the American policies or British policies. Let’s have a South Asian NPT. We didn’t sign it beca

Not sure this is new, but it nevertheless depicts IR-6 centrifuges:

Here’s a list of Intelligence Community Annual Worldwide Threat Assessments.

DAE in a recent Lok Sabah session:

the details of combined energy generation capacity of the operational nuclear power plants and the percentage of their overall energy supply contribution in the country;

There are presently 22 reactors with a total capacity of 6780 MW in operation and one reactor, KAPP-3 (700 MW) has been connected to the grid on January 10, 2021. There are 10 reactors [including 500 MW Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor(PFBR) being implemented by Bharatiya Nabhikiya Vidyut Nigam Ltd. (BHAVINI) totaling to 8000 MW under construction at various stages and the Government has accorded administrative approval and financial sanction for construction of 10 more reactors totaling to 7000 MW, to be set up in fleet mode. The projects under construction and accorded sanction are expected to be completed progressively by 2031. More nuclear power plants are also planned in future.

This December 2021 report t from India’s DAE to the Lokh Sabah has this chart about India’s uranium imports: