The SPND (or Defense Research and Innovation Organization) has been in the news ever since the death of the organization’s founder, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh. According to State’s most recent compliance report, the SPND is “an organization subordinate to the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics [MODAFL] that conducts military research and development – on weaponization-relevant dual-use technical activities.” The EU described the SPND somewhat similarly in 2012 and also identified the organization as “part of” MODAFL. The MODAFL association seems relevant to me because President Rouhani recently opined that “the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces’ Logistics will fill this scientist’s place with his colleagues and students with increasing self-sacrifice and efforts.”

Here’s a fuller description from State a few years back:

The Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND) is a Tehran-based entity that is primarily responsible for research in the field of nuclear weapons development. SPND was established in February 2011 by the UN-sanctioned individual Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, who for many years has managed activities useful in the development of a nuclear explosive device. Fakhrizadeh led such efforts in the late 1990s or early 2000s, under the auspices of the “AMAD Plan, the MODAFL subsidiary Section for Advanced Development Applications and Technologies (SADAT) and Malek Ashtar University of Technology (MUT). In February 2011, Fakhrizadeh left MUT to establish SPND. Fakhrizadeh was designated in UNSCR 1747 (2007) and by the United States in July 2008 for his involvement in Iran’s proscribed WMD activities. SPND took over some of the activities related to Iran’s undeclared nuclear program that had previously been carried out by Iran’s Physics Research Center, the AMAD Plan, MUT, and SADAT.

Iran has issued a couple of recent statements concerning the SPND’s activities. Fro example, this letter to the UN described Fakhrizadeh’s

outstanding role in the development of the first indigenous coronavirus disease (COVID-19) test kit, which is a great contribution to our national efforts in curbing the COVID-19 pandemic…He was also supervising the development of a COVID-19 vaccine.

From State’s 2020 CWC compliance report:

The other day, Treasury and State announced that the U.S. has designated two Iranian entities affiliated with what the USG characterizes as a suspected chemical weapons program,

According to Treasury,

Shahid Meisami Group is an organization subordinate to SPND and has been responsible for numerous SPND projects, the cost of which totaled in the millions of U.S. dollars. These projects include testing and producing chemical agents and optimizing them for effectiveness and toxicity for use as incapacitation agents. The United States has longstanding concerns that Iran maintains an undeclared chemical weapons program…

Mehran Babri is the head of Shahid Meisami Group. Prior to his current position at Shahid Meisami Group, Babri worked at Iran’s Defense Chemical Research Lab.

According o State,

The United States is concerned about the regime’s true intent with regard to the testing and production of these so-called chemical incapacitation agents, which could be used either to further oppress Iranian citizens or for offensive purposes.

State’s CWC compliance report from earlier this year had this to say:

A bit old, but worth noting….this 2018 Treasury report has this to say about Pakistan:

Like China and Russia, Pakistan is a nuclear weapons state but there is no U.S. targeted financial sanctions program dedicated to Pakistan for the development and maintenance of its nuclear weapons program. Unlike China and Russia, however, Pakistan is not a party to the NPT and therefore is not recognized under international law as having the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, to include the transfer or acquisition of nuclear technology. As a result, the Pakistani nuclear program has been marked with controversy since its inception, not just in its own right as a state-led program going against the grain of international norms, but also due to the outward proliferation tied to former members of the program in future years. Having to operate outside of regulated international channels has meant that Pakistan has largely had to acquire technology and know-how through covert means, and in select cases, those acting for on behalf of Pakistani government entities have sought to procure U.S.-origin goods and facilitate these illicit transactions by exploiting the U.S. financial system.

Conflict:

Well, sort of. This document, titled “General and Complete Disarmament: Report of the First Committee,” has a slew of links to documents, resolutions, and links to resolutions.