Monthly Archives: June 2009

Regime Type Déjà Vu

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This one is somewhat off topic, but may be of interest to anyone who has tried to anticipate what Country x or Country y will do in relation to matters of armament and disarmament, war and peace. Or whatever.

A question that plagues discussions of deterrence, proliferation, alliance formation, and assorted other security policy issues — or enlivens them — is systems of government: how they work, who runs them, how they will behave under various circumstances. It’s notoriously hard to reduce any of this to a neat formula. Not that this stops anyone from trying, but you know how it is: governments are made of people, and people are quirky.

It Ain’t Beanbag

The never-ending debate about revolutionary states and their leaders — rash or rational? — is merely one frame for this picture. Not that I’d recommend it. Anyone who has ever been part of any organization ought to be quick to recognize the inadequacy of either label. Not that this stops anyone from using them.

There are basically three problems. First, “nobody knows anything”:http://books.google.com/books?id=m9bviPR-UvIC. It’s not like all this stuff is written down somewhere.

Second, even when you do think you know something, it’s complicated. The biggest concerns can be parsed out — structure, traditions, ideologies, personalities — but they are all mutually entangled and overlapping. The best analysts will have a feel for how it all fits together, not a mathematical model.

Third, all this stuff keeps changing. Like small children or pets when someone is trying to take a family portrait, nothing sits still for too long.

Everything Ancien Is New Again

Even so, one of the more interesting recurring aspects of even some of the most unpredictable regimes is how much they seem to resemble their forerunners. Every “matryoshka”:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matryoshka_doll that starts with Vladimir Putin seems to end with Tsar Nicholas.

Consider Mehdi Khalaji’s “op-ed in today’s Post”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/14/AR2009061401758.html, comparing this week’s “military coup” in Iran to the 1953 coup against Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh. In a few quick strokes and without explicitly saying anything about it, Khalaji has clarified the interminable argument over the roles and powers of Iran’s Supreme Leader and President. The former looks awfully like a Shah, the latter like a Prime Minister. So who really holds the power? Well, it depends on who and when, and you can’t really say except in hindsight. For comparison, is the American office of the Vice Presidency a powerful position? Very few people thought so in 2002.

Or take North Korea… please. In how many Communist states does authority devolve according to the “dynastic principle”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/2029/il-piccolo-principe, based on a claim to “divine or semi-divine origins”:http://articles.latimes.com/1992-06-02/news/wr-623_1_kim-il-sung? According to one “school of thought”:http://dissidentvoice.org/Oct06/Leupp16.htm, these features of the regime were borrowed more or less directly from its predecessor, Great Imperial Japan.

There is nothing inevitable about any of this; that’s just how it came out. If Kim Il Sung had made other choices, it might have worked out somewhat differently. Egypt, for example, is still noted for its highly centralized form of government, even if it no longer has “divine pharaohs”:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_pharaohs to speak of.

Or think about these United States we have over here. It’s a federal republic, not a constitutional monarchy. There is no established church. And we don’t have a parliamentary system. But somehow, it does happen that we have a powerful head of state, a bicameral legislature, and an independent judiciary. “Wherever could all this have come from”:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_United_Kingdom?

Maybe revolutionary apples don’t fall so far from the tree. Something for the Supreme Leader to think about as he weighs his next move.

He could also “listen to this musical bonus”:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JFipyKSC2U8.

NK Diplomacy, 1985-2009

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ACA has a handy new “Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy”:http://armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron now online. Can’t say that I’ve read it end to end, but it looks like a useful resource.

If you just can’t get enough NK chronology, NTI has more on “missiles”:http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/Missile/chronology_2008.html and “nukes”:http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/Nuclear/nk_nuclear_2008.html.

Bosworth: NK Maintaining Radio Silence

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In “testimony to the SFRC”:http://foreign.senate.gov/hearings/2009/hrg090611p.html, Special Representative for North Korea Policy Steven Bosworth spells out the diplomatic situation:

bq.. Fourth and finally, we remain willing to engage North Korea to resolve our differences through diplomacy, including bilaterally, within the framework of the Six-Party process. A central tenet of the Obama Administration’s foreign policy approach to date has been a willingness to engage in dialogue with those with which we have had differences, sometimes very serious differences. From the beginning, this has been the approach we have pursued with North Korea. But North Korea greeted the open hand of the new Administration with preparations to launch a ballistic missile. When I was appointed by the President and Secretary Clinton, I proposed to the North Koreans a visit to Pyongyang, in the spirit of engagement, rather than threat. To this day, I have received no response.

On our trip, we made clear that the United States remains open to bilateral dialogue with North Korea in conjunction with the multilateral effort to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. As we have repeatedly stated, the United States has no hostile intent towards the people of North Korea, nor are we threatening to change the North Korean regime through force. We remain committed to the September 2005 Joint Statement from the Six-Party Talks, the core goal of which is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through peaceful means. We believe it benefits North Korea’s own best interests to return to serious negotiations to pursue this goal. The United States position remains unchanged: we will not accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state.

In conclusion, diplomatic outreach will remain possible if North Korea shows an interest in abiding by its international obligations and improving its relations with the outside world. If not, the United States will do what it must do to provide for our security and that of our allies. We will work with the international community to take defensive measures and to bring significant pressure to bear for North Korea to abandon its nuclear and missile programs. The choices for the future are North Korea’s.

p. Shorter version: The ball is in Pyongyang’s court.

_Update: Also of interest are “Bosworth’s remarks to the Korea Society”:http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2009/06/124567.htm in New York last week._

V. Cha: What KJI Wants

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Victor Cha has a “measured take”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/12/AR2009061202685.html on what the North Korean regime is really after (an India-style deal), what we can realistically expect from them (not much), and what the real value of diplomacy with Pyongyang probably is: damage control.

“Check it out”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/12/AR2009061202685.html.

Mis-Reporting North Korea

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Can I start by saying that I hold no brief for the DPRK? That ought to be “reasonably”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/2029/il-piccolo-principe “clear”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/2028/what-kji-is-after by now, but I’d like to avoid any confusion on that point. They’ve earned the “disrespect”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1892/how-much-respect-does-a-nuclear-arsenal-get and then some.

It’s also not my intention to become one of those raging _Death-to-All-MSM!_ types, although the sentiment “certainly seems”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2285/oh-calm-down “warranted”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/2027/the-disappointing-new-york-times “at times”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/2018/art-of-the-blown-headline.

OK. End self-referential throat-clearing. Here’s the bad news about this morning’s newspaper.

What the North Koreans Said

Yesterday, the North Korean Foreign Ministry released another milestone “statement” via “KCNA”:http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm. This one comes in response to the “passage of UNSCR 1874”:http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/13/world/asia/13nations.html on Friday. As of this writing, the official English translation is not yet up on the site, but Reuters has “gotten ahold of the text”:http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSSEO5078.

Update: the “official text”:http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2009/200906/news13/20090613-10ee.html is now online.

(This is a media-criticism post. I’ll tackle the implications of the statement later, time permitting.)

The statement announces three North Korean “countermeasures” to the Security Council’s resolution, which can be summarized as follows:

* “Weaponizing” plutonium that North Korea now claims to have already reprocessed from its current bunch of spent fuel rods.

* Commencing uranium enrichment on an “experimental” basis, in connection with fueling a light-water reactor, as yet not built.

* A “decisive military response” and “all-out confrontation” against any “attempted blockade” of the DPRK by “the U.S. and its followers.”

Got it? For your reference, again, “the text is here”:http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSSEO5078. I’ll put it in the comments, too.

So why can’t the _Washington Post_ get the story straight?

Sorry, Guys, You Blew It

There’s already so much confusion and mythology out there about North Korea’s activities in the field of uranium enrichment (to say nothing of uranium conversion). Why does the _Post_ have to add to it with this “rhetorical flourish in the lede”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/13/AR2009061300636.html?

bq.. TOKYO, June 13 — North Korea adamantly denied for seven years that it had a program for making nuclear weapons from enriched uranium.

But on Saturday, a few hours after the U.N. Security Council slapped it with tough new sanctions for detonating a second nuclear device, the government of Kim Jong Il changed its tune, vowing that it would start enriching uranium to make more nuclear weapons.

p. Let’s compare this directly with the relevant section of the NK FM statement, “via Reuters”:http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSSEO5078:

bq. Second: The process of uranium enrichment will be commenced. Pursuant to the decision to build its own light-water reactor, enough success has been made in developing uranium enrichment technology to provide nuclear fuel to allow the experimental procedure.

Do you see any reference to making uranium-based nuclear weapons there? I sure don’t. At best, that’s an inference by the _Post._ Maybe it’s warranted. But the DPRK “vowed” no such thing. This is just plain bad reporting, based on careless reading.

The part of the NK FM statement about the uranium came right after the part about weaponizing plutonium, so it’s not hard to see where the confusion started. But the same _Post_ story discusses the history of the uranium issue at some length, and even quotes part of the relevant excerpt of the NK FM statement above. There’s just no excuse.

How the Others Did

It must have been an easy mistake to make, since the _Post_ was merely this morning’s worst offender. “AFP blew it”:http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,25634212-12377,00.html, too. So did “this AP story by Carolyn Thompson”:http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5iwlhL35A2ztIHM3SXt-k0qKVfuMgD98Q5VU00.

The _New York Times_ “did somewhat better”:http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/14/world/asia/14korea.html:

bq. In a statement on the North’s official Korean Central News Agency, an unidentified spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry was quoted as saying that his nation would continue its nuclear program to defend itself against what he called a hostile United States policy. He was quoted as saying that his nation would “weaponize” its existing plutonium stockpiles and begin a program to enrich uranium, which can also be used to make atomic warheads.

Yes, this wraps up the plutonium and uranium issues together, and does not mention the LWR angle, which could be misleading. But it contains little that can be called inaccurate. (The statement said that that NK would “commence” enrichment, but also said that the development of technology has been underway for an unspecified time, so “begin a program” does not seem quite right.)

The NYT also noticed that this part of yesterday’s statement echoes “one from late April”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/2021/what-to-expect-from-north-korea. That’s something else the WP -got wrong- _appears to have missed._

This other “AP story by Hyung-Jin Kim”:http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090614/ap_on_re_as/as_koreas_nuclear;_ylt=AqBRpW8iowxU7sCNOahYFAys0NUE;_ylu=X3oDMTJqaDI1aDJvBGFzc2V0A2FwLzIwMDkwNjE0L2FzX2tvcmVhc19udWNsZWFyBGNwb3MDMwRwb3MDMTAEc2VjA3luX3RvcF9zdG9yeQRzbGsDbmtvcmVhd2FybnNv got it right about the LWR angle, wrong about the novelty of the statement:

bq. In Saturday’s statement, North Korea said it has been enriching uranium to provide fuel for its light-water reactor. It was the first public acknowledgment the North is running a uranium enrichment program in addition to its known plutonium-based program. The two radioactive materials are key ingredients in making atomic bombs.

Sorry to drag on like this, but I’m really frustrated by the bad reporting. Can you tell?

On a Happier Note

The _Washington Times_ “got it pretty much straight”:http://washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jun/14/un-sanctions-prompt-threat-to-attack/?feat=home_headlines:

bq. The news agency quoted an unidentified Foreign Ministry official as saying that Pyongyang would start a program to enrich uranium for a light-water reactor.

As in the case of the NYT, one could quibble about the word “start.” Regardless, I’m awarding to Desikan Thirunarayanapuram of the _Washington Times_ the inaugural _TW Prize for Largely Accurate Reporting About North Korea._ Congratulations, Desikan.

Natanz

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Strains are starting to show in the “monitoring arrangements”:http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5gODK4WyI04gVjnabOevtEzeWBdKAD98OIRH00. A bad sign.

About That Stacked Deck

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Right about now, it looks as if Iran’s “democratic wild card”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/2034/irans-elections turned up again. Life is full of surprises! But this time, the government responded with a game of “52 pickup”:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/52_Pickup.

That popular vote thing always was a little inconvenient. (“Ask Slobo”:http://www.unesco.org/courier/2001_03/uk/droits.htm!)

The commanders of the Iranian internal security apparatus — the “silencing of dissent”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/2016/raised-middle-finger specialists — seem to have judged, based on their experience with the protests and crackdowns of 1999, that they had more determination than the “young people who might come out onto the streets in protest”:http://iranian.com/main/2009/jun/reaction-against-re-election. So the leaders opted for a pretty brazen rule change. You can “read about it here”:http://tehranbureau.com/2009/06/13/the-election-in-a-nutshell/.

A great deal has been written about Iran’s political system, and I will not pretend to have read more than a fraction of it, even just what’s been written in English. Still, I’m partial to this now-more-prescient-than-ever “2005 publication by Kazem Alamdari”:http://www.iranian.com/Alamdari/2006/March/Iran/Images/MilitalizationIRI.pdf. Read it if the spirit moves you.

Two Paths

So what are the implications for the nuclear issue, you’d like to know? My guess is, there are two possibilities, and we’ll probably know which one it is pretty soon. Both are based on the assumption that the duumvirate of Khamenei and Ahmadinejad is going to be with us for awhile yet, but without a trace of legitimacy.

First, to further consolidate power by painting all opposition as treasonous, the regime could step up its confrontation with the West, rhetorically at a minimum. Under this scenario, serious talks won’t get underway. If lots of opposition and civil society figures are arrested in the next few days and weeks, this is probably the direction one should expect.

Second, to ease the pressure from below, the regime could instead reach out to Obama for a life-preserver of sorts, engaging in talks to demonstrate reasonableness and to signal to a disgruntled public that it should not harbor any hopes of rescue from the West.

Either way, the old strategy of indefinite “bobbing and weaving”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/2016/raised-middle-finger doesn’t seem so likely anymore.

_Update._ The NYT’s Bill Keller (that’s a statement in itself) “reports from Tehran”:http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/14/world/middleeast/14memo.html:

bq.. One employee of the Interior Ministry, which carried out the vote count, said the government had been preparing its fraud for weeks, purging anyone of doubtful loyalty and importing pliable staff members from around the country.

“They didn’t rig the vote,” claimed the man, who showed his ministry identification card but pleaded not to be named. “They didn’t even look at the vote. They just wrote the name and put the number in front of it.”

p. Iran may be in for a period of some turmoil.

Risk Communication

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This “op-ed in the _IHT_ by Laurie Garrett”:http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/11/opinion/11iht-edgarrett.html provides some food for thought. It concerns how to express information about pandemic influenza, suggesting that a one-dimensional scale of phases be replaced with a more informative and useful two-dimensional scale.

Parsimony, it seems, can be taken too far.

Iran’s Elections

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In the stacked deck of Iran’s theocratic constitution, there is a democratic wild card. If there’s a surprise coming up, it won’t be the first time. But now, it has implications for the nuclear issue.

What those implications might be, I won’t try to puzzle out at just this moment. But in case you missed it, Mir-Hossein Moussavi gave an interview to the _FT_ back in April. Here’s the “relevant bit”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1997/moussavi-on-the-nuclear-issue.