I’ve just stumbled across a “paper”:http://web.mit.edu/stgs/pdfs/Friend%20-%20Urenco%27s%20Views%20on%20International%20Safeguards%20Inspection.pdf, almost a year old now, by one Peter Friend, the head of Safeguards and Security at Urenco. It concerns the safeguarding of a centrifuge enrichment facility.
Yes, this again.
It includes a short section on “new inspection techniques.” Here are the highlights:
There are many organisations – particularly in USA – currently aiming to develop new equipment and new techniques for safeguards verification purposes. But many of the developers (who might not have many contacts with IAEA or with operators experienced in safeguards implementation) seem to be too interested in the technology per se, and should give a lot more thought into the practicalities.
[snip]
In Urenco’s view, the presence of a competent inspector on site provides more effective safeguards than the use of complex remote monitoring equipment.
(VERTIC’s Persbo has “mentioned the idea in the past”:http://verificationthoughts.blogspot.com/2007/11/new-safeguards-approach-for-enrichment.html as well.)
Without regurgitating Friend’s entire list of concerns — see page 7 of “his paper”:http://web.mit.edu/stgs/pdfs/Friend%20-%20Urenco%27s%20Views%20on%20International%20Safeguards%20Inspection.pdf if you’re interested — it suffices to say that there are many complexities involved with designing and installing new monitoring technologies in centrifuge plants, especially if the plant is already standing.
One might add to this a certain lack of trust between the monitors and the monitored: just what is that gizmo doing, anyway? And those third parties meant to be assured by the monitoring may have concerns that the gizmos can be gamed, one way or another, if there’s no one around to keep an eye on them. So having a permanent on-site presence does seem preferable in many ways.
(To be sure, sorting out the modalities, including who would make a mutually acceptable on-siter, is not entirely simple. Also, I do think continuous flow monitoring would be an excellent idea. These are not mutually exclusive ideas, or shouldn’t be.)
But there’s another benefit to having a small team of on-site inspectors always present. They can really get to know the people.
Without pretending to know more than I do, let’s just say that there can only be so many humans in a given country, such as Iran, with the requisite expertise in working with centrifuge enrichment technology. Getting to know those humans and what they are doing seems like the best possible monitoring technique.
Call it “social verification”:http://www.gsinstitute.org/pnnd/docs/NWC_Becker.pdf, right?
Concerns about breakout potential are “clearly”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1890/more-breakoutology “mounting”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1900/tribute-breakout-blogging — even if one doesn’t indulge in worst-case thinking — and undeclared centrifuge facilities are notoriously difficult to detect. So if you are worried about both a breakout at a declared site _and_ the possibility of an undeclared site somewhere else, how would you guard against them? There’s reason to be doubtful that even the Additional Protocol, by itself, would suffice to detect undeclared plants with confidence.
You’ll sometimes hear this same argument made in favor of a multinational fuel center; personally, I find it pretty compelling, at least compared to alternative strategies. But there’s a long way to go before any such proposal can be realized. The good news is, even if the multinationalization idea can’t be achieved, the idea of a full-time -inspectors- _presence_ can be adapted to safeguarding a national facility.
_Added thought: The difficulty, of course, remains in getting the monitored side to agree._
“Cross-posted to ArmsControlWonk.com”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2215/non-technological-safeguards. See “the comments at ACW”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2215/non-technological-safeguards#comment.