I just started reading niacINsight – NIAC’s “blog”:http://niacblog.wordpress.com/ about Iran. It has some useful stuff; “take a look.”:http://niacblog.wordpress.com/
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Monthly Archives: January 2009
Learning About Arms Control
I love hearing people from outside the arms control community telling me what that community thinks. I often learn that the community thinks the opposite of what it thinks.
Or something like that.
L Rozen’s New Home
Laura Rozen has a new blog called “The Cable,”:http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/ which is being hosted by the good people at Foreign Policy. So far, much transition porn. Check it out.
They have some other blogs too, most of which are linked “here.”:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
ISIS Procurement Case Studies
The ISIS crew has clearly been busy. They just put out three case studies (which you can find “here”:http://isis-online.org/publications/expcontrol/index.html) on illicit procurement by Iran and Pakistan. They are timely, given the lack of public evidence about post-Khan network procurement.
China and the HCOC
Today, I stumbled across “this statement”:http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/jks/kjlc/wkdd/t410752.htm from China’s foreign ministry about the “Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation”:http://www.sipri.org/contents/expcon/hcocfinal.html (HCOC).
I’m not sure if Beijing has said this before, but, according to the statement, “China’s policy on missile nonproliferation is in line with the principle and purposes of the HCOC.” This stance seems similar to China’s position on the MTCR…though China actually wants to join that group.
On another note, the Code would be funnier if it still went by its original name – the International Code of Conduct. ICOC is now more amusing in the age of the iPhone…
Deeper Iran Thought
FoKerr _JP_ asked me to elaborate on my “assertion”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1813/deep-iran-thought that “capabilities influence intentions.”
Here’s the full paragraph from the original post:
bq. Put another way, some in Iran probably want a nuclear weapon, or at least a weapons option, but there is scant evidence that they want one at all costs. Therefore, Iranian officials’ preferences for a nuclear weapon are not immutable. Capabilities influence intentions.
As we know, a state’s propensity to undertake a certain course of action is a function of the government’s capabilities and intentions (I actually learned it as “opportunity and willingness,” which I think is a better formulation.) But those two variables are frequently not independent; the more difficult it is to take a course of action, the less likely it is that a government will bother to take (or continue with) that action.
In the case of Iran, I think there is good evidence that at least some elements of the Iranian government wanted a nuclear weapon _if_ that weapon could be developed in secret. The evidence that Tehran wants to develop a weapon overtly is not nearly as good. If that is true, then complicating Iran’s efforts to develop a nuclear weapon in secret could dissuade Tehran from trying.
Parenthetically, it is also entirely possible that a strategic decision to actually field an Iranian nuclear arsenal has been shelved, scrapped, or never existed in the first place.
Yesterday’s Mehr News Agency
Obviously, I have no idea if this means anything, but, at least for a while, this was the top headline on the Mehr News Agency’s home page:
“Obama promises new Iran approach”:http://www.mehrnews.com/en/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=814854
And, in the right-hand column, these two September stories are posted from the archives:
“Iran interested in talks with U.S. based on mutual respect”:http://www.mehrnews.com/en/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=742843
“Iran has cleared up many ambiguities on nuclear program”:http://www.mehrnews.com/en/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=750334
Deep Iran Thought
It is probably the case that Iran pursued a nuclear weapons program until 2003. But that program was secret and it’s pretty obvious that Iran did not anticipate getting caught. Tehran has _not_ demonstrated a willingness to pursue an overt nuclear weapons program.
This matters because it makes an Iranian breakout scenario pretty unlikely. Furthermore, the more likely it is that Iran will be caught developing a nuclear weapon (through measures such as IAEA safeguards, intelligence methods, additional monitoring methods, etc.), the less likely it is that Tehran will try.
Put another way, some in Iran probably want a nuclear weapon, or at least a weapons option, but there is scant evidence that they want one at all costs. Therefore, Iranian officials’ preferences for a nuclear weapon are not immutable. Capabilities influence intentions.
As an aside, a weapons option may be troubling, but the number of people you can kill with an option is zero.
*Update:* Thanks a lot to Steve Clemons for the “link.”:http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/2009/01/ventilating_tho/
U.S. Additional Protocol Enters Into Force
Following up on “this post,”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1809/us-to-ratify-additional-protocol the U.S. Additional Protocol, which was signed in 1998, entered into force on 6 January.
So “says”:http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2009/usap.html the IAEA.
Do Svidaniya!
It’s now the bittersweet time for me to say goodbye. I wanted to thank Mr. WonKerr for the fun opportunity and for his patience during these ten months. The heartfelt thanks, however, are reserved for the few readers out there. Thanks for letting me entertain you with some silliness and providing me with feedback on the very few serious posts. And since the Russian “Staryi Novyi God”:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Old_New_Year holiday is still a few days ahead, I wanted to wish the best in 2009 and beyond!
I leave you with an excerpt of my most favourite piece from the March 2, 1981, issue of _NuclearFuel_. “Dr. Yumi Akimoto”:http://www.jaea.go.jp/04/np/en/shiryou/forum2006/frm06b03.html is commenting on the results of the 1977-1980 “International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE)”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_12/Rauf.
In Akimoto’s view, INFCE resulted in two “major” achievements. The first is that “the world has reconfirmed the political nature of nonproliferation issues,” even though the exercise itself took “the opposite course.”
The second is “that the member states have recognized how the world is too small to allow arbitrary movements of individual nations.”
In that regard *INFCE was like hedgehogs “trying to warm themselves in winter cold*.
“Winter cold,” he said, “was the increasing danger of nuclear proliferation. The American hedgehog probably was the first who reacted to such cold and his sudden move resulted in unconsciously harming his companions, the other nuclear nations, with his spines. Due to the resultant confusion, many of the countries involved wounded each other.”
But INFCE, said Akimoto, “offered a suitable place for the wounded hedgehogs to display their respective wounds to each other and to learn how to warm themselves without harming others.”
Paul Says: Anya’s efforts made this blog much better than it otherwise would have been and she will be missed around these parts. But you will hear from her again, doubtless from much loftier perches.