Monthly Archives: November 2008

On Cessation of Fingerpointing and Special Relations

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In case you’re not in the mood to think or talk about Iran or Syria, here is some stuff on India. (But who cares about India now?)

Anyway, Rosatom’s Kiriyenko and crew have been “making the rounds at Kudankulam”:http://www.hindu.com/2008/11/20/stories/2008112055441300.htm. (Check out physical progress of construction at NPCIL’s “snazzy new website”:http://npcil.nic.in/npcil_new_web/main/ConstructionDetail.aspx?ReactorID=77.) Apparently, Kiriyenko “was quite pleased”:http://www.rosatom.com/en/news/12774_20.11.2008:

bq. “Today, we have seen significant changes at the two reactors and auxiliary facilities,” Kiriyenko said while opening a working conference after visiting the site. He thanked Indian and Russian engineers for *“working hard for the sake of the general cause and not pointing at one another in case of problems.”*

Also, a few days back, Interfax “conducted an interview”:http://www.interfax.com/17/447042/Interview.aspx with India’s Ambassador to Russia Prabhat Shukla. Below is my favorite part:

[Interfax:] _In your opinion, what is the outlook of Indian-Russian contacts in the field of atomic energy, given that Nuclear Suppliers Group recently lifted its sanctions from India? Does India intend to sign a contract on cooperation with Russia in this field?_

[Amb. Shukla:] Just to clarify something that is important, India was not under any sanctions from the Nuclear Suppliers Group. In the previous scenario, the Nuclear Suppliers Group approved nuclear trade and commerce only to countries that have accepted full scope and comprehensive safeguards. India does not accept comprehensive safeguards. What has now happened is that the Nuclear Suppliers Group has made an exemption specific to India. Notwithstanding India not accepting comprehensive safeguards, the NSG countries have now decided to engage in nuclear cooperation with India. It is a very welcome development and *I must pause here to say a sincere thank you to the Russian leadership for its support to India in the NSG. I know that it was very effective support which we got from Russia. Russia also lobbied very hard in our favour with other NSG members*.

As for what we are going to do, we are hoping to sign an intergovernmental agreement when President Medvedev is in India. I think Russia is in a unique position as far as nuclear trade with India is concerned because Russia is already constructing two nuclear reactors in Kudankulam in India. I think this is now going to grow, and *Russia has probably the best prospects among any of our partners in winning more lucrative contracts for nuclear reactors* since they already have men and material on the ground, in India.

Anyway, get ready for a “Russo-Indian nuclear lovefest”:http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20081118_3186.php in December.

Ah yes, Shukla also noted that the process of deciding who gets to sell India the 126 fighters will be “very fair, objective and transparent.” _Riiiiight._

Nuclear Renaissance à la Russe

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Rosatom is running its annual “_Nuclear Renaissance_”:http://www.atomfoto.ru photo contest. Goals of this project include chronicling the development and growth of nuclear power and industry in Russia, and creating and promoting a new visual form for the nuclear industry.

I came across a seemingly random pic titled “Nuclear Renaissance”:http://www.atomfoto.ru/photos/0c85f04dd9b529da195d8d272ec6a5a4,pos=15,picsperpage=,sort=s5 and just had to share. Apparently, these are birdies in a nest made of industrial wire at the “Kalinin NPP”:http://knpp.rosenergoatom.ru/eng/.

!/images/62.jpg!

Andy G and Russia

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Riffing on Anya’s “comment”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2091/who-speaks-for-russia#comment, I would agree that Andy Grotto’s “admonition”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2091/who-speaks-for-russia applies only to the numerous advocates of naive diplomacy for achieving Utopian ends.

On Coincidences

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Check out Dmitriy Medvedev’s response to a question on whether the timing of his “state of the nation speech”:http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/11/05/2144_type70029type82917type127286_208836.shtml so close to the U.S. election was “coincidental”:

bq. MEDVEDEV: Do you think this is blackmail? This is not just a coincidence, I can disclose to you the inside workings of this. Two times I postponed my state-of-the-nation address because I was not happy with the documents that had been prepared for me, and at some time I simply had to sit down at the table and edit the text of that state-of-the-nation address. And the date I chose was November 5. *With all my respect to the United States, I absolutely forgot about the important political event that had to take place that day. There is nothing personal here.*

Ok. Maybe he didn’t quite _forget_. But this just goes to say that not all events in the world necessarily revolve around U.S. elections. Thus, they shouldn’t be “interpreted”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2083/medvedevs-welcome-to-obama as such.

Full transcript of Medvedev’s “CFR talk is here”:http://www.cfr.org/publication/17775/conversation_with_dmitry_medvedev.html.

*Update*: In a story that starts with Medvedev’s comment about lack of trust in U.S.-Russian relations (from aforementioned CFR talk), WaPo ran a pic of “Medvedev pouting”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/15/AR2008111502528.html. Sheesh.

ACW and Troglodytes

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Reading “this post”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2095/have-a-sense-of-humor inspired me to break out “this”:http://www.cduniverse.com/search/xx/music/pid/1056981/a/Attack+Of+The+Killer+B’S.htm Anthrax album. In reference to the tune “Dallabnikufesin,” the liner notes say

bq. If anyone is offended by this song, they’re an idiot.

Foster Criteria and Article II of the NPT

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After recently re-reading “this post”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/category/nuclear-energy by J Acton, I realized that it’s a bit difficult to find then-ACDA Director William Foster’s 1968 statement to the SFRC (AKA, the “Foster Criteria”), which described the U.S. position on those activities that would violate Article II of the NPT.

Here it is:

Extension of Remarks by Mr. Foster in Response to Question Regarding Nuclear Explosive Devices

The treaty articles in question are Article II, in which non-nuclear-weapon parties undertake “not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,” and Article IV, which provides that nothing in the Treaty is to be interpreted as affecting the right of all Parties to the Treaty “to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes…in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.” In the course of the negotiation of the Treaty, United States representatives were asked their views on what would constitute the “manufacture” of a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device under Article II of the draft treaty. Our reply was as follows:

“While the general intent of this provision seems clear, and its application to cases such as those discussed below should present little difficulty, the United States believe [sic] it is not possible at this time to formulate a comprehensive definition or interpretation. There are many hypothetical situations which might be imagined and it is doubtful that any general definition or interpretation, unrelated to specific fact situations could satisfactorily deal with all such situations.”

“Some general observations can be made with respect to the question of whether or not a specific activity constitutes prohibited manufacture under the proposed treaty. For example, facts indicating that the purpose of a particular activity was the acquisition of a nuclear explosive device would tend to show non-compliance. (Thus, the construction of an experimental or prototype nuclear explosive device would be covered by the term ‘manufacture’ as would be the production of components which could only have relevance to a nuclear explosive device.) Again, while the placing of a particular activity under safeguards would not, in and of itself, settle the question of whether that activity was in compliance with the treaty, it would of course be helpful in allaying any suspicion of non-compliance.”

“It may be useful to point out, for illustrative purposes, several activities which the United States would not consider per se to be violations of the prohibitions in Article II. Neither uranium enrichment nor the stockpiling of fissionable material in connection with a peaceful program would violate Article II so long as these activities were safeguarded under Article III. Also clearly permitted would be the development, under safeguards, of plutonium fueled power reactors, including research on the properties of metallic plutonium, nor would Article II interfere with the development or use of fast breeder reactors under safeguards.”