Monthly Archives: April 2007

More on Nuclear Terrorism

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A Loyal Reader sent the following comment in response to “this post”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1409/nuclear-terrrorism about nuclear terrorism. I thought it worth highlighting, so here it is in full:

I’d say that if the potential for nuclear terrorism is to be taken seriously, then yes, it mainly adds urgency to a number of things we should already be doing urgently. At least in a rational world — I seem to recall that Rumsfeld and Rice both made very dismissive comments about the need to resource Nunn-Lugar programs early in the administration. Ghastly.

If there is an exception to the “merely adds urgency” rule of thumb, it probably isn’t detection, though. Anyone capable of building a nuclear device, or who knows what they are doing, is going to shield their material and/or device adequately, assuming it needs shielding in the first place to evade detection. Radiation detection could help with RDDs and the radionuclides that go into them, but the only thing that’s really going to help with a nuke is an x-ray, to spot the lead, tungsten, or DU box around the bomb, or perhaps the unshielded HEU. And you can’t have an x-ray machine going in the Holland Tunnel, I don’t think… Plus which, it’s a little late to catch the nuke at that point.

My own preferred candidate for a nuclear-terrorism inspired policy
decision is attribution R&D.

The last two paragraphs are in response to my claim that:

bq. I’ve always thought that, from a policy perspective, the risk of nuclear terrorism does not make much difference – we should do things like fissile material control, threat reduction, and counter-terrorism anyway. The exception may be for things like nuclear detection programs.

Happy effing Monday.

Ahmadinejad on Nukes

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I plan to write more about this at some point, but I thought I would point out a statement that Ahmadinejad made about nuclear weapons during a 23 April interview on Spanish TV:

bq. In the political sense, too, those who look at the world logically can understand that the use of nuclear weapons is already a thing of the past. Today, in political relations, *nuclear weapons are not considered to be a privilege for those who have them. If nuclear weapons had any effects, any influence, they could save the Americans in Iraq or could have saved the former Soviet Union from disappearing.*

To be fair, what he had to say about terrorism struck me as pretty disingenuous:

[Correspondent] The last question Mr President. I come from a country wherein an international act of terrorism took place three years ago, under the name of Islam. I would like to know what you think about this kind of terrorism. Can you elaborate on Iran’s pledge to fight this type of international terrorism?

[Ahmadinezhad] Iran is a victim of terrorism. Terrorism has dealt us the heaviest blow. At this same building behind me, terrorists killed the prime minister and the elected president one day. They killed more than 70 officials of our country who were appointed by the people. Hundreds of our people have been killed in bombings in the streets. They set school busses on fire. We are a victim of terrorism.

We strongly reject terrorism from a religious point of view. Anyone who kills people is hated and isolated. Our religion is humane and respects all human beings, regardless of their belief, their nationality and the continent they come from. In our religion, people are respected. We are all obliged to preserve mankind’s dignity and honour. Therefore *we strongly condemn the [terrorist] actions of certain people. Of course you know that there are big powers behind such moves. You must know about the relationship between big powers and terrorist currents. Independent nations are victims of terrorism.*

Safe bet to say that this answer likely includes a different definition of terrorism than Iran’s critics use.

Needless to say, Ahmadinejad’s words about nukes might be taken a bit more seriously were it not for all his nonsense about Israel and bullshit about the Holocaust. But I have never understood why “one (ambiguous at best) quote”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1401/rafsanjani-and-nukes from Rafsanjani from 15+ years ago is taken as evidence that Iran is bent on pursuing nuclear weapons when Iranian officials have said numerous times that Tehran rejects nuclear arms.

Just a thought. Go outside and play.

Robot Economist On Prompt Global Strike

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The Robot Economist has a great post up about Prompt Global Strike where he discusses, among other things, how convincing Russia and China that the program isn’t aimed at them would be a pretty tough sell:

bq. …it may be impossible to gain international acceptance of the Prompt Global Strike concept. Even if the you could conclusively mitigate the potential for a mistaken nuclear attack, *China and Russia still have cause fear Prompt Global Strike because they couldn’t defend against it.* Does the military [sic] that either nuclear power would accept the idea that the United State could launch any type of strike deep within its territory? *The Bush administration feels so insecure about such a scenario from happening to the United States that it is funding U.S. missile defense programs to the tune of $10 billion annually.*

He also helpfully provides a “link”:http://209.85.165.104/search?q=cache:IZwraNfornAJ:www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/Archive/R.20021002.MTR/R.20021002.MTR.pdf+The+Military-Technical+Revolution:+A+Preliminary+Assessment&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us to a 1992 Office of Net Assessment study which indicates that the Russians/Soviets had been “thinking about the implications of a long-range strategic strike for decades.”

Light weekend reading.

Iraq: Told You So

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Jeffrey “pointed out a few days ago”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1467/1300-centrifuges-at-the-fep that we did, with respect to Iran’s centrifuges.

Because my ego needs more boosting, I will take this occasion to point out that, a couple of days before the invasion of Iraq, _Defense News_ published a (widely-read and obviously influential) piece in which I argued that it was not time to attack Iraq.

Specifically, I wrote:

Given the obvious risks and costs of military intervention, *it is worth looking for a way to disarm Iraq without going to war.* Any rush to use military force, especially without U.N. Security Council approval, would undermine one of Bush’s most compelling rationales for using military force against Iraq – preserving U.N. credibility.

[snip]

The problem is that, *despite its claims to the contrary, the Bush administration is not giving the inspection process sufficient opportunity to succeed. The inspectors have only recently begun to receive the helicopters, surveillance equipment and intelligence they need to do their job. The Security Council can certainly provide them with whatever additional resources are necessary.*

We must recall that weapon inspectors during the 1990s found and destroyed the vast majority of Baghdad’s weapons of mass destruction in the face of systematic Iraqi obstruction. Additional U.S. intelligence could help inspectors investigate other suspicious sites likely to reveal even more convincing evidence of ongoing activities related to weapons of mass destruction.

I think that people frequently forget the extent to which concerns about the length of time that the United States could keep troops deployed in the region drove the timetable for invasion. At the time, I wrote

bq. the large number of troops deployed to the Arabian Gulf region suggests *short-term military requirements are driving the timetable for action, rather than any threat Iraq poses*. Military experts disagree about how long a large number of troops can be kept in the theater, but it is clear that political and military pressure for action increases with the length of deployment.

Anyway, the rest of the article is at the bottom of the post.

“We were all wrong,” my ass. Let me “reiterate:”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/601/youre-out-of-your-element-tommy

bq. …those who supported the Iraq fiasco really need to STFU, stop lecturing the rest of us about foreign policy, sit in a corner, and think about what they did.

Not that I’m bitter. Happy Friday.

Time To Launch Iraq War Has Not Yet Arrived
Defense News March 17, 2003

By Paul Kerr

A cautionary voice needs to be injected into the chorus calling for war against Iraq. To be sure, the prospect for a peaceful solution to the Iraq crisis seems remote. The United States has provided compelling evidence Baghdad is not complying with its disarmament obligations under U.N. Resolution 1441, and President George W. Bush’s administration has suggested St. Patrick’ s Day as the deadline for compliance.

Given the obvious risks and costs of military intervention, it is worth looking for a way to disarm Iraq without going to war. Any rush to use military force, especially without U.N. Security Council approval, would undermine one of Bush’s most compelling rationales for using military force against Iraq – preserving U.N. credibility.

A genuine commitment to the U.N. process is required if Bush’s diplomatic efforts are to be seen as anything more than tactical maneuvers to facilitate a preconceived decision to go to war.

Fortunately, recent history suggests that such a commitment can compel Iraq to further comply with inspections if the Security Council applies united, unyielding pressure on Baghdad.

Largely ignored in the Iraq debate is that Baghdad significantly changed its position on weapon inspections during the last several months. Starting last spring, Iraq expressed to U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan a willingness to discuss resuming weapon inspections, but only if the Security Council agreed to first address issues such as removing the no-fly zones and lifting economic sanctions. Annan and the Security Council correctly insisted that Iraq had to admit inspectors prior to any such discussion.

Iraq then surprised skeptics by deciding to admit inspectors in September. The Security Council then adopted a new resolution to compensate for weaknesses in the inspectors’ previous mandate. In November, Iraq again confounded expectations and accepted Resolution 1441, giving inspectors unprecedented access to suspected weapon sites. So far, Iraq has not impeded this access.

The inspectors’ March 7 report indicates this trend has continued. Although more certainly needs to be done, Iraq has increased its cooperation with inspectors in several respects. Baghdad has begun to destroy its prohibited al Samoud 2 missiles and allowed more unfettered interviews with weapon scientists.

These changes did not happen because Iraq is enthusiastic about disarming, but they did happen. If the Security Council insists that Baghdad comply fully with all its obligations under resolution 1441, including a complete accounting for its past chemical and biological weapon production, it may yet do so.

In this regard, Security Council meetings during the past several weeks have been encouraging, with all Permanent Five members emphasizing the importance of Iraqi cooperation with weapon inspections. They should intensify this pressure and make certain Iraq understands that its past strategies of dividing the Security Council will not succeed and inspections will not continue indefinitely without concrete results.

The problem is that, despite its claims to the contrary, the Bush administration is not giving the inspection process sufficient opportunity to succeed. The inspectors have only recently begun to receive the helicopters, surveillance equipment and intelligence they need to do their job. The Security Council can certainly provide them with whatever additional resources are necessary.

We must recall that weapon inspectors during the 1990s found and destroyed the vast majority of Baghdad’s weapons of mass destruction in the face of systematic Iraqi obstruction. Additional U.S. intelligence could help inspectors investigate other suspicious sites likely to reveal even more convincing evidence of ongoing activities related to weapons of mass destruction.

Inspectors may not be able to find all of Iraq’s prohibited weapons without its cooperation, but more discoveries can put additional pressure on Saddam to comply with Resolution 1441.

However, the large number of troops deployed to the Arabian Gulf region suggests short-term military requirements are driving the timetable for action, rather than any threat Iraq poses. Military experts disagree about how long a large number of troops can be kept in the theater, but it is clear that political and military pressure for action increases with the length of deployment.

There have long been enough troops in the region to make threats of force credible. Continued war preparations may create a self-fulfilling prophecy and undermine Bush’s claims that war can be avoided.

Make no mistake, Iraq must comply with Resolution 1441 and military force may eventually be required. As the administration itself has argued, arms control agreements are some of our most valuable tools for preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We have an interest in making sure leaders like Saddam Hussein take them seriously.

Fortunately, we can afford to wait at least a few months. Iraq does not present a short-term threat to the United States. The inspectors’ presence can deter weapon production, we control two-thirds of Iraq’s airspace, and Iraq’s military is considerably weaker than in 1991.

The administration says it has not yet decided to use military force and that war is not inevitable. Iraq’s negotiating behavior suggests that a bit of patience on the administration’s part may yield a peaceful solution.

Olmert on Iran

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Apologies for the light blogging as of late. Deadlines and all that…

Anyway, this is potentially of interest. Israeli Prime Minister
Ehud Olmert offered a relatively low-key assessment of Iran’s nuclear program in a 22 April broadcast on Reshet Bet Radio:

OLMERT: *I recommend in every issue, and in these sensitive issues too, not to conduct a policy on the basis of panic and self-intimidation. There is no need for that.* There is a huge unprecedented effort by the entire international community, in order to succeed in preventing Iran from turning into a nuclear power —

Q: — but in the meantime, the centrifuges are spinning and increasing in numbers.

OLMERT: The fact is that the Security Council has already passed two resolutions unanimously which implement unprecedented sanctions on Iran, and we have the basis to assume that these steps, eventually, will also achieve the results which we did not know if we can expect — in advance. It is a process which will still continue.

*I think that there is a possibility to cause, even without a military operation, that Iran will not be nuclear.* From time to time I hear the declarations of Iran’s leaders and *I’m telling you that Iran is far from crossing the technological threshold.*

Unfortunately, *it is as far as I wished it would be, but it is not as close as it is pretending to be.* And I believe that the continued international efforts which Israel is part of, will eventually achieve the goal, and *there is no need to get caught up in all kinds of apocalyptic prophecies which have no basis in reality.*

Dead-Horse Flogging, Department of

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US Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation Chris Ford:

bq. There have been more PSI successes than one can discuss publicly, but we should remember that *it was a PSI interdiction, of a shipment of illicit centrifuge equipment bound for Libya in October 2003 that began the unraveling of the dangerous and infamous A.Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network and helped catalyze Libya’s decision two months later to renounce the pursuit of WMD* and dismantle its WMD programs.

“Bzzzt:”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_07-08/Interdiction_Misrepresented.asp

John Wolf, who served as assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation from 2001 to 2004, told _Arms Control Today_ May 25 that the BBC China operation was “separate” from PSI. He said the incident stemmed from previous efforts to track and uncover the Khan network.

A foreign official familiar with the operation corroborated Wolf’s version of the event. “The BBC China operation was carried out in the spirit of PSI, but it was not a PSI operation,” the official informed _Arms Control Today_ May 31.

Previous dead-horse abuse “here.”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1385/nyt-on-bob-j

Insert dolphin-flogging joke here.

North Korean HEU: Bad Decisions

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I was re-reading a Nelson Report from a few weeks back and noticed a interesting tale related to US intelligence RE: North Korea’s HEU program. Chris gave me permission to print the following paragraphs:

… directly involved players in 2002 have told us that despite the strong public face presented to both N. Korea and the Congress, there was a bitter inter-agency fight over how to interpret the intelligence on all DPRK nuclear activity, but especially over the HEU situation. And we quoted one of these sources as saying he personally witnessed the intervention of then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz to produce a formal assessment on the hard-line extreme of the interpretive spectrum.

Yes, you would be correct to recall a similar phenomenon, and player, in the Iraq WMD fiasco.

Commenting privately today, a concerned observer, then and now, said “the [HEU] evidence was very ambiguous. Wolfowitz took it and ran with it as hard as he could, and the upshot was that we shut down everything we planned to do with the DPRK. It was after that [Jan., 2003] they threw out the IAEA and began [what became] the run-up to the bomb test [last fall].”

This story struck me because I recently “wrote about”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_04/NewsAnalysis.asp decisions that stemmed from worst-casing the HEU intelligence:

Even as U.S. confidence about the suspected [HEU] program has decreased, policy decisions based on those judgments have continued to reverberate.

*[snip]*

The belief that North Korea may have constructed an enrichment plant also apparently influenced at least some Bush administration policy decisions. A former State Department official said in a March 21 interview that some U.S. officials were “intent on making policy” based on the worst-case assumption that Pyongyang had an enrichment facility. For example, some State Department officials forcefully advocated an extremely intrusive verification scheme that would allow the United States to search for a possible North Korean enrichment facility. Several former U.S. officials have told Arms Control Today that such a plan would have been unacceptable to Pyongyang.

Former State Department Korea director David Straub, however, argued in a March 25 interview that some Bush administration officials were “intent on making policy toward North Korea based on worst-case scenarios about everything,” regardless of the enrichment issue. The entire department supported a “very intrusive inspection system, although some even more so,” he added.

The _ACT_ article also has some relevant information about the HEU program, if anyone’s interested. My last post on the subject can be found “here.”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1368/cia-and-heu-nork-edition

Happy Friday.

Nuclear Terrorism and Probability

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Jeffrey has a good “post”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1464/more-nuclear-terrorism about the “Allison/Levi exchange on CFR.org”:http://www.cfr.org/publication/13097/ abut nuclear terrorism. He correctly points out that the debate should be “about a particular policy that might be controversial—say, domestic nuclear detection efforts.”

I’ve always thought that, from a policy perspective, the risk of nuclear terrorism does not make much difference – we should do things like fissile material control, threat reduction, and counter-terrorism anyway. The exception may be for things like nuclear detection programs.

Jeffrey (and Matt Bunn) point out that

probabilistic models [of a nuclear terrorist attack] are only useful to identify the optimal allocation of resources in deterring, preventing and responding to nuclear terrorist attacks. As Matt Bunn said in the comments on an earlier post:

… a systematic approach helps in focusing the discussion, identifying areas of disagreement, identifying areas where additional information would reduce the range of uncertainty, and, yes, offering an at least somewhat more focused approach to assessing which policy options might be most important.

My point is that the universe of policy options to which the actual probability of a terrorist attack is relevant seems to me to be pretty small.

Iran Has More Centrifuges

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According to “this _AP_ story,”:http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/world/AP-Nuclear-Iran.html

bq. Iran has started enriching small amounts of uranium gas at its underground nuclear plant and is running *more than 1,300 of the centrifuges* used in the process.

The report cites an 18 April letter to Iranian officials from IAEA DDG Olli Heinonen which says that “Iran has provided information to the agency that it has put into operation *1,312 centrifuges.”*

I can’t provide details, but the 1312 number is consistent with some information that I received a couple of weeks ago.

In addition,

bq. the letter also cites Iranian information to the agency that *”some UF6 is being fed’*’ into the centrifuges at the underground Natanz facility, referring to the uranium gas that can be enriched to levels potent enough to be used for nuclear arms.

I must point out that the story wrongly says that “Last week, Iran said it had begun operating 3,000 centrifuges at Natanz.”

“Bzzzzt.”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1403/iran-still-does-not-have-3000-centrifuges

*Update:*

“Reuters”:http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSL1870149120070418?feedType=RSS and “AFP”:http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070418/wl_mideast_afp/irannuclearpolitics_070418182439;_ylt=AinlHTfubaXBPE5tcrqcLfZSw60A have the story too. According to Heinonen’s letter, IAEA inspectors found that Iran has 8 cascades running.

*Later Update:*

ISIS has a “copy”:http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/IAEAreport18April2007.pdf of the letter.

Papal Proliferation

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I know at least one other person will be amused by this. A former co-worker of mine at CSIS (no, not Jeffrey) used to warn us about “Papal Prolif” as a potential nuclear threat.

Anyway, according to “this letter”:http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2007/infcirc187m1.pdf, the Holy See has amended its IAEA small quantities protocol.

Read more about the SQP “here”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_11/NOV-IAEALoophole.asp and “here.”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_07-08/IAEASafeguards.asp