Monthly Archives: February 2007

Iran in Iraq in PowerPoint

The issue of alleged Iranian jackassery in Iraq isn’t something I write much (if anything) about, but those who are interested should check out “this presentation”:http://www.realcities.com/multimedia/nationalchannel/archive/mcw/pdf/Iran_in_Iraq.pdf over at McClatchy’s site. It looks to be the DoD officials’ presentation referenced in press reports over the last couple of days, but that’s not totally clear; it could just be McClatchy’s summary.

*Update:*

It’s from the DoD…should’ve read further down in “this _WP_ article.”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/11/AR2007021100479.html

bq. The officials released a PowerPoint presentation including photographs of the weaponry, but did not allow media representatives to record, photograph or videotape the briefing or the materials on display

Ass-tacular

I cannot imagine why anyone would think that the U.S. will refuse to take “yes” for an answer from Iran RE: its nuclear program.

From the ” _WP_:”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/10/AR2007021001275_2.html

bq. Later this month, the U.N. Security Council will convene to judge Iranian compliance with a unanimous December resolution giving the nation until Feb. 21 to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activities. Anticipating a negative finding, the administration is readying a new resolution to increase Iran’s isolation. Among other measures, officials are considering charging Iran with violating U.N. resolutions that prohibit member countries from harboring or assisting known terrorists. Tehran has refused to hand over a number of senior al-Qaeda operatives it has claimed to be holding under “house arrest” for years.

The article also points out that

bq. Some senior administration officials still relish the notion of a direct confrontation. One ambassador in Washington said he was taken aback when John Hannah, Vice President Cheney’s national security adviser, said during a recent meeting that the administration considers 2007 “the year of Iran” and indicated that a U.S. attack was a real possibility. Hannah declined to be interviewed for this article.

Which makes this paragraph even funnier:

bq. “I don’t know how many times the president, Secretary Rice and I have had to repeat that we have no intention of attacking Iran,” an exasperated Gates told reporters at a NATO meeting in Spain.

Keep at it, Bob. We’ll tell you when to stop.

Rice/Iran Update

_Newsweek_ ran “this article”:http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17050142/site/newsweek/ a few days ago which confirms, and provides additional, details about” Rice’s silliness”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1346/rice-what-iran-proposal RE: Iran’s spring 2003 proposal to the United States.

Hereafter, the relevant portions:

Asked about her comments later by NEWSWEEK, [Flynt] Leverett shot back: “If I had been in such a position I certainly would have done that. The two people who were in that position then were Elliott Abrams and Zal Khalilzad.” A spokeswoman for Abrams, who is currently the deputy national-security adviser for democracy promotion—but was then in charge of Mideast affairs—told NEWSWEEK on Thursday: “He has absolutely no recollection of getting any sort of fax at all.” (Khalilzad, soon to be the next ambassador to the U.N., was traveling abroad as special envoy to Afghanistan at the time, and is unlikely to have been in Washington when the fax came through.)

Such a proposal did find its way to the State Department in 2003, via Swiss ambassador Tim Guldimann. But a lot of questions remain about its origins and importance. Iranian officials insist that the document began as a U.S. trial balloon, possibly developed out of the office of former deputy secretary of State Armitage. But Armitage, in an interview this week, said he had nothing to do with creating the document and saw it for the first time as an Iranian fax. At the time, Armitage said, he thought it might have represented some creative diplomacy by Guldimann (who would not comment on the proposal to NEWSWEEK). “We couldn’t determine what was the Iranians’ and what was the Swiss ambassador’s,” Armitage said. His impression at the time was that the Iranians “were trying to put too much on the table,” Armitage added.

One small gripe I have is with _Newsweek’s_ claim to have “obtained” a copy of Iran’s proposal. To me, that implies (though does not say) that that info is some sort of _Newsweek_ exclusive. The document has been available “on the internets”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1083/irans-march-2003-offer for a while now.

*Update:*

Steve Clemmons has “this”:http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/001935.php to add:

bq. Leverett has reported to this blogger that about 90% of what is available on the internet and in the press about the “content” of the Iran proposal is correct — but there is another 10% that has not been disclosed and that is critical to understanding the seriousness and consequential nature of what Iran put forward.

_Thanks to SLK for the tip._

Feith OSD Update

!/images/8.jpg!

The DoD released a “summary”:http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/DODIG_execsummary_020907.pdf of the report. Essentially, it says that Feith and Co. did shit that they should not have done, but it wasn’t illegal. OSD’s response can be found “here.”:http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/news/nation/16656258.htm?source=rss&channel=krwashington_nation [Via “Spencer Ackerman”:http://www.tpmmuckraker.com/archives/002518.php ]

For more, read these articles from the “_WP_”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/08/AR2007020802387_pf.html and the “_NYT_.”:http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/10/washington/10feith.html?_r=1&oref=login Ackerman also has “some details”:http://www.tpmmuckraker.com/archives/002530.php about the SSCI’s investigation.

Given that one of the “slides”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/368/clowns-on-parade from their “Iraq is friends with al Qaeda” briefing is a poster child for Teh Stupid, the fact that “some of these same geniuses”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1209/npr-on-iran-intel are apparently doing what looks like “comparable work on Iran”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/09/AR2007020902294.html ought to make everyone feel, like, really great and stuff.

Original post is “here,”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1347/d-feith-twofer BTW.

[ “Apologies to”:http://lefarkins.blogspot.com/2006/07/teh-stupid-make-it-stop.html LGM. ]

D Feith TwoFer

File this under “gossip,” but it’s entertaining.

From “Juan Cole:”:http://www.juancole.com/2007/02/3-month-record-for-us-troops-killed.html

State Dept. Official: “Doug, after the smoke clears, what is the plan?”

Feith: “Think of Iraq as being like a computer. And think of Saddam as like a processor. We just take out the old processor, and put in a new one–Chalabi.”

State Dept. Official: “Put in a new processor?”

Feith: “Yes! It will all be over in 6 weeks.”

State Dept. Official: “You mean six months.”

Feith: “No, six weeks. You’ll see.”

State Dept. Official: “Doug.”

Feith: “Yes?”

State Dept. Official: “You’re smoking crack, Doug.”

Feith: “Oh, so you’re disloyal to the President, are you?”

[Via “The Iron Mouth”:http://ironmouth.com/PermaLink,guid,b2203970-0496-4e6d-b1c7-58abe35cdf1a.aspx ]

More importantly, Larisa Alexandrovna of Rawstory “reports”:http://www.rawstory.com/news/2007/Pentagon_Inspector_General_to_release_investigation_0207.html that the Pentagon Inspector General might finally finish its report RE: the intel shop that Feith ran in OSD. That matters because the relevant portion of the SSCI’s investigation of the Iraq intel fiasco has been delayed by the IG’s investigation.

She writes:

bq. According to sources close to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the classified version of the Pentagon IG’s report will be released to committee members Friday. Two to three declassified pages may also be concurrently released to the public.

*Update:*

My apologies to any crack users offended by this post.

Rice: What Iran Proposal?

Glenn Kessler “this morning”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/07/AR2007020702408.html reported that, during a hearing yesterday, SecState Rice claimed to have never seen “this 2003 proposal”:http://www.armscontrol.org/pdf/2003_Spring_Iran_Proposal.pdf from Iran.

According to the _Post_:

bq. “I have read about this so-called proposal from Iran,” Rice told the House Foreign Affairs Committee yesterday, referring to reports in The Washington Post and other publications last year. “We had people who said, ‘The Iranians want to talk to you,’ lots of people who said, ‘The Iranians want to talk to you.’ But I think I would have noticed if the Iranians had said, ‘We’re ready to recognize Israel.’ . . . I just don’t remember ever seeing any such thing.”

If anyone at State wants to refresh her memory, they can check the proposal out “here”:http://www.armscontrol.org/pdf/2003_Spring_Iran_Proposal.pdf. Subsequent Iranian proposals related to their nuclear program and other issues can be found “here.”:http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals.asp

Anyway, the _Post_ article gives some details about the State/NSC sausage factory:

Rice dismissed yesterday the earlier comments of [former NSC official Flynt] Leverett.

“First of all, I don’t know what Flynt Leverett’s talking about, quite frankly,” she said. “Maybe I should ask him when he came to me and said, ‘We have a proposal from Iran and we really ought to take it.’ ”

Leverett said yesterday that he became aware of the two-page offer, which came over a fax machine at the State Department, in his waning days in the U.S. government as a senior director at the National Security Council, but that it was not his responsibility to put it on Rice’s desk because Rice had placed Elliott Abrams in charge of Middle East policy. “If he did not put it on her desk, that says volumes about how she handled the issue,” he said yesterday.

Abrams is currently the deputy national security adviser in charge of the Middle East and democracy promotion. An NSC spokeswoman, speaking on behalf of Abrams, said yesterday that Abrams “has no memory of any such fax and never saw or heard of any such thing.”

Former State Department officials have said that they saw the Iranian offer and used it as a key element in a 2003 memo to then-Secretary of State Colin L. Powell proposing that the United States pursue a “grand bargain” with Iran. The Iranian offer was attached to the memo, but Powell did not forward the memo to the White House, officials said.

Kessler also did some more homework:

bq. Last June, Rice appeared to confirm, in an interview with National Public Radio, that the White House had received the memo. “What the Iranians wanted earlier was to be one-on-one with the United States so that this could be about the United States and Iran,” Rice said. State Department officials at that time did not dissuade reporters from interpreting her comments as referring to the 2003 fax.

Here is the “relevant portion”:http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/67391.htm of that interview:

QUESTION: Some officials who work with you at the White House and at the State Department said that the U.S. missed an opportunity in 2003, that Iran came to the U.S., wanted to talk, and the U.S. rejected that. And that was a period when the U.S. was stronger. It appears that the U.S. is coming to this in a much weaker position. Aren’t you?

SECRETARY RICE: Oh, I think coming to the table with the entire international community united around a particular course is a pretty strong position to be in. What people wanted, what the Iranians wanted earlier, was to be one-on-one with the United States so that this could be about the United States and Iran. Now it is Iran the international community, and Iran has to answer to the international community. I think that’s the strongest possible position to be in.

Not a denial.

More On J Rood

Jeffrey’s “take is way better”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1385/poor-mans-bob-joseph, though I disagree with his policy suggestion, which is to make the administration comply fully with certain sections of the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act:

bq. That’s the deal. Either the country gets a North Korea Policy Coordinator and a report on the Administration’s strategery in Iran, or Rood stays as Assistant Secretary.

I’d like to hope that Biden would “hold out for a lot more”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1343/j-rood-to-replace-b-joseph. Compliance with a law is hardly a concession.

And, as much as I hate correcting Jeffrey, I think he names the wrong sections of the NDAA. According to Thomas, “H.R.5122…became Public Law 109-364 on 10/17/2006.”

According to the text of HR 5122, the relevant sections are 1211 and 1213. Jeffrey named sections 1214 and 1216.

This doesn’t change the substance of his argument at all, but it’s important for understanding the relevant portion of Bush’s “signing statement”:http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061017-9.html from this past October:

A number of provisions in the Act call for the executive branch to furnish information to the Congress or other entities on various subjects. These provisions include sections 219, 313, 360, *1211,* 1212, *1213*, 1227, 1402, and 3116 of the Act, section 427 of title 10, United States Code, as amended by section 932 of the Act, and section 1093 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375) as amended by section 1061 of the Act. The executive branch shall construe such provisions in a manner consistent with the President’s constitutional authority to withhold information the disclosure of which could impair foreign relations, the national security, the deliberative processes of the Executive, or the performance of the Executive’s constitutional duties.

*snip*

The executive branch shall construe section *1211*, which purports to require the executive branch to undertake certain consultations with foreign governments and follow certain steps in formulating and executing U.S. foreign policy, in a manner consistent with the President’s constitutional authorities to conduct the Nation’s foreign affairs and to supervise the unitary executive branch.

Adult supervision (of the administration, not Jeffrey) is truly needed…

J Rood To Replace B Joseph

The White House “announced it”:http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/02/20070202-8.html yesterday:

bq. The President intends to nominate John C. Rood, of Arizona, to be Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security at the Department of State. Mr. Rood currently serves as Assistant Secretary (International Security and Non-Proliferation) at the Department of State. Prior to this, he served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Counterproliferation Strategy at the National Security Council.

I cannot imagine why they would have released this information on a Friday.

Anyway, a source in Congress told me that Rood may be waiting a while for his promotion:

bq. Senator Biden took the unusual step of opposing Rood’s nomination last year when he was up for the ISN gig. Now that he is Chairman, it will be interesting to see if he decides to have some fun here. My sense is that Rood will be waiting for a long time for his
confirmation hearing, and that Biden will try to extract some type
of policy concession from the Administration.

Back to it…

Vertical WonKerr Ego Proliferation

I recently found myself thinking about the following two _ACT_ excerpts while speaking to some colleagues about Iran.

The first is called “How Long Until an Iranian Bomb?” It’s from an October article and can be found “here.”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_10/IAEAIranIntel.asp

In the interview, Negroponte reiterated U.S. estimates that Tehran will have the “capability” to produce a nuclear weapon “five to 10 years from now,” unless circumstances change. A Department of National Intelligence spokesperson said that the intelligence community is evaluating this assessment as part of its work on a new National Intelligence Estimate, Newsweek reported Sept. 25.

By contrast, Israeli government estimates suggest that Iran could master the enrichment process within six to 12 months and produce enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a nuclear weapon in as little as three years, according to a knowledgeable Western official.

Asked about differences between the two government’s estimates, Negroponte said that both countries “basically operate from the same knowledge base” but that Israel will “sometimes…give you the worst-case assessment.”

Some U.S. officials have also argued for less-optimistic timelines. For example, Bolton said that the international community should not “assume that the intelligence estimates that put [ Tehran’s ability to acquire nuclear weapons] off for many years are necessarily going to be right.”

Additionally, Joseph told the House International Relations Committee in March that several “wildcards,” including potential assistance from foreign entities, could “accelerate” the intelligence community’s notional timeline.

The “second excerpt,”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_06/IranDirectTalks.asp is from the June issue and called “Getting to Yes?”

The first part discusses Iran’s positions RE: a possible solution to the controversy over its enrichment program. But the part below describes a couple of expert opinions RE: Tehran’s nuclear intentions:

Iranian officials, however, have said that Iran would accept limits on the number of centrifuges in its pilot facility. For example, the Iranian diplomat indicated that Tehran would have been willing in March to limit the number of centrifuges to between 164 and 500. A former European diplomat who maintains contact with Iranian officials said in a May 22 interview that, according to an Iranian official “directly involved” in the matter, Khamenei agreed in the spring of 2005 that Iran would accept a limit of 164 centrifuges.

Iran is currently operating a 164-centrifuge cascade in its pilot facility and is building two others.

But Gary Samore, a former Clinton administration National Security Council aide who maintains contact with Tehran, told Arms Control Today May 17 that Iran is determined to have an industrial-scale enrichment capability and does not want a constraint on its enrichment facilities. According to Samore, Iranian officials say privately that they want to have a “breakout capability” for developing nuclear weapons. Interestingly, the Iranian diplomat who spoke with Arms Control Today also suggested that there are some officials in Tehran who may want Iran to have a nuclear weapons option.

A former senior intelligence official offered another view. Former National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia Paul Pillar told Arms Control Today May 22 that, in his judgment, Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program but is not on an “irreversible course.” Pillar cautioned that such assessments are only judgments, noting that U.S. intelligence about Iran’s nuclear programs is limited.

Because this blog is obvoiusly all about me.

Have a good weekend.