The Majlis approved the “bill”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1313/update-majlis-v-iaea, “IRNA reports:”:http://www.irna.ir/en/news/view/line-24/0612274790134716.htm

The Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis) on Wednesday ratified a double-urgency bill urging the government to speed up Iran’s peaceful nuclear activities and make a revision in the country’s cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to meet interests of the nation.

The bill on “urging the government to revise cooperation with the IAEA” was approved by MPs during the open session of the Majlis.

Still unclear what this means. But apparently the SNSC will be in charge. According to “another IRNA report:”:http://www.irna.ir/en/news/view/menu-234/0612271099174543.htm

Secretary of Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Ali Larijani on Wednesday declared the formation of a special committee to examine various dimensions of government’s plan to revise its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

He made the remark while speaking to reporters on the sidelines of his meeting with Iraqi Minister of Economy and Finance Bayan Jabr.

Larijani said that the committee will work under the supervision of the SNSC, adding that officials in charge of the relevant affairs will be members of the committee.

“Following the ratification of a draft-bill on revision of Iran-IAEA relations by Majlis, based on which the government is required to expedite the country’s nuclear program for peaceful purposes, the SNSC appointed a committee to conduct the necessary studies on making appropriate decisions in accordance with the current conditions,” said Larijani.

Maybe this won’t be so bad, but it still strikes me as gratuitous.

ISNA “reports”:http://www.isna.ir/main/Default.aspx?Lang=E that the Majlis bill requiring Iran to revise its cooperation with the IAEA “is under close study in the parliament behind closed doors.”

The bill, which I “blogged about”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1312/iran-majlis-vs-iaea yesterday, may not be quite as bad as I feared. According to “this report”:http://www.irna.com/en/news/view/menu-234/0612265841161858.htm from IRNA, the bill seems to give Tehran a lot of discretion when it comes to “revising” the government’s cooperation with the IAEA. Not good, but better than halting cooperation with the agency altogether.

Says IRNA:

Majlis passed a double-urgency bill to oblige the government to revise its cooperation with the IAEA, he [Head of Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy Commission Alaeddin Boroujerdi] said.

The double-urgency bill which authorizes the government to revise its relations with IAEA is like a *blank check* which allows the government to meet the country’s national interests by any means.

Revising cooperation with IAEA means that the government is allowed to take any necessary action to safeguard the country’s national interests, he underlined.

On probable withdrawal of Iran from Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), he said such a plan is not on the agenda for the time being although a number of Majlis representatives have called for it.

[emphasis mine]

Another “report”:http://www.isna.ir/main/NewsView.aspx?ID=News-851628&Lang=E from ISNA _suggests_ that Tehran would like the Majlis to take it easy:

Iran’s atomic energy international affairs deputy stated that although Iran’s parliament was displeased of the approved UN Security Council resolution, it would show a logical reaction.

Mohammad Saiedi while giving news that today a logical proposal regarding the revise of cooperation between the government and the IAEA had been forwarded, noted that he hoped tomorrow the parliament would approve a rational bill which in addition to supplying national interests would ease the nuclear progress path.

When asked if Iran was considering leaving the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Saeidi answered that this issue was not seriously taken by the majority in the parliament.

“The Parliament has no interest in moving towards this issue, but a logical reaction will be taken,” he said, while nothing that the government had also not considered this issue as one of the possible options.

Unclear how serious “this is”:http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/12/24/iran.parliament/index.html but it might not be good:

bq. Iran’s parliament passed an urgent measure Sunday that stipulates its members must decide within the next 48 hours whether to continue its membership in the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog agency the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Iran did this after the UNSC adopted “Resolution 1737.”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1311/resolution-1737-text Here’s part of a “relevant story”:http://www.irna.com/en/news/view/line-24/0612242656161014.htm from IRNA:

A number of Iranian MPs introduced a double-urgency motion to Majlis on Sunday calling for suspension of the UN nuclear watchdog’s inspection of Iranian nuclear sites following the approval of an anti-Iran resolution by the United Nations Security Council.

A member of the Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy Commission Heshmatollah Falahat-Pisheh told IRNA on the sidelines of a Majlis open session Sunday that the motion did not indicate Iran’s withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. “There is no need so far, to quit the NPT,” Falahat-Pisheh said.
Reacting to the approval of the UNSC resolution for imposing sanctions against Iran, the MP said that adoption of the resolution “was a politically-motivated act and part of a psychological warfare against Iran.

“Iran’s nuclear program has been under sanctions since 1990,” Falahat-Pisheh said adding, “This resolution has only legitimized previous sanctions for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).”

More “here:”:http://www.irna.com/en/news/view/line-24/0612244222170750.htm

bq. “Iran has exercised full cooperation with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and that the UN agency has carried out over 2,000 person/hour inspection on Iranian nuclear sites. So, under the current circumstances which the Security Council passed resolution against Iran, it is not logical to continue cooperation with the agency,” head of Parliamentary Commission for National Security and Foreign Policy Alaeddin Boroujerdi said ahead of voting for a bill to review Iranian interaction with the UN nuclear agency.

Also, the “Majlis speaker spoke about the matter yesterday:”:http://www.irna.com/en/news/view/line-24/0612236416174745.htm

Majlis Speaker Gholam Ali Haddad Adel said here Saturday that if pressures on Iran continues and the UNSC passes any resolution or adopt any other policy except continued negotiations, Majlis would revise its relations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

[snip]

The Majlis Foreign Policy and National Security Commission has ratified a bill authorizing Tehran to revise its relations with IAEA in case of any pressure, he said, adding that if they put pressure on Iran, the bill will be debated in Majlis.

I’m not sure that “revising cooperation” with the IAEA is the same as withdrawing from it, but it’s still a really bad idea. The Iranians should remember what happened when the inspectors left Iraq and the resulting information vacuum filled with horseshit. That was one issue I briefly discussed in “this piece”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_10/IAEAIranIntel.asp a couple months back:

White cautioned that the information vacuum could cause analysts to underestimate capabilities, noting that this had happened in the case of Iraq prior to the 1991 Persian Gulf War. By the same token, however, he agreed that the IAEA’s restricted ability to investigate Tehran’s nuclear program could also allow unsubstantiated reports of clandestine Iranian nuclear activities to go unchallenged and influence perceptions that the country is pursuing nuclear weapons.

The departure of UN weapons inspectors from Iraq in 1998 deprived the international community of a critical tool for verifying what later proved to be inaccurate human and technical intelligence reports that Iraq was pursuing a nuclear weapons program. A European diplomat interviewed Sept. 25 argued, however, that the international community had learned a lesson from the Iraq intelligence debacle, describing the ongoing process of evaluating intelligence on Iran’s nuclear program as “rigorous and conservative.”

As was the case prior to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, policymakers have responded differently to the ambiguity surrounding the potential Iranian nuclear threat, with some arguing for caution and others suggesting more vigorous action.

[Insert witty punch line.]

Here are some of the most important parts of Resolution 1737, which the UNSC adopted today. The whole thing can be found “here.”:http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2006/sc8928.doc.htm

Essentially, the resolution reiterates the council’s call on Iran to suspend its enrichment program. But it also adds (if memory serves) a new requirement that Tehran suspend

bq. work on all heavy water-related projects, including the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water…

Here’s the part that talks about the items countries aren’t supposed to send to Iran. The resolution (unlike a “previous draft”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_11/IranIgnores.asp) does not explicitly mention the Bushehr project, but it does appear to exempt it from other sanctions related to nuclear items.

“3. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to Iran’s enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, namely:

(a) those set out in sections B.2, B.3, B.4, B.5, B.6 and B.7 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1 in document S/2006/814;

(b) those set out in sections A.1 and B.1 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1 in document S/2006/814, except the supply, sale or transfer of:

(i) equipment covered by B.1 when such equipment is for light water reactors;
(ii) low-enriched uranium covered by A.1.2 when it is incorporated in assembled nuclear fuel elements for such reactors;

(c) those set out in document S/2006/815, except the supply, sale or transfer of items covered by 19.A.3 of Category II;

(d) any additional items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, determined as necessary by the Security Council or the Committee established by paragraph 18 below (herein “the Committee”), which could contribute to enrichment-related, or reprocessing, or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

“4. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of the following items, materials, equipment, goods and technology:

(a) those set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part2 of document S/2006/814 if the State determines that they would contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities;

(b) any other items not listed in documents S/2006/814 or S/2006/815 if the State determines that they would contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

(c) any further items if the State determines that they would contribute to the pursuit of activities related to other topics about which the IAEA has expressed concerns or identified as outstanding;

“5. Decides that, for the supply, sale or transfer of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology covered by documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/815 the export of which to Iran is not prohibited by subparagraphs 3 (b), 3 (c) or 4 (a) above, States shall ensure that:

(a) the requirements, as appropriate, of the Guidelines as set out in documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/985 have been met; and

(b) they have obtained and are in a position to exercise effectively a right to verify the end-use and end-use location of any supplied item; and

(c) they notify the Committee within ten days of the supply, sale or transfer; and

(d) in the case of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology contained in document S/2006/814, they also notify the IAEA within ten days of the supply, sale or transfer;

The documents listing the controlled items can be found “here”:http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1718/1718SelEng.htm. Note the similarity to the NSG lists, the MTCR Annex, -and the Australia Group lists.-

There are also some exemptions to the sanctions:

“9. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 above shall not apply where the Committee determines in advance and on a case-by-case basis that such supply, sale, transfer or provision of such items or assistance would clearly not contribute to the development of Iran’s technologies in support of its proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and of development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including where such items or assistance are for food, agricultural, medical or other humanitarian purposes, provided that:

(a) contracts for delivery of such items or assistance include appropriate end-user guarantees; and

(b) Iran has committed not to use such items in proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

The resolution also contains restrictions on Iranian financial transactions.

And here’s what the IAEA is supposed to do:

bq. …Iran shall provide such access and cooperation as the IAEA requests to be able to verify the suspension outlined in paragraph 2 and to resolve all outstanding issues, as identified in IAEA reports, and calls upon Iran to ratify promptly the Additional Protocol;

It’s worth noting that there are also restrictions on IAEA TC with Iran:

bq. …technical cooperation provided to Iran by the IAEA or under its auspices shall only be for food, agricultural, medical, safety or other humanitarian purposes, or where it is necessary for projects directly related to the items specified in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) above, but that no such technical cooperation shall be provided that relates to the proliferation sensitive nuclear activities set out in paragraph 2 above;

The IAEA DG also has to issue a report within 60 days

bq. a report…on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in this resolution, as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the other provisions of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration

Here are the reportedly-controversial travel restrictions:

“10. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and decides in this regard that all States shall notify the Committee of the entry into or transit through their territories of the persons designated in the Annex to this resolution (herein “the Annex”), as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, except where such travel is for activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) above;

“11. Underlines that nothing in the above paragraph requires a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory, and that all States shall, in the implementation of the above paragraph, take into account humanitarian considerations as well as the necessity to meet the objectives of this resolution, including where Article XV of the IAEA Statute is engaged;

The resolution also establishes a committee (similar to one established by UNSCR 1718) that is charged with a few tasks:

(a) to seek from all States, in particular those in the region and those producing the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, information regarding the actions taken by them to implement effectively the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 of this resolution and whatever further information it may consider useful in this regard;

(b) to seek from the secretariat of the IAEA information regarding the actions taken by the IAEA to implement effectively the measures imposed by paragraph 17 of this resolution and whatever further information it may consider useful in this regard;

(c) to examine and take appropriate action on information regarding alleged violations of measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 of this resolution;

(d) to consider and decide upon requests for exemptions set out in paragraphs 9, 13 and 15 above;

(e) to determine as may be necessary additional items, materials, equipment, goods and technology to be specified for the purpose of paragraph 3 above;

(f) to designate as may be necessary additional individuals and entities subject to the measures imposed by paragraphs 10 and 12 above;

(g) to promulgate guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the measures imposed by this resolution and include in such guidelines a requirement on States to provide information where possible as to why any individuals and/or entities meet the criteria set out in paragraphs 10 and 12 and any relevant identifying information;

(h) to report at least every 90 days to the Security Council on its work and on the implementation of this resolution, with its observations and recommendations, in particular on ways to strengthen the effectiveness of the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 above;

The resolution also includes an Annex which includes a list of entities and people involved in Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

Happy Holidays.

*Update:*

The resolution does _not_ regulate items on the Australia Group lists. My bad.

Jeffrey “here”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1330/more-on-the-leverett-redactions and “here”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1329/leverett-stuff.

Michael Roston and Ron Brynaert “here”:http://www.rawstory.com/news/2006/The_redacted_Iran_oped_revealed_1222.html.

Anyone who is interested in seeing the texts of Iran’s March 2003 proposal, as well as some other Iranian proposals, should check “this out”:http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals.asp.

Not to beat this horse too much, but the New America Foundation has an audio “link”:http://www.newamerica.net/files/naf121806a.mp3 to an event they did yesterday which featured Flynt Leverett.

Here’s an update to “this post”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1305/flynt-leverett-and-the-nsc…

Earlier today, T-Snow “discussed”:http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/12/20061218-6.html F. Leverett’s allegations RE: his _NYT_ op-ed:

Q Flynt Leverrett, a former NSC official, Mideast expert, also worked in the CIA, has charged that the administration has blocked publication of an op-ed he wrote in The New York Times simply because it’s critical of the administration’s Iran policy.

MR. SNOW: I doubt that. Flynt has been plenty critical and plenty public in the past. I don’t know —

Q And he says that it’s now being blocked because he’s become increasingly critical at a time when it’s politically important for the White House to have public support for its foreign policy.

MR. SNOW: I sincerely doubt that, but I’ll try to find out. I don’t know anything about it, except, come on, it’s not like Flynt has not been out publicly on a number of occasions questioning the administration.

Q But he says the CIA has cleared this particular piece and the White House has blocked it. So my question is —

MR. SNOW: The White House is not blocking his writings.

Q There is no effort to use national security claims to falsely silence critics?

MR. SNOW: We don’t falsely silence critics on national security claims. Now, if there’s a legitimate national security claim, I’m sure that that will be made. Let me — rather than chasing around, I don’t know anything about this, so I’ll find out. And you can call me —