In intelligence analysis, certain inferences may be permitted that could not serve as the basis of a criminal conviction in most Western countries. But this time around, shouldn’t the court case be closer to a “slam dunk” than the intel finding?

Putting on an intelligence hat for a moment, the equipment sought by the Iranian buyers raises some pretty serious questions. Were the Iranians moving ahead on certain types of weaponization work in 2007? Were they stockpiling equipment for that purpose at a later date? Or were the transactions unrelated to any of this? To use an Anglo-American idiom, the jury’s still out on that one.

Whether the defendant violated German law is a different question. Certainly, the refusal of the lower court to hear an export-control violation case partly because of uncertainty about the intentions of the purchaser seems a little strange, and in that respect, the decision of the appeals court seems like simple common sense. That the court’s ruling basically puts Iran’s acquisition patterns on trial will hopefully make for some interesting headlines to come.

Then there is the question of the BND reports, which is what the Schirra op-ed was really all about. We have only a veiled glimpse of what’s in them. So here is a cautionary note of my own: these reports come from the people who brought you Curveball. Don’t say I never warned you.