Thanks for reminding me of John Steinbruner’s 2001 paper on Joint Missile Surveillance. How remarkable it is to find ourselves back at the start again.

I share John’s judgment that JDEC, as conceived of in the MOU of 2000, is not adequate to give the Russian side much added assurance against U.S. attack. In a crisis, the U.S. might well stop supplying its warning information, completely or selectively, perhaps without mentioning this to the Russian side. (Let’s leave aside the “bolt from the blue.”)

Jointly operated sensors, like the forlorn RAMOS concept, or John’s “more venturesome” idea of returning to the joint defensive concepts of the early 1990s, would be another matter. But we are a long, long way from the sort of relationship that could support these ideas.

As you correctly stated in your blog, I see the operational value of JDEC as mainly related to third-party interactions. Apart from that, there is also some potential for trust-building. More ambitious goals will have to wait.

I have some thoughts on this post and about JDEC over on the Lowy Institute’s blog, The Interpreter:

http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2009/07/09/Obama-on-BMD.aspx