That quote really sums up so much of the poor analytical reasoning that takes place among so-called “experts.” You’d think they never heard of confirmation bias – well maybe they actually haven’t, who knows.

Of course the problem with assuming the worst based on contradictory or insufficient evidence, as Golfarb suggests, creates a nice feedback loop that ensures preconceived bias is enforced, particularly when evidence that supports the worst-case is emphasized. Why bother with evidence at all in such a case since the “analytical” conclusion is pretty much pre-determined?

PS: How do I to work in these comments?

What does not fit is the information from a ‘European defense official’ speculating that Iran could do an underground test as early as year end. The best public information indicates Iran has no stockpile of weapons grade uranium or plutonium at this time nor the ability to quickly make enough for even one bomb test. Thus the only other explanation is he believes the Norks have struck some kind of grand bargain with Iran and have transferred at least 8Kg, if not more, of their plutonium stock. Given the current estimates (prior to the failed test) were that NK had only 20-50Kg of bomb grade material, we find this idea a stretch. Any transfer of this kind would be of a functional warhead – neither side would wish to waste the small amount available on an indigenous Iranian design. Lastly, the Nork plutonium is inferior and believed to have high quantities of Pu240 making it a risky and less desirable source.

I hate to be a negative Nancy here, but it seems like assuming the worst about Saddam Hussein back in 2003 didn’t really lead the U.S. to an ‘optimal’ policy choice…