The precceding article on this blog is a fine example of such “research”.

And what makes you think China and Pak are not colluding as is, despite the fervent hope of many NPA advocates (alas, if wishes were reality!) that China is abiding, lock, stock and barrel by its NPT obligations?
India finally went NWS in 1998, when it became clear to the Indian strategic community that Pak had operationalized its Ns and tested a missile which was able to hit the hitherto protected Indian south. Prior to that, way back from the 80’s, Indian newspapers were hollering about the Khan proliferation network and its ties to Beijing and Pyongyang. All too predictably, they were written off as Indian scaremongering with condescending quips about- “oh those Indians and their loathing for the poor Pakistanis” and the like. Of course, come issues of Khans collusion with folks to target the west after 9/11, and the tune changed rather predictably. Now it was evil Khan and the threat to peace (sic.). Face it, as far as the treatment of India has been concerned, there has been a fair amount of hypocrisy (yes, the H word), when it comes to NPA advocates. I am not being polemical- merely pointing out the facts. If India were proliferating to NK or Iran or Libya, then I would seriously consider statements on India being a proliferation hazard. But the facts are that it hasnt, nor has it been pursuing terror as an instrument of state policy (a la’ the Pak. ISI in India and Afghanistan), with its nuclear “muscle” as some sort of negotiating point, each time its antics become too odious to be ignored.
Now Messrs. Albright and co can come up with all the specious excuses they want to paint India as the big bad wolf of proliferation (including that rather ridiculous bit on publically available tender documents earlier being a scoop. Daniel Craig, move over!), but the reality is that the NPA group appears to have little to no issues in dealing with a totalitarian state that has constantly mocked the NPT, in terms of its actions via arming Pak. in order to contain its Asian rival, and then watched as that latter country became the centerpiece of a global walmart for N tech.. All this continued till the events of 9/11 drew sharp attention to security issues facing the west, but sorry- India has been facing all that for donkeys years (please google for the Mumbai blasts) and has to take certain steps to safeguard its security. Its pretty straight forward. India wanted a gas deal with Iran for energy security- the US had New Delhi vote against Iran at the UN for this N deal and scupper it. Now the N deal constitutes a “proliferation hazard”. Ok, so what is India supposed to do now? Oh wait, we’ll strike deals with Iran again and give them billions for oil and gas (because we must) and of course, that means more Kornets and Metis-M ATGMs for use by Hezbollah. Isnt the world such a nice place? OTOH, please do continue asking a secular democracy to not pursue assured energy supply for its gorwing economy and then wonder, dang- what if all those poor people whose aspirations the GOI has not been able to meet, what if they become a source of regional inStability? Cant get any worse than the current set-up, right with another 300 Million anti-western extremists?
Please do think- you cant have your cake and eat it too. With or without the US, India is on its way to power status- with this deal, at least a sort of alliance shall emerge which will ensure that the US has some stake in India’s path and the choices it makes and that there is indeed a reasonably democratic state amongst a plethora of failed ones in the region.

But techno-geekism aside, I find it hard to think of India as a “threat”, either of agression or proliferating to other countries. The problem with turning a blind eye to India’s nuclear program is one of inconsistency (and, arguably, hypocrisy) when one has to deal with other countries which one really, really does not want to have the bomb.

You are correct in pointing out to me that the US-India deal is about “diversifying India’s energy resources.” The point is that the deal could potentially free up India’s resources used to produce nuclear weapons. Surely one would want to factor this in to their assesment as to whether or not the deal is worth it.

And precisely what does “Cleaning up the terrosist cesspools in Pakistan is a separate long term task that will involve most NATO countries as a result of Afghanistan.” mean? Pakistan’s security is viewed in the context of both the domestic (an Islamist coup) and the existential (India’s nuclear arsenal). Anything that increases the threat of the second is likely to figure prominently in the reconfiguration of Pakistan’s security posture; and if the past is any guide, it is likely to do so while having its own domestic reverberations.

Finally, I would hope that one could think of better ways to “clean up terrorist cesspools in Pakistan” without the assistance of NATO. Pakistan won’t even allow U.S. troops on its soil so I wouldn’t be holding my breath on the boys from Brussels touching down anytime soon.

You are making a leap of imagination. The US-India deal is about diversifying India’s energy sources.

Cleaning up the terrosist cesspools in Pakistan is a separate long term task that will involve most NATO countries as a result of Afghanistan.

Thanks for the comment. Sorry I don’t have time for a longer response, but here are a few points.

—Agreed that the biggest problem with the deal is the bad signal it sends.

—It seems that the study I cited, the Tellis pieces, and India’s long-running thorium project all indicate that there is a tradeoff between India’s military and civilian nuclear programs in a world where New Delhi decides to pursue its energy program on a large scale. I’m not sure that’s inconsistent with your comment – India could probably keep producing plutonium for a while if it neglected the civilian program. I’d be interested to see the presentation that you referred to.

—I think it’s reasonable to argue that, due to the point above, that the deal could very well violate Article I of the NPT. As for the title, I was engaging in a bit of hyperbole, but I think the deal is pretty damaging to the NPT precisely because it rewards India for not signing the NPT.

I wonder if they will cry “hypocrisy” when Pakistan and China collude to protect Pakistan’s “security”?

I think the nonproliferation downsides of this deal lie elsewhere—in essence, in sending a message to others that may be considering nuclear weapons (such as Iran) that, after some period of sanctions and resistance, the West may possibly acquiesce (whether or not that would happen, my Iranian colleagues tell me that argument is being raised in Tehran); and sending a broader message about the limited benefits of membership in the regime, if states outside of the regime can get similar benefits.

I think describing the deal as “NPT Wreckage” is going WAY too far. After all, the United States had civilian nuclear cooperation with India, which was outside the NPT, when the NPT was negotiated. There is no prohibition in the NPT on nuclear cooperation with states outside the treaty.

While this is certainly good for India (assuming that this doesn’t lead to China and Pakistan enlarging their arsenals), I challenge the ardent proponents to explain how promoting enlarging India’s (or anyone’s) nuclear arsenal is any good for the rest of the world.