India , however, is rankled by Washington’s public linking of PSI with negotiations on a U.S.-Indian civil nuclear cooperation pact. China, as well as India and Indonesia, has expressed concerns about the legality of PSI, but U.S. officials have described Beijing as helpful on interdictions. Indonesian Minister of Defense Yuwono Sudarsono wrote June 13 in The Jakarta Post that the country’s leadership is weighing “partial and ad hoc adherence to the PSI on a case by case basis.”

“U.N. Nuclear Watchdog Chides Egypt
15 February 2005
The New York Times
Late Edition – Final
9
English

VIENNA, Feb. 14 (Reuters)—The United Nations’ nuclear
monitoring agency chided Egypt in a confidential
report on Monday for failing to declare nuclear sites
and materials but said its inspections had so far
found no evidence that Egypt was seeking nuclear
weapons.

The International Atomic Energy Agency said in the
report that Egypt had not understood that it had to
declare some nuclear sites and materials, including a
plant for separating plutonium, which can be used in
an atomic weapon…”

“Pakistan has given the Reagan
Administration ‘’absolute assurances’’ that it is
neither developing nor planning to develop nuclear
weapons, Under Secretary of State James L. Buckley
said today.

‘’I was assured by the ministers and by the President
himself that it was not the intention of the Pakistan
Government to develop nuclear weapons,’’ he told a
Senate Government Affairs subcommittee.

Mr. Buckley added that Pakistan, which has not signed
a 1968 treaty to curb the spread of nuclear weapons
technology, had made no promise not to seek a
weapons-making ability or nuclear explosions such as
one by India in 1974.

‘’One has to make a distinction between the nuclear
option and nuclear weapon,’’ he told the Senate panel.

Mr. Buckley’s testimony was in the context of the
United States’ policy on the nuclear spread, now under
review. At the end of a visit Mr. Buckley made to
Pakistan earlier this month, the two sides announced a
$3 billion aid package, including the supply of
advanced F-16 fighter planes. The announcement made no
mention of any pledge by Pakistan not to develop
nuclear weapons.

Senator Charles H. Percy, Republican of Illinois, told
Mr. Buckley that it was the sense of Congress that aid
would have to be terminated if Pakistan detonated any
kind of nuclear device. Mr. Buckley said he had not
stated this explicitly in his talks with the
Pakistanis, but he added, ‘’They are familiar with our
laws.’’

Pakistan has grown in security significance for the
United States since 1979 when Washington lost its
influence in Iran during the Islamic revolution and
the Soviet Union sent 85,000 troops into Afghanistan
to help the Marxist Government there quell a
rebellion.

In another area, Mr. Buckley told the Senate panel
that the United States was ‘’in total absolute
disagreement’’ with a speech yesterday by President
Saddam Hussein of Iraq, who called on ‘’all
peace-loving nations of the world ‘’ to help Arabs
acquire nuclear weapons to balance Israel’s reputed
nuclear ability.

‘’We do not accept any proposal or proposition that
there is any justification for any nation to acquire
this technology,’’ Mr. Buckley stated. Pact With India
May Be Ended

Mr. Buckley said the United States might soon end its
18-year-old nuclear cooperation agreement with India.
He said that officials of the two countries would meet
to discuss the 1963 agreement to supply fuel for
India’s reactor at Tarapur and that termination of the
arrangement was ‘’one item on the agenda.’’

A 1978 law requires the United States to cut off the
shipment of nuclear fuel and technology to countries
that do not support the 1968 nuclear weapons curb,
which India has declined to do. The Carter
Administration convinced the Senate by a two-vote
margin last year to permit one more shipment of 38
tons of enriched uranium for the Tarapur reactor…Senator Glenn and others expressed skepticism about
Pakistan’s assurances when Mr. Buckley said he had
been told that Pakistan needed commercial nuclear
power and its nuclear fuel was not of sufficiently
high quality to make weapons.

Senator Glenn said Pakistan’s plans for a 130-megawatt
nuclear plant could not account for what he called a
clandestine search for nuclear equipment around the
world… The Reagan Administration has asked Congress to change
the law that bars military aid to countries that
refuse to support the nuclear weapons curb or to
accept international safeguards. The Senate Foreign
Affairs Committee recently agreed to exempt Pakistan
from the law, but its House counterpart has postponed
action on the request. “
.S. CITES PAKISTANI PLEDGE NOT TO MAKE ATOM ARMS

By JUDITH MILLER, New York Times 25 June 1981

Besides a few joint exercises far away from their intended targets, I haven’t seen much PSI activity since it was “created” back in 2003. Given that PSI members don’t want to move beyond its voluntary, ad-hoc approach, it will probably just fade into the background in a few years. Heck, it wouldn’t be surprising if PSI’s only lasting impact are the boarding agreements the U.S. signed with the six main flags of convenience.

Is it really worth arguing over the legality of a program that isn’t going anywhere?

***** POLICY FORUM ONLINE *****

-“The Proliferation Security Initiative in Perspective”
by Mark J. Valencia

May 25th, 2006

Read the article
at:
http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0641Valencia.html

Nautilus invites your contributions to this
forum, including any responses to this report.
——————————CONTENTS
I. Introduction
II. Essay by Mark J. Valencia
III. Nautilus invites your responses

I. Introduction

Mark J. Valencia, a Maritime Policy Analyst in
Kaneohe, Hawaii and Nautilus Institute Senior
Associate, writes, “Most of the PSI’s
shortcomings stem from its ad-hoc, extra-UN, US
driven nature. Bringing it into the UN system
would rectify many of these shortcomings by
loosening US control, enhancing its legitimacy,
and engendering near universal support.”

The views expressed in this article are those of
the author and do not necessarily reflect the
official policy or position of the Nautilus
Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus
seeks a diversity of views and opinions on
contentious topics in order to identify common ground.

II. Essay by Mark J. Valencia

-“The Proliferation Security Initiative in Perspective”
by Mark J. Valencia

As the US ratchets up pressure against Iran and
North Korea for their alleged nuclear
proliferation activities, the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI) may become a leading
coercive tool in its arsenal. The PSI is an
activity initiated by the Bush Administration to
prevent weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their
delivery systems and related materials from
reaching or leaving states or sub-state actors
‘of proliferation concern’. Reflecting the Bush
Administration’s disdain for the UN, it was
conceived, originated and implemented outside the UN system.

Indeed, US State Department officials and some
analysts have proclaimed the PSI a successful
example of an ad hoc extra-UN ‘coalition of the
willing’. But their oft-repeated specific claims
of success do not bear up well under close examination. Some examples:

* The PSI has the support of nearly 80 countries.
As Sharon Squassoni of the US Congressional
Research Service points out, it is unclear what
“support” means and how robust it is. The
‘concrete steps’ for contribution to the PSI
listed on the US State Department web site are
rather vague and conditional. First and foremost,
participating states are encouraged to formally
commit to and publicly endorse, if possible, the
Statement of Interdiction Principles. Follow-up
steps are also replete with conditional language
such as ‘indicate willingness’, ‘as appropriate’,
‘might contribute’, and ‘be willing to consider’.

It is nigh impossible to obtain an ‘official’
list of PSI “supporting” countries. Apparently
this is because some “supporting” states have not
publicly endorsed the PSI Principles. Reasons
given include not perceiving PSI as a top
security priority and wanting to avoid possible
reprisals for co-operating with the United
States. This reluctance in itself indicates less
than stalwart support in general as well as in
time of specific need. Indeed given the
“flexibility” of co-operation, many, if not most
of these 80 so-called “supporters” would not
automatically participate in interdictions of
vessels or aircraft at the behest of the United
States. Thus in a pinch, ‘support’ could easily evaporate.

* The PSI has widespread geographic participation.
While there is indeed a growing list of nations
willing to associate themselves with different
aspects of the PSI on a case by case basis,
support in Asia – a major focus of proliferation
concern – is weak. Despite considerable US
pressure to fully and publicly participate, key
countries like China, India, Pakistan, Indonesia
and Malaysia remain outside the ‘coalition of the
willing’. And the co-operation of others that
have nominally joined—-like Japan, South Korea
and Russia—-for various reasons is lukewarm at best.

* The PSI has been successful.
There is insufficient public information and no
objective measure of PSI success or
failure. Thus it is unclear how the much-touted
12 PSI interdictions in three years compares to
efforts prior to the Initiative, or if an
increase in successful interdictions is due to an
increase in proliferation activity. The 12
interdictions could actually be considered a
rather poor result compared to the Stanford
Database estimate of an average 65.5 nuclear
trafficking incidents per year. We do know that
contrary to assertions by some US officials, the
October 2003 interdiction of WMD-related
materials bound for Libya was most likely not due
to the PSI. Rather it was the result of an
unrelated effort to get Libya to abandon its ambition to possess WMD.

* UN Secretary General Kofi Anan supports the PSI.

This is a half-truth. Anan sees the PSI as an
effort to “fill a gap in our defenses” against
nuclear proliferation. But he qualifies this
position with the preference that PSI issues and
actions be addressed and undertaken collectively
through and by the United Nations. He has also
consistently stated in this context that the
Security Council must be ‘the sole source of
legitimacy on the use of force’. To cite Anan’s
position without its qualifications is misleading at best.

* UNSC Resolution 1540 confirms UN support of the PSI.
The resolution that passed was a much watered
down version of the original submitted by the
United States. For example, under a threat of
veto by China, the United States dropped a
provision specifically authorizing the
interdiction of vessels suspected of transporting
WMD. The resolution does not specifically
mention the PSI and does little to strengthen its
effectiveness because it focuses on non-state
actors. Moreover most UN members have failed to
meet the deadline to submit required reports on
their efforts to comply with the resolution,
i.e., strengthening their domestic laws
criminalizing the spread of WMD as well as their export and border controls.

Contrary to these misleading claims of success,
the PSI has been criticized for insufficient
public accountability, stretching if not breaking
the limits of existing international law,
undermining the UN system, impeding legal trade,
being politically divisive, and having limited
effectiveness. In reality it remains a
US-initiated and driven ad-hoc activity conceived
primarily to deter trade in WMD components and
‘related materials’ to and from North Korea—-and now Iran.

Most of the PSI’s shortcomings stem from its
ad-hoc, extra-UN, US driven nature. Bringing it
into the UN system would rectify many of these
shortcomings by loosening US control, enhancing
its legitimacy, and engendering near universal
support. Whether or not the PSI is formally
brought into the UN system, its reach and
effectiveness could be improved by eliminating
double-standards, e.g., when it comes to India,
Pakistan and Israel, and increasing
transparency. Needed is a neutral organization
to assess intelligence, co-ordinate and fund
activities, and make decisions regarding specific
or generic interdictions. Such an organization
could provide more objective and legitimate
definitions of states “of proliferation concern”
and “good cause” (for interdiction). It would
also help avoid erroneous judgments, resolve
disagreements, provide consistency and a concrete
structure and budget, and ensure compliance with
international law—-or be a vehicle for any agreed changes therein.

III. Nautilus Invites Your Responses

The Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network
invites your responses to this essay. Please send
responses to: bscott@nautilus.org. Responses will
be considered for redistribution to the network
only if they include the author’s name, affiliation, and explicit consent.

_______________________________________________
napsnet mailing list
napsnet@nautilus.org
http://www.nautilus.org/mailman/listinfo/napsnet

If you are so concerned with international law, why are you attempting to lump India and Israel (why not Pakistan?) in the same category as Iran? I’m sure you are somewhere trying to make a point about proliferation…

I expect to see some meth-addled North Korean “trawler” captain, caught in his t-shirt, mumbling “No, man, that’s not my high-precision rotor hub. I don’t know how that got there.”

Bad boys, bad boys….