He’d just made a monumental blunder leading to his military getting hammered, and his own image to become a whole lot less scary. He was in real danger of being shot by his own military.

If he’d meekly accepted whatever his enemies cared to impose, he would have been a dead man. He had to appear strong for his own domestic audience.

Here’s a relevant quote from JFCOM’s IPP report:

“Saddam walked a tight rope with WMD because as he often reminded his close advisors, they lived in a very dangerous global neighborhood where even the perception of weakness drew wolves. For him, there were real dividends to be gained by letting his enemies believe he possessed WMD, whether it was true or not.”

“According to Chemical Ali, Saddam was asked about having WMD during a meeting with members of the Revolutionary Command Council. He replied that Iraq did not have WMD, but flatly rejected a suggestion that the regime remove all doubts to the contrary. Saddam went on explain that if Iraq made such a declaration, it would not only show Israel that Iraq did not have WMD but might actually encourage the Israelis to attack.”

In short, Saddam’s paranoia was probably the principle reason for non-cooperation.

As for the rest of it, it seems like the old problem of being suspected of breaking one rule because you’re actually breaking another and don’t want to be open about it. Unfortunately in so many of situations like this, the rule which is actually being broken seems to insignificant, in the end, in comparison of the one which is alleged to be broken.

And these concerns proved to be quite valid too!